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This thesis deals primarily with criminal responsibilityj although 
some of D.y arguments also apply bo responsibility for non-criminal acts^
It ca.n roughly be divided into three parts : (1) a defense of the practice
of holding people rosponsiblo for their actions based upon the fact that 
people are morally responsible for their actions ; (2) a defense of the
practice of holding people responsible for their acts based upon a series 
of arguments in which I try to show tliat a society which, retains the practice 
of holding people responsible for their actions is better than one vHiich 
replaces this practice with something else ; and (3) a defense of the 
doctrine of mens rea against strict liability and objective liability,
fn (l) I argue for a version of libertarianism and then I argue that 
moral responsibHity is a sufficient reason for holding people responsible 
for their actions. This involves a discussion of punishment,
In (2) I first discuss tiie arguments of three people who believe that 
we should do away with the practice of holding people responsible for their 
actions and replace it with treatment designed to modify people's 
(especially cxujnirLals ' ) behaviour^ I argue that to abandon the practice 
of holding people responsible for their actions would be extremely unwise 
for a variety of reasons, Among these reasons are considerations of 
Justiceÿ human-rights, dignity, humane treatment of criminals, and the 
control of crime,
In (3) I carefully compare a legal system which retains the doctrine 
of mens rea with legal systems which have adopted either strict or objective 
liability, I argue that considerations of Justice and huma,n rights make 
it imperative that we retain the doctrine of mens rea.
la this thesis I will discuss tv/o related questions, First, ought we 
to hold people responsible for their mnsdoeds? Üocond, if the anawer to the 
firf£ft quest"'on is yes, under what clrcujristancos oux-iit people to bo excused 
from responsihilit.y for their misdeeds? My arguments mosbly concern respon­
sibility for criminal acts, but I also discuss responsibility for non- 
criminal misdeeds and responsibility for praiseworthy actso
I begin with a discussion of Aristotle's ansvi/or to both questions and 
I a.rgue that Aristotle's answer to the first question is not satisfactory,
I then proceed to give two independent answers to the first question, I 
argue that we ought to hold people responsible for their misdeeds because 
they are morally responsible for them, That is, people make a free choice 
before they perform misdeeds and therefore must accept moral responsibility 
for their misdeeds, .1 then argue tha/b people ought to be held responsible 
for their actions because a society which abandons the practice of holding 
people responsible for their actions and replaces this practice with something 
else Y/ill be very much worse off for the change, I conclude this thesis by 
defending a doctrine of excusing conditions which is very similar to 
Aristotle’s,
My a.rguinents employ a wide range of moral concepts such as justice, 
utility, freedom, human rights, dignity, etc, I make no o,ttompt to show 
that several of these concepts can 'be reduced to a single, irsore fundamental 
concept. That is, I do not try to show that utility or justice is somehow 
a more important or fundamental concept than the others. Instead, my main 
method of argument is to show what ga,ins and losses would result from taking 
a particular course of action, such as abandoning the practice of holding 
people responsible for their actions, and then comparing these gains and 
losses with those which would result from an alternative course of action.
This method of argument has the disadvantage of requiring that we make 
judgments by "weighing" gains expressed in terms of one moral concept
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against losses expressed in terms of another moral concept, and this c'j.oarly 
can present problems, For example, If courso of action A would aid. us in 
controlling' crime but v;ould take away sonic .human i'.ig;hts and alternative 
course B would not infringe human rights but also might not be as effective 
in controlling crime, then the choico between the two courses of action is 
clearly a difficult one, Wc are .faced with a decision between two thingc 
we value very highly, and there seems to be no way to quantify the decision 
or to make it more clear-cut. That iss there seems to be no satisfactory 
way to give positive numerical scores for a,11 the gains and negative 
numerical scores for all the losses because the concepts are so very 
different. For example, even if we knew precisely what effect courses A 
and B would have on the crime rate, we would still be faced with tho 
necessarily imprecise choice between crime control and himian rights.
The need to make decisions of this type would seem to be a good reason 
to try to reduce several moral concepts to one primary concept, but I have 
not chosen this course of action for several reasons. First of all, I simply 
have no idea how this could be done, Î just do not see how such diverse 
moral considerations as utility, human rights, freedom, and justice can be 
covered under one heading. Second, I believe that any such attempt to 
reduce all moral concepts to one primary concept vmuld simply mask moro.l 
problems rather t.han solve them. For example, there is a long tradition of 
people trying to show that if we maximize utility we will by some unknown 
process never run foul of other moral considerations. However, far from 
solving problems, this position seems to create them because people who 
sha/re this view seem to be constantly engaged in explaining away apparent 
conflicts between the maxirmization of utility and other moral considérationsp 
most commonly, justice. In view of this, it seems far more sensible to 
admit that there are a variety of moral considerations which may conflict 
with each other.
Finally, it must be remembered that moral judgments involving a variety
of moral consi.deratlons need not always be terribly d.ifficultc- This is 
because one course of action may be favoured by a majority of moral con­
siderations. For example, .if tl}0 only Leriefj.t of course A was that it 
would help to control crime and if it had many disarivantagco such as loss 
of human rights, loss of freedom, and loss of human dignity, and course 33 
vmuld maintain rights, freedom and dignity, then tlie decision between the 
two courses of action becomes less difficult. Such a decis.i on is still 
far from cloar-cut because some people may be willing to give up a, great 
deal in order to control crime, while other people may not bo v/filing to 
do 80, However, such differences between, people are clearly unavoidable ; 
also, a great deal is accomplished by making the benefits and disadvantages 
of altexmtive courses of action apparent because once we have done so, we 
are in a position to make a rational decision, as to which course of action 
to take. Thus, all in o.ll, I believe that it is best to accept that i.ioral 
philosophy is a complex subject and not to try to make decisions appear more 
simple than they .are.
ARis'raTiE’s ARGn ua G
In the first five chapters of Book III in the Hioonachean Ethics, 
Aristotle discusses the two central questions of this thesis. However, 
he deals with them in reverse order« In his first set of arguments vdiich 
are found in Chapter One, he assumes that people ought to he held responsible 
for their actions and he investigates the circumstances under which people 
ought to be excused from responsibility^ for their actions. In a second 
set of arguments in Chapters Two through Five, Aristotle defends what he 
assumes in the first set, that people ought to be held responsible for their 
actions o*
10 ^^cuses
According to Aristotle only voluntary acts may be praised or blamed,
80 it is obviously necessary to delineate the voluntary from the involuntary. 
InvoDumtary actions are of two kinds ; (1) Actions done under compulsion,
and (2) actions done by reason of ignorance.
Actions done under compulsion are those in which the moving principle 
is outside the actor and to which the actor contributes nothing.
Aristotle’s example's of this kind of action are being carried off by a wind 
or being bodily carried away against your will«. In cases of this type there 
is no question that the action is involuntary because not only was a force 
external to the actor involved but the actor was’ totally passive during the 
action.
Far more difficult are actions in vdiich external force is involved but 
;ln which the actor also contributes to the action. All actions done 
because of threats are of this type. For example, if I stead, some valuable 
documents because someone has threatened that he will harm my wife if X don’t, 
it is debatable whether or not my action v^ as voluntao^o On one ho,nd it is 
clear that I would not have stolen the documents if my v^ ife had not been 
I owe several of the points in this chapter to Mr. Alexander Broadie •
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threatened, and therefore my action is clearly occasioned by compulsion. 
However, on the other hand it is clear that I contributed something to the 
act» Ï could have refused to steal tho docu.entB and accepted the conse­
quences.
Aristotle tackles this problem by claiming that actions done because 
of throats are involuntary'' when considered abstractly, but in individual 
instances they are voluntary because the course of action taken by the actor 
is determined by his own deliberate choiceo Here Aristotle is in very 
close agreement with the predominant modem view on this subject* It is 
generally accepted today that actions done because of threats ai'e voluntary« 
but tlie threat is considered to be a mitigating circumstance when blame is 
affixed to the action» This is precisely Aristotle’s view* He gives as 
an example a man who does an ignoble act in order to avoid unbearab]i.e torture 
and claims tJmt in such a case the man should be pardoned « However, he does 
claim that some deeds arc so terrible that all people should be willing to 
endure painful death rather than do them* Such a deed is matricide* This 
example isn’t totally satisfactory because while it may be true tliat one 
ought to endure painful death rather than kill one’s mother, it isn’t clear 
whether one ought to allow ruffians to kill one’s father, spouse, or several 
unrelated strangers rather tlian kill one’s mother* iix'lstotle doesn’t 
mention such oases, but it is clear that he was not unaware of them because 
he concludes his discussion of actions done because of threats by saying, 
"what sort of things are to be chosen, and in return for what, it is not 
easy to state; for there are many differences in the particular cases*"
The only other ground on which people can be said to be not responsible 
for their actions, according to Aristotle, is ignorance* But before he 
discusses what sorts of ignorance excuse people from responsibility he makes 
a l)uzzling distinction between actions done by reason of ignorance which are 
involuntary, and actions done by reason of ignorance which are not voluntary* 
The former are those actions done by reason of ignorance which are followed
by repentance and the latter are those actions done by reason of i^piorance which 
are not followed by repentance * Aristotle leaves this point dangling; in fact, 
all he says is that since the two cases are clearly different it is best to have 
different words for them.
One way of making sense out of this distinction is to note that repentance 
after an action done by reason of ignorance is a, sign that had the actor known, 
the true cirowistancoB of his action he would not have performed it. Also lack 
of repentance is a siipi that had the actor known the true circumstances of his 
action he would have performed it anyway. For example consider two cases of a, 
hunting’ mishap: (l) A hunter mistakes his son for a deer and kills hha, (2) a 
hunter mistakes his mortal enemy for a deer and kills him. In the first case the 
hunter would no doubt feel a great deal of repentance and clearly had he known 
that the "deer" was really his son he wouldn’t have performed the actione In the 
second case the hunter would feel no remorse and had he known that the "deer" was 
his enemy he would have shot him anyway. This is an interesting point because 
there clearly is a moral difference between these two types of cases. In the first 
case the action is not typical of the actor’s character while in the second case 
the action is typical of the actor’s character. Later I will argue that this 
interpretation is consistent with Aristotle's other views on actions done by 
reason of ignorance*
Aristotle states that not all ignorance is a ground for excusing people from 
responsibility for their actions. Ignorance of what one ought to do and ought not 
to do and ignorance of what end one ought to pursue do not qualify as excuses.
Only ignorance of the particular circumstances surrounding an action or ignorance 
of the object of an action count as grounds for excusing responsibility for the 
action. Aristotle gives several examples of this kind of ignorance such as 
ignorance of the true identity of your target when shooting, ignorance of the 
true na,ture of your instrument (e.g. taking a real spear from a rack when you only 
intended to take a practice spear),etc. The important point here is not so much what 
items Aristotle includes in his list of particular things about which we can be 
ignorant, but rather that he restricts ignorance as an excusing condition to
ignorance of particulars, that is, ignorance of the pai'tlouiar cix'cu®stances 
and objects of actions. Eis point here seems to be that the other types of 
ignorance which I mentioned are character traits, and no one ought to be excused 
from responsibility for an action simply because he has a bad character, j'his 
point,of course, is very controversial today. It isn't uncommon to hear arguments 
which maintain that either no one has any control over his character and therefore 
no one ought to be held responsible for his actions, or that some people who have 
been "socialized" in a certain way cannot help having bad characters and therefore 
ought not to be held responsible for their actions* Aristotle is explicitly 
■opposed to these two views. He maintains that onlyactions which are "out of 
character" are to be excused; actions which are consistent with a person's cha%%oter 
are not to be excused. This is consistent with what I said earlier about Aristotle’s 
distinction between actions done by reason of ignorance which are followed by 
repentance and those which are not. The former actions are not typical of the 
actor’s character while the latter actions are typical of the actor’s character.
Thus, in vie?/ of Aristotle’s doctrine that a bad character is no excuse for a bad 
action it is quite natural for him to distinguish between these two types of actions.
Next, Aristotle discusses actions doneby reason of anger or appet'te and here 
his insistence that men are responsible f or actions which are inconsistent with 
their cha;racters is even more explicit. He points out that actions done by 
reason of appetite and anger are no less typical of the person who performs them 
than are reasoned actions. Thus, according to Aristotle, it is silly to say that 
a man is not responsible for actions done in anger or due to appetite,because these 
are no less typical of his character than a reasoned action is typical of the 
character of a sober,temperate man.
I think Ax?istotle*s point is well talcen in most cases. A great niuiiber of
actions done in anger are done by people who have irascible cliaraoters,and it
seems silly to say that such people aren’t responsible for their actions,v/hile at
the same time we say that people of different characters who perform actions typical of
their characters are responsible for their actions. However, it must belemembered
that there is a class of actions done in anger which are not typical of the character
of theætor. These are actions done under extreme provocation. How, I may be
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conoiclered unwise to Tiring up this point because ’ extreme provocation’ is a term 
which is no doubt quite abused these days. It has become a common excuse for all 
sorts of actions both in legal and moral contexts. For instance, in 1968 the 
Chicago police tried to excuse their brutality toward the demonstrators at the 
Democratic Convention by arguing that they were extremely provoked. However, 
despite this common abuse of the term there still seem to be cases in which the 
term has an application. Cases in which it is unreasonable to expect even the 
most temperate and self-controlled person to control his anger. For example, 
it seems unreasonable to expect a parent to control his anger when he sees his 
young child being injured by a bully. Even a psxent with saintly self-control 
might lose his temper in such a situation. Thus, v/hile I agree with Aristotle 
tliat angry acts are often in character and therefore ought not to be treated 
any differently than other acts -which are in character, I also think we must 
recognize as a distinct class of actions, actions done in anger due to extreme 
provocation. Such acts clearly are not in character and therefore deserve to be 
treated with acts done by reason of ignorance which a.re not typical of the agent's 
character*
Thus, Aristotle’s doctrine of volimtary and involuntary actions consists of 
two parts. To be voluntary an action must have as its moving principle the actor 
himself and the action must be consistent with theætor’s character or typical of 
the actor. This second part would be the subject of vigorous attack today on the 
g3:ounds that a man hasn’t the power to mould and change his character and therefore 
to say that men ought"to be praised or blained for actions typical of their oharactere 
is absurd,because one can’t be praised or blamed for something that is not in his 
power. Aristotle seems to have been well aware of this argument because he spends 
the next f our chapters arguing that we have our chara,cters to some extent in our 
power,
2♦ Choice
Aristotle begins his argument that our characters are in. our power by discussing 
choice. Choice is voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary since the 
voluntary is a broader concept as can be seen from Aristotle's treatment of the
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voluntary in the first chapter, Aristotle considers several theories of the 
nature of choice* These are that choice is appetite, anger, opinion or wish.
He dismisses all of these as completely wrong exoept wish which he claims is 
similar to choice, hut not quite the same. It isn’t the same because we can wish 
for impossible things,but we can’t choose impossible things, Also Aristotle 
makes the controversial claim that wish relates to ends rather than means and choice 
rela/fces to means rather than ends,-, His reasons for saying this are that choice 
seems to relate to things which are in our power and that ends are often not in 
oux* power. For instance,we can’t choose to be healthy, we can only wish to be 
healthy and choose the means which w ill best promote our' health. The same thing 
goes for happiness, we caiit choose to be happy we can only choose those things 
which will make us happy. These uses have a certain amount of appeal but they 
don’t fit every sort of situa,tion. Suppose,for instance, a man wished to live a 
very fast life full of a great deal of drinking, late partying and generally carrying 
on. buppose,further, that this same man wished to be healtl^y* V/hen this man 
realized that his fast life was ruining his health, he might by great effort give 
up the fast life and start to cultivate those activities which lead to health.
In such a case it seems to make perfectly good sense to say that the man chose 
between two ends both of which he wished. To deny this would seem to be to deny 
a very important moral phenomenon,
Aristotle finallytnlects "that which is decided upon by previous deliberation" 
as the most likely candidate for a definition of choice. However, before he can 
discuss this he must discuss deliberation, a)eliberation he says is always about 
things in our power and we deliberate not about ends,but about means. He gives 
as examples that doctors do not deliberate about whether they shall heal; statesmen 
do not deliberate about whether they will promote law and order ; and ore,tors do 
not delibere/be about whether they will persuade, Deliberation consists of setting 
an end before oneself and then considering the means by which it will best be 
achieved. If there are several such means,we select that which is simplest and most 
economical, or most suitable in some other sense. Also once the means has been 
decided upon, deliberation consists of gomg tiirough the individual steps of the
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means until we come to the "first cause" which must he performed before anything 
else. If this first cause is in our power we will proceed and if not we must 
look for another means to the end or abandon the end altogether.
A good example of this process occurred in Toronto this last summer, A 
doctor had a patient who required extremely complicated heart surgery. In fact 
the required surgery was so complicated and unusual that no "heart team" in 
Ca:oada had ever performed it. Thus, the end was securing health for the pa,tient 
and there were two means to this end; (l) the doctor could simply refer her to 
a Oarmidian "heart team" and hope for the best or (2) he could try to arrange for 
her to be sent to a Texas clinic which had pioneered this type of surgery* The 
doctor tentatively chose the latter means as best for the patient but then had 
to consider the individual steps involved. The first efcep became clear: the ' 
doctor had to convince the Ontario Health Insurance. Board that it ought to provide 
money for an operation which w oui cl be performed in the United States, After 
considerable effort the doctor succeeded and the operation took place.
This example conforms well to Aristotle’s doctrine of choice, because it is 
no doubt true that the doctor in this example considered it axiomatic that he 
ought to try his very best to secure the health of the patient. Thus, in this 
case it is true that the doctor didn't deliberate about the end,but only about 
the means* But in this example the patient was an otherv;ise healthy 28 year old 
woman. What if the patient had been much older with health problems other than 
the heart condition ? À few years ago medical opim.on would have been una,nimqus 
that the operation should go ahead anyway. At that time there seemed to be an 
axiomatic belief among doctors that everything must be done to preserve life even 
if there was m  hope tha.t the patient would return to healthy active life. Today 
this axiomatic belief is being challenged by doctors as well as by people without 
medical training. Therefore,today it isn’t at all uncommon to hear of a doctor faced 
with the very difficult decision of whether to prescribe a particular course of 
treatment in order to preserve the life of a terminally ill patient a little longer 
or whether to forbear the treatment and allow the patient to die. The doctor in 
such a situation must choose between quite distinct ends ; the preservation of
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life or the preservation of useful active life (this example is not intended 
to in any way minimize the moral problems which surround euthanasia.)* How, clearly 
one could deliberate about which of these ends ought to be pursued. Thus, it is 
odd that Aristotle restricts deliberation, and choice to means*
Another obstacle to understanding Aristotle’s doctrine of choice is that 
Aristotle uses ’end’ ambiguously* Up to chapter four he uses ’end' in the sense 
of particular end,that is, a determinate object of pursuit such as health,the 
winning over of a mob to a certain point of view,establishment of law and order, 
etc. However in chapter four Aristotle uses ’end’ in the sense of the uj.timate 
end for which men wish* Aristotle introduces his dicussion of this type of end 
by saying "That wish is for the end has already been stated; some think it is for 
the good,others for the apparent good". Aristotle then proceeds to find faults 
with both of these positions* The problem, with maintaining that people always 
wish the good is that one is then forced to maintain that those people who seem 
to wish for something other than the good are not,in fact, wishing for these things 
at all, and such a doctrine of false wishes is at best difficult to defend.
On the other hand the problem with maintaining that the object of wish is the 
apparent good is that it follows from this that there is no natural object of 
wish. Aristotle achieves a tenuous compromise between these two alternatives by 
saying that absolutely and in truth the good is the object of wish,but for each 
person it is the apparent good* Clearly, the end in the sense of the good or the 
appa.rent good which I will call the ultimate end, is quite a bit different than 
the ends such as healthjpux’suation and law and order which I will call particular 
ends. In fact, it seems reasonable to say that; people wish the good or the 
s.pparent good as an ultimate end,but they can choose among several particular 
ends. Also it could be argued that one ground for choosing a particular and is 
whether or not it is consistent with my ultimate end. For example, if I were an 
orator who wished happiness in the sense of eudaimonia, I might very well deliberate 
about whether or not I will persuade a crowd of people, because the particu].ar 
end of persuading the crowd may be inconsistent with my ultimate end which is the 
good.
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3* Puesponsibility for Virtue and Vice.
In chapter five Aristotle gives an argument designed to show that it is 
within our power to he virtuous or vicious. He ar.gncs that v;e wish for the end 
and deliberate and choose the means to the end,thus, actions concerning means 
must be according to choice and voluntary. But sjjnce the exercise of virtue 
is concerned with means it follows that virtue and vice are according to choice 
and voluntary.
I don’t believe that this argument is adequate, Aristotle’s doctrine is 
that the means are dictated to some extent by the end. That is,he believed 
that we wish for the end and then investigate possible means to the end, and 
tliat we finally choose the most suitable means from the set of means which are 
within our power. Thus, it would seem that this argument rests on the understood 
premise that to every end there are both virtuous and vicious means. If this 
were not the case then it would follow that in some cases the end wished for 
might be such that no virtuous means could possibly bring it about, and in 
such a case Aristotle couldn't say that virtue was in the actor's power,
I will now argue that Aristotle cannot supply this understood premise. I 
will argue this point with respect to both particular and ultimate ends. In the 
case of the particular ends it is clear that there are some ends which cannot 
be achieved by both virtuous and vicious means. For instance, consider the 
following two particular ends. Suppose A wishes to be a statesman. There are 
at least two means to this end ; (l) A could strive to make himself morally and 
physically worthy of dn appointment to a high government post, or (2) A could 
bribe officials in the hope of achieving a high government post. Here there is 
a clear choice between virtuous and vicious means to a particular end. Bu.t wiiat 
if the particular end is becoming the dictator of a popularly governed state.
In such a case there are simply no virtuous means by which the end can be a.chieved. 
To achieve such an end one would sjjnply have to lie,cheat,bribe, falsely accuse, 
murder, etc, and these are all obviously vicious things to do.
The same holds true if we consider ultimate ends such as the good or the
apparent good. How,clearly anyone who wished eudaimonia would only choose
virtuous means to this end,but suppose A wished for an apparent good. To take
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an explicit example,suppose A wished a life of pleasure and suppose further that 
A was so debauched that only the most extravagant pleasures satisfied him. In 
this case it is clear that in order to attain the life of pleasure A will require 
a substantia,! income * It is true,of course, tliat there are both virtuous and 
vicious means of obtaining a substantial income but invariably the virtuous 
means allow very little time for leading a life of extravagant pleasure * Thus, 
unless A is blessed with an independent income he must resort to vicious means 
to 0,0 hie VO his particular end of a substantial income.
Thusg Aristotle's doctrine of choice is not sufficient to show that it is 
'in OUT' power to be virtuous or vicious, because it simply is a fact tha,t some 
ends can only be achieved by vicious means, Ydiat Aristotle must do then is 
show that people have some power over the ends for which they wish, Aristotle 
seems to have been aware of this necessity because in the second half of chapter 
five he tries to shov? that people do have some power over the appearance of the 
ultiimte good, Here he says that it might be objected that all men desire the 
apparent good, but have no control over the appearance,to this he replies that 
if each man is somehow responsible for his state of mind then he will be somehow 
responsible for the appearance of the end, but if not no one will be responsible 
for his own evil doing. Unfortunately, rather than tackle this problem by showing 
that men can control the appearance of the ^ood, Aristotle tackles it by way of a 
reductiOo And,of course, the problem with a reductio is that the absurd 
conclusion upon which it rests may turn out to be not so absurd after all. This 
is the fate of Aristotle’s reductio in this age of modern social science,
Aristotle argued that to say that men have no control over the appearance of the 
good implies that both virtue and vice are involuntai\y, and he found this conclusion 
to be clearly a,bsurd. Virtue,he held, was clearly voluntary,therefore any argument 
that vice is involuntary which entails that virtue is involuntary must be unsound. 
This,of course, just doesn’t stand up today. Those who argue that vice is 
involuntary are perfectly willing to accept as a consequence that virtue is 
involuntary.
Having proved to his satisfaction that vice and virtue are voluntary,Aristotle
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claims that this could be true for two reasons; (l) men have some control 
over how the end appears to them or (2) men have no control over how the end 
appears to them but they choose the means and therefore virtue and vice are 
voluntary0 Aristotle can’t maintain the second alternative for reasons I have 
given earlier in this paper so it must be lamented that he failed to defend 




In the preceding chapter I argued that Aristotle’s reasons for believing
that men are generally responsible for their actions were inadequate. Eut,
having said this, I cannot simply drop the subject; this is a problem vjhioh
simply fiust be faced before any rational system of excuses can be constructed.
The reason for this is that a. system of excuses is completely otiose if no one 
is responsible for their actions*
In order to attack this problem, I nmst make a distinction between some>- 
one’s being responsible for his actions in a moral sense and the practice of 
holding someone responsible for his actions « For someone to be morally responsible 
for an action, he must deserve reward,praise, blame or punishment for it 
(providing,of course, the action is not trivial or morally indifferent)« The 
practice of holding someone responsible for hisætions is the actual rewarding, 
praising, blaming or punishing of people who may or may not deserve what they goto 
In order for someone to be morally responsible foz' an action, it is generally
assumed that he must satisfy the following three conditions : (l) He must have
performed the action in question. (2) He must not have an excuse for performing
it, such as mistalceo (3) He must have been d>le to have acted otherwise than he
in fact did* That is, he mst have what is commonly called free will* It is also 
generally assumed that in order to be justified in holding someone responsible 
for an action he must in fact be morally responsible for the action* This consumption 
raises no problems when we consider people who are not morally responsible for 
ansDtion because they fail to meet the first two conditioius,but serious problems 
arise when we oome topeople who are not morally responsible fortheir actions 
because they fail to meet the third condition* For example, it is obviously 
wrong to hold a man responsible for an action which he did not perform. If we
were to do so,wo would be punishing and blaming the innocent o;c rewarding and 
praioing the undeserving, and teth practices are olear].y unacceptable* Also, 
to hold comeoneiBsponsiblo for an action performed due to ignorance or by mictaV.:e
io unacceptable because , in the case of bad actions, the actor possesses none
of the bad character!sties by virtue of which he deserves blaaie or punishment
and, in the case of good actions, he possesses none of the good characteristics 
by virtue of which he deserves praise or reward* For instance, if a pex'son
accidentally injures someone else, he is not wicked as is a person who intentionally
injures someone else and,therefore, he does not deserve to be blamed or punished. 
for his action»*
However, things are very different when we corne to people who are not 
morally responsible for their actions because,while they meet the first two 
conditions, they fail to meet the third condition* The problem is that such 
people can intentionally perform very good or very wicked actions and yet not 
be morally responsible for them* This presents us with the following dilenuna*
Cn the one hand,vie are presumably not justified in holding such people responsible 
for their actions because they are not morally responsible for them* But on the 
other hand, it seems very important that we praise or revsard such people if ' 
their actions are good and blame and punish them if their actions are bad*
Holding people responsible for sot ions which they perform intentionsflly is a
central feature of our society, auid if we abandon it, things would certainly
change - qu.ite possibly for the worst* For example, if we fail to praise or
reward good actions, ve can hs/rdly be surprised if the number of good actions
decreases, and if we fail to punish or blame ba.d actions, vjeiust expect the
number of bad actions to increase» This dilemma becomes especially disturbing when
we are faced with the prospect that no one in fact ever meets the third condition*
It was this prospect which troubled Aristotle, and it still troubles people today
-Hlowever, if his action was due to carelessness, he may deserve blame and 
possibly punishment because of his carelessness»
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beoaiiGe of the fa/irly widely held, 'belief that the thesis of determinism is 
true emd,therefore, that s3.1 people lack free will «
There are three possible ways of resolving this dilemma» First, we coiiXd.
simply abandon praise, reward, blame and punishment in favour of some alternative 
such as manipulation or treatment» The second solution is the one Aristotle 
chose vdiich is to srgue that people actually possess free will and therefor meet 
the third condition* The third possible solution is to argue that we are 
justified in holding people responsible for%eir actions if they meet the first 
two conditions but fail to meet the third»
For a variety of reasons which I will discuss in some detail later, X find 
the first solution totally unacceptable* However, I believe that both the 
second and third solutions are worth pursuing and in the next several chapters 
I will pursue both of them» In this and the next chapter, I will argue that some 
people meet the third condition and that those who do not have the potential. 
of becoming people who do meet it» I will then spend several chapters arguing 
that even if the thesis of determinism is true and no one meets the third 
condition, we still ought to hold people responsible forUieir actions (providing, 
of course, tha;b they meet the first two conditions)® by arguments for this will
be fairly varied, but my central point will be that the practice of holding 
people responsible for their actions is vitally important both for individuals 
and for society and that the alternatives to holding people responsible for 
their actions are morally undesirable»
Thus, I will be presenting two separate and fairly long arguments for the 
principle that we ought to hold people responsible for their actions: if they 
meet the first two conditions* Stating this principle in this way is quite 
awla-jard and,therefore, I will refer to it from now on as the ’principle of 
responsibility* .
Finally, it might legitimately be asked why I am offering two independent 
defenses of the principle of responsibility» The answer to this question is that
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I want to make in,y case for the principle as strong as possible arid 1 also want
the case to he "metaphysioally satisfying"» That is, I would prefer to baoe
my case for the principle on actual moral responsibility because I find a world 
in which people are morally responsible for their ætions more pleasing in a 
metaphysical sense than a world in which they are not* However, I am fully 
aware that my caso for moral responsibility will be extremely controversial, 
so in order to make the case for the principle of responsibility as strong as 
possible, I will also argue that we are justified in retaining the principle 
of res pons ibilit y even if the thesis of determinism is true*
(l)o Moral Responsibility
To be morally responsible for an action, the actor must have been able to 
have performed an alternative action to the one he actually performed* Thus 
it makes no sense to blame a man for failing to lift 2000 pounds or for sneezing 
and thereby giving away your position to the enemy» In either caso, the man
could lot have done otherwise^ As we saw in the last chapter, even in Aristotle’s 
time, people used this point to argue that no one is morally responsible for any 
of his actions because it is never the case that an actor could have performed 
an alternative action to the one he actually performed* This same argument, in 
a considerably more sophisticated form, is put forward today by people who accept 
a position which is generally called determinisnu
The determinists’ position is that for every event there are conditions 
which are causally sufficient for the occurrence of that event» They further 
maintain that human actions are events, and therefore,that there must be sufficient 
causal conditions for the performance of every human setion* The conclusion 
which is drawn from this is that in any given action situation, an actor can 
perform only one action. It is argued that this is true no matter how many 
alternatives appear to be open to the actor» The particulars of the action 
situation and the pliysical and mental medce-’up of the actor are sufficient conditions
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vjlilch maVvG one a.nd only one action casnall.y nececs&ry*
The doctrine of dotermlniem ie in a very interesting position because the 
denial of determinismj or indeterminism^ is an even more disturbing doctrine®
It seems to entail that human actions are uncaused and therefore due to chance 
and henceacapriciousj and clearly no one can he held morally responsible for an actior 
due to chance®- In fact ; it could be argued that it is incorrect to call any 
event due to chance an actioue
This leaves two possible X'jays of saving moral responsibility: the first 
is to deny that in order to be morally responsible an actor imist have been able 
to perform an alternative action to the one he actually performed®. In other 
wordsÿ the strategy here is to argue that moral responsibility is compatible
with determinism^ and as a result of this ^ philosophers viho take this line
eore called "reoonoiliationists’* or "soft determinists"® 'Hie second way is to
argue that human actions are not events which are made necessary by causally 
sufficient conditions, but are actions which are performed by an agent*
Philosophers who take this line are called "libertarians" or "agency theorists"*
There have been a large number of soft determinist theories, o I can 
only discuss the bare bones of the position here. They claim that in order for 
an actor to be morally responsible for an action, it is not necessary for the 
action to be uncaused but for it to exhibit tho actor^s character ■>- that is,his 
desires, moral outlook, degree of rationality,etc®, These actions are opposed 
to actions which do not exhibit the actor* s character, such as those done under 
duress, when suffering from a high fever, done under hypnosis,etc * The point 
is that moral responsibility for an action does not depend on the action*s 
being uncaused , but on the action’s being caused in a certain way - that is, 
by the agent’s character*
This theory did not satisfy everyone because it completely ignores the 
fact that in order to be rorally responsible for an act an actor must have been
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able to perform an alternative action to tho one ho actually did pcrfornu
The soft deterndnists replied to this objection by pointing out that according 
to their theory an actor could have performed ,analternative action to the one 
he actually did perform had he chosen to do so* This,they maintainedywan 
sufficient to show that an actor is morally responsible for his actions even 
though they admitted that according; to their theory (which,of course, is deter­
ministic) the aotor could not have ohoson to perform an alternative action to 
the one he actually did perform* The argument generally used to support this 
point is based on an analysis of the meaning of the phrase, "Ke could have 
performed an alternative action to the one he actually did perform*" The soft 
determinists maintain that x-iiat x;e actually moan when we say this is that he 
could have performed an alternative action to the one he actually did perform 
had he chosen to do so*
This point is attacked in great detail by the late Professor G*A* Campbell 
in his article, "Is ’Free will’ a pseudo-problem ? This is a long article 
which considers several versions of soft determinism and it would le silly to 
repeat all of Professor Campbell’s arguments, but I will repeat one which is 
directe’, against the particular version of soft detei’minism that I am dealing 
with here® In this argument, Professor Campbell simply points out that in virtually 
all cases in which an ©tor’s moral responsibility is in question it is obviously 
true that the actor could have performed an alternative action had he chosen to 
do soo However, this trivial truth has no bearing upon the moral responsibility 
of the actor because it still makes sense to enk whether the actor could have 
performed an alternative action* It would seem,therefore, that the soft deterininists 
are wrong when they say that the real meaning of "he could have performed an 
alternative action" is that he could have performed an alternative action had 
he chosen to do so* However, this trivial truth 1ms no bearing upon the moral
* C*A, Campbell, "Is 'Free bill* a Pseudc-lroblem Xind^L%(l95l), pp. 6G6 - TCo.
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responsibility of the actor because it still makes sense to ask whether the 
actor could have performed an alternative action* It would seem,therefore, 
that the soft determinists are wrong when they say that the real meaning of 
"he could have performed an alternative act ion" is that he could have performed 
an alternative action had he chosen to do so*
It would appear then that only a version of the theory of agency will be 
adequate to save moral responsibility, and this is just what Professor Campbell 
goes on to defend* Ke argues that most actions are merely the product of the 
individual’s character and for these actions sufficient causal conditions exist®
However, he argues that in oases which involve moral conflict, the "self" which
is distinct from the character and is a causal agent can rise to duty or allow
the character to do whab it is most inclined to do* In such oases, he argues, 
it makes sense to say that the actor could have performed an alternative action 
and therefore, that people are morally responsible for their acts *
A more precise statement of agency theory can be found in "Determinism 
and the Theory of Agency" by Richard Taylor*# Taylor points out that two 
conditions must be met before we can say that people are in general morally 
responsible,. These are: "(a) there is a reason for everything that happens, 
but (b) some such happenings - via* some human acts are contingente" If these 
two conditions arc met,then clearly people are in general morally responsible 
because (a) assures that human actions are not capricious and (b) assures that, 
in some cases, an actor could have performed an alternative action*
This,then, is a concise statement of the theory of ag;ency« Unlike soft 
determinism, the theory of agency, if true, would clearly render people morally 
responsible for their actions* However, there are three reasons for not accepting 
the theory of agency* The first is due to a misunderstanding, so I will dispense
* Richard Taylor, "Determinism and the Theory of Agency", in Determinism and Freedom, 
Sidney Egok (ed, ), New fork University Press, Hew York, I958.
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with it right here* It is that if there are no sufficient conditions for some 
human actions, then these actions are inexplicable* This simply isn’t true, 
unless someone means by ’explicable’ only able to be explained in terms of 
causally sufficient conditions* How clearly this is one perfectly proper 
cense of ’explicable’, because once we have discovered causally sufficient 
conditions for a particular event then we have explained it in the scientific
sense of explanation* However, this is clearly not the only sense of explicable*
A human action can also be explained in terms of the actor*s reasons for
performing it, and indeed, this is certainly the most common type of eccplanation 
with regard to human sot ions, Thus, if the theory of agency is true and there 
are no causally sufficient oonditions for human actions,it does not follow
that human actions are inexplicablee It only follows that human actions are 
not inexplicable in terms of causally sufficient conditions* bo long as there 
are reasons for such actions, they would still be explicable in terms of the 
reasons the actor had to perform them, anid this is certainly a respectable type 
of explanation
The second and third reasons for not accepting the theory of agency are 
more substantial « The second is that the theory of agency as described by 
Professor Campbell is a very strange theory* The theory states that whenever 
there is a moral decision to be made, the self can somehow opt out of the 
ordinary causal world and rise to duty* Professor Campbell gives us no reason 
why the self should'behave this way only when there a,re moral decisions to be made, 
and a determinist could not be blamed if he thought this a bit odd* The third 
reason is that the determinist can point to a large number of people who cannot 
in any sense be described as agents, but who are also in no sense mentally 
disordered or insane. Together, the second and third reasons seem to make a
strong casCo A determinist is quite justified in asking whether it makes sense
to adhere to a strange theory when it is clear that some people are not agents.
# I owe this argument to Richard Taylor's book, Action and Ihiruose, Prentice- 
Hall, Inoo, New Jersey, 1966, pp. 140,141o
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Thcae points are well -taken - as Ion;;: as the agency theorist ça.nnot
provide a more substantial account of what the self or the agent is thon his 
case will remain very weak*
I will now argue that agency is the ability to deliberate* In other words,
I will argue that the actions which proceed from deliberations satisfy Taylor’s
two conditions for moral responsibility* That is, they are performed for a
reason and therefore,they arc not capricious* Also, they are contingent and
therefore, the actor could have performed, an alternative action* Also,since
I will argue that not all people have the ability to deliberate in the way
required for agency, it will follow that it is not anomalous that some people
are agents while others are not *
I'ly arguments centre around three young executives who each comes upon
su opportunity to steal a. substantial amount of money from his employer* The 
executives are alike in that they each have a similar opportunity to steal the money 
and in that all three do, in fact, steal the money « However, their charsjcters 
are radically different. I will argue that the first executive is not an agent 
and,therefore,, that he is not morally responsible,while the second and third 
are agents cind a.re morally responsibleo
The situation in which each young executive finds himself is this ; while 
performing his daily duties, he comes across a. computer error which lists the 
total price of new heating equipment for one of firm’s factories as £400,000 
when the actual oost" of the equipment is only £31!) ,000* The young executive 
is in charge of paying for the equipment and he realises immediately that if 
he draws £400,000 from company fund©, pays the heating supplier £315*000 and 
keeps £85,000 for himself, the company’s computerised accounting' sytrfcem will 
not show any discrepancy. In fact, the young executive realises that the theft 
will only be discovered if an auditor happens to compare the amount of the 
heating supplier's bid with the amount the computer shows has been paid out «
Now, since we are talking about whether the executives are agents and
therefore morally responsible, it is best to keep our examples free of any
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excusing conditions which might render our executives not morally responsible 
on other grounds. Thus, I will leave out any hint of coercion such as a usurious 
debt to pay off, or a greedy husband or wife who brings pressure to bear upon 
the young executive* In short, I am assuming that the young executive alone 
knows of the opportunity and that no pressing conimitmont of any kind makes 
stealing the money in any sense impex’ative. Now let us consider how the three 
very different young executives react to this situation®
The first executive 
The first executive has a. very strong desire to live well* lie wants a 
truly glamorous and exciting existence, and such an existence ,of course^ 
requires money® He also has boundless self-confidence as a result of an
extremely successful time at school* Ke did well academically and was superb
at sports* He had never failed at anything in his life and,for this reason, 
he does not even consider the possibility of getting caught if he steals the 
money* Finally, the first executive has virtually no "moral sense" duo to 
to the fact that his father was thoroughly unscrupulous and proud of it® For
example,his father cheated on his income tax and proclaimed to his young 
son that anyone who did not cheat on his income teu: was a fool*
In view of the above description of the first executive, it is not 
surprising that as soon as he discovered the opportunity to steal the money, 
he went ahead and stole it*
The second executive 
The second executive is similar to the first one in that he desires to 
live a very comfortable life, but beyond this there is no similarity* The 
second executive is a very prudent man* His pa.rents always taught him to
weigh possible gains against possible losses* He also has had a fsdrly strict
moral education; unlike the first executive, he is well aware that stealing
the money would be wrong* Due to his cautious nature, he makes no hasty 
decisions* He ponders the possibility of gaining £85,000 against the possibility
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of getting caaght and losing not only the money but his proaent situation 
and his freedom as well. However, he decides that the price is so grand 
that it is worth the risk* Then he ponders whether the possibility of gaining 
the money is worth doing something which is very wrong® After a great deal 
of deliberation, he finally decides that the possibility of being rich is 
worth running the grave risk of being oauglrb and doing something v;hioh is 
very wrong® Upon deciding this, he steals the money*
The third ezecutiye 
The third executive differs from the second in that he has spent a great 
deal of time deciding what type of life he ought to live® The first and 
second executives merely desire a comfortable life; they have never given 
any thought to any other type of life* The third executive has chosen to 
live a comfortable life after considering several others, such as a life 
service "to others* He has also considered how central, the pursuit of a
comfortable life ought to be* That is, he also considered just how far he 
ought to go in order to procure a comfortable life* For example,ought he 
to try to secure a comforto,ble life only within the bounds of the existing 
legal system ? Or ought he to adopt restraints upon his search for a comfortable 
life that are more or less strict than those prescribed by the present legal 
system ? 1 will discuss his reasoning in more detail later; for the present
just let me say that he rejected part of the restrictions of the present 
lega.1 system and then considered the gain as opposed to the risk« Re judged 
that the pri%e was worth the risk and stole the money*
Now, as I said before, I am conceding to the determinist that the first 
executive could not have performed an alternative action and that he is, 
therefore, not morally responsible for his action* This, of course,, is generally 
considered to be a fatal move* It is often assumed that if you admit that 
some people could not have performed an alternative action, you must also 
admit that all people in all action situations could not have performed
alternative actions* It is this assumption which has forced libertarians
into the very difficult to defend position that people such as the first
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executive could have peri'oruied alternative actions* In such a case, tho 
sufficient conditions simply stare one in the face: the combination of the 
first executive’s desire for the rood life, lack of prudence, and lack of 
moTcal sense malee it ridiculous to argue that he could have risen to duty 
and. not stolen, the money or that he could have considered the consequences 
andmt stolen the money. The example explicitly excludes these possibilities 
because he has no sense of duty nor any sense of prudence*
It is far better to concede such cases to the determinists cuid then argue 
that people such as the second and third executive could have performed 
alternative actions,and this is just what I will do. However, I must first 
dispose of two arguments which try to show that from tho fact that the first 
executive could not have performed an alternative action, it follows that the 
second and third executives could not have performed alternative actions*
These arguments are attempts to prove that there must be sufficient conditions 
for all human actions even though it is impossible to list the sufficient 
conditions for complex actions such as the actions of the second and third 
executives.
The first argument merely insists tha;t the reason that it is impossible 
to list sufficient conditions for the seoondand third executives’ actions is 
not that no sufficient conditions exist, but rather that the second and third 
executives have more complex characters than the first executive. 3?he sufficient 
conditions are therefore too complex to list,but they must exist. The ba©is 
for this argument seems to be a feeling that with regard to moral responsibility 
all men must be essentially alike,and therefore,if the first executive could 
not have performed an alternative action,we must admit that the same goes for 
the other two executives* This argument is unacceptable because to assume 
from the beginning that either all men must be morally responsible or not 
morally responsible is to rule out of court one perfectly sensible solution
to the morally responsible versus determinism debate - that is, that some people
may be morally responsible while others are determined.
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The second argument tries to show that there must he sufficient conditions 
for the actions of the second and third executives by drawing an analogy 
hctwoen the human brain and electronic computers® A rough outline of the 
analogy goes as follows :
1« The brain, like a computer, is made up of a huge number of switching 
deviceso The materials are different and the complexity of the connections 
is far greater in the brain than even in the best computers,but basically 
the brain is a very complex computer.
2* The brain controls several mechanical mechanisms, i«e, the muscle and the 
bone combinations throughout the body* Present-day computers can control 
very sophisticated high speed printing devices,and there is every reason 
to believe that some day an advanced computer will be able to operate fui 
artificial arm and hand*
3* It is with its electronic machinery that a computer computes, and in a, 
similar way, it is with the brain that people think* This, of course, is
very controversial. It is argued,for example, that it is a category mistake 
to equate the mind with the brain,but these a-rgurnents need not deter the 
determinist. All he has to do is to show that human thought is in some 
sense dependent upon the brain, and this is not difficult to do because the 
evidence for dependence is amazing: if you damage the brain,you damage the
mind. If you drug the brain you dzug the mind* If you electronically 
stiimlate the brain, you mysteriously get through to the mind. Thus no matter 
what the precise ontological status of the mind turns out to be, there is 
little doubt that the mind and brain are inextricably linked; therefore we 
must graut the computer/brain analogy*
Once we have granted him the computer/brain analogy, he might proceed 
with his argument as follows : for every action of a computer, there are 
sufficient conditions which include tho state of the computer (ioOe. its 
physical plan, the state of its memory,etc.), its programme,and external 
stimuli in the form of instructions given by operators. In a similar sense,
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can there be any doubt that for every human action there is a Bet of 
sufficient conditions which consist of the state of the human brain (1*0* 
its complexity and its memory), its programme feelings,preferences,
mo;ra.I beliefs, and skills such as reading, math skills,etc*),and external 
stimuli such as the discovery of an opportunity to steal money ?
The evidence, that there are sufficient conditions for all human actions 
is overwhelming* We know that the brain is like a computer* We know that 
thinking depends on the brain* We Imow that the state of a. person’s brain 
affects his actions* We know that external stirmli affect a person's actions* 
You have even admitted that in the case of the first executive there are 
sufficient conditions for his action* Surely,then, the only sensible conclusion
from all this is that there are sufficient conditions for all human actions*
This,then, is the determinists' argu.ment* It can be written in step 
form as follows :
1 * The human Ixain is a very complex computer®
2* There are sufficient conditions for every "action" a computer performs *
3* Therefore,there are sufficient conditions for every action a person 
performs*
This argument is lot completly sound because the second premise is not 
known to be true* What we do know is that there are sufficient conditions 
for every action performed by every modern computer,but these computers are 
much simpler than the human brain* Would the same hold t m e  for much more 
complex computers ? Since no such computers exist, we just do not know for 
sure® However, the determinist would no doubt insist that it is reasonable 
to assume that a complex computer would not be so fundamentally different 
from a simple one that there would be no sufficient conditions for some of 
its actions* But here we must be very careful. For example, consider the 
following argument which is similar to the one above:
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1* An amoeba is juct a complex chunk, of matter®
2» Hatter does not have the power of locomotion*
3* Therefore, an amoeba does not have the power of locomotion.
The conclusion to this argument is,of course, absurd* lie know from 
direct observation that an amoeba does have the power of locomotion,so that 
we must reject at least one of the premises® The most likely candidate is 
premise 2, In view of the fact that there is no reason to believe that an 
amoeba is anything other than complexly organized matter, we must anoept the 
fact that a certain level of complexity matter display© emergent properties 
such as locomotion.
Now, in the case of the brain/computer argument, we do not know the 
conclusion to be false,and therefore,we are not forced to reject one of the 
two premises,but the possibility that one of them is false plainly exists*
For instance, it is perfectly possible that at a certain level of complexity
computers will display the emergent property of no longer having sufficient
conditions for all of their "actions". Thus, the deterrninists’ second
argument is also inconclusive * It is still possible that for some human 
actions there are no sufficient conditions* I will now argue that this is 
, the case®
2« Deliberation
In order to show that some people are morally responsible for some of 
their actions, we must show that some humeu actions satisfy Prof essor Taylor's 
two conditions* That is, that there is a reason for the action in question, 
but that the action was not made necessaz-y by causally sufficient conditions® 
In this section, I will argue that we have good reason to believe that 
deliberate actions meet these two conditions*
By ’deliberate actions’ I mean actions which follow from deliberation 
and for * deliberation’ I will use îrofecsor Taylor’s definition :
# Richard Taylor, Action and lurnose. op* cit.
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Deliberation a© I am conceiving it, is a process of active, 
purpoSGful thought, having on its aim or goal a decision to act, 
under circumstances in which rnoz'c than one action is, or a,t 
least is believed to be, possible for him who deliberates*
(p.. 168)
‘The actions of the second and third executives are by this definition
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deliberate, while the action of the first executive is not* Both the
second and third executives deliberated about whether they should steal
the money and,in addition, the third executive had earlier deliberated 
about the type of life he should lead® The first executive, on the other
hand, simply grasped the opportunity to steal the money as soon as it 
presented itself; he did not deliberate about what to do at all.
It is easy to show that deliberate action satisfies the first condition, 
because deliberations can have several rad-ional conclusions® For
example, the second executive might decide to steal the money or he might 
decide not to steal it. His reason for stealing it might be the reauon 
given in the example — that the possibility of gaining the money (even given 
the risk) is wo)?th doing something very wrong. If he decided not to steal 
the money, his reason might be tha,t no amount of money was worth the risk 
or that the possibility of getting the money was not worth doing such a 
great wrong* Thus, either outcome can be rational - there are perfectly 
sound reasons for each alternative.
The difficult question is to show that there are no sufficient conditions 
for deliberate cution*
## It must be pointed out that I am not saying that the first executive’s 
action is not intentional, while the actions of the second and third 
executives are intentional* Theactions of all three executives are 
intentional; that is,they all intended to steal the money. Also, I do 
not mean to say that the first executive’s action is involuntary, 
while the second and third executives’ actions are voluntary* All three 
actions are voluntary because no person or circumstances forced any of 
the executives to steal the money* But an action need not be deliberate 
to be voluntary,nor is it impossible for an action to be involuntary but 
also deliberate* 1 or example, if I am forced by someone to choose between 
two alternative actions (which I would have never dreamed of performing 
had I not been coerced), I might well deliberate about which action to 
perform. If I did deliberate, then my decision would be deliberate but 
involuntary.
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The doctrine tlio-t there are sufficient conditions for all human actions 
is simply that all human actions are essentially like the first executive’s 
action, although they may be more complicated* For example, the second 
executive’s action involved consideration about the amount to be gained,
the risk involved and the morality of stealing the money; and therefore,
it is much more complicated than the fii'st executive’s action which only 
involved consideration of the amount to be gained. The doctrine admits
that in cases such as those of the second and third executives, it is difficult 
to give a precise statoment of the sufficient conditions which made their 
artions causally necessary, but that such conditions exist none-the-leese 
The reason it is difficult is that these actions involve conflicting 
motivatiiig. factors * For example, in the case of the first executive,the 
two motivating factors of his desire for a comfortable life and his extreme 
self-confidence do not conflict and together they make the first executive’s 
motivation to steal the money overwhelmingly strong® Thus, in the case of 
the first executive, it makes sense to say that his psychological state and 
the discovery of the opportunity to steal the money are two conditions which 
were causally sufficient for his going ahead and stealing the money* Now, 
the question we rmst answer is whether it is reasonable to believe that such 
sufficient conditions exist for the actions of the second and third executives® 
I have purposely couched this question in terms of what it is reasonable 
to believe because this is one of those problems which quite possibly will
never be solved conclusively® On the one hand, the deliberations preceding the 
auctions of the second and third executives are so complex that it is quite 
possible that even if sufficient conditions do exist for their actions, they 
could never be identified,even in the fadrly crude way I identified sufficient 
conditions for the action of the first executive® On the other hand, it 
is probably impossibleto show conclusively that no such sufficient conditions 
exist because a determinist can always argue that simply because deliberation 
is such a complicated process -does not æan that there are no sufficient
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conditions for the decisions whicli fo'îlov; iz'om deliberation, however I do 
believe that careful inspection will chow that it ic more reasonable to 
believe that there are no sufficient conditions for tho decisions which 
follow from deliberation. To see this wo must look more closely at the
ca©e for saying that there are sufficient conditions for the decisions of 
the second and third executives®
The déterministes case is hasically that the only difference between
the case of the first executive and the cases of the second and third executives 
is one of complexity* In support of this claim, ho can point to the fact 
that the motivating factors in the cases of the second and third executives 
were not fundamentally different from the factors in the case of the first 
executive, but were simply more numerous. Also, he could point out that 
the second executive is clearly a product of his upbringing in the same way 
that the first executive is a product of his* The first executive is over­
confident and lacking in moral sense because of his early background, and 
the second executive is prudent and has a strong moral sense because his 
parents instilled both qualities in him. In view of these similarities, 
the determinist feels justified in aryuiîi|); that there are sufficient conditions 
for the second executive's decision,even though the second executive's
way of coming to the decision to steal the money is very different from the
way the first executive came to his decision* The fact that the second
executive deliberated about whether or not to steal the money while the 
first executive did not is not seen as a significant difference by the
determinist,but rather as simply the result of tho fact that the second
executive had something to deliberate about (iee® conflicting motivating
factors)® Hero deliberation is viewed as a completely deterministic process
in which conflicting motivating factors interact in various ways until a
decision is finally reached^
The third executive offers a bit of a problem to the determinist
because the factoi© which motivate him are largely self-chosen. But
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liex'G tîiG determinist would argue that the third executive is simply
more complex than the second executive* He would argue that the thiz'd 
executive’s early background caused him to he the type of person who
deliberates deeply about everything, and through yearn of deliberation^
the third executive chose to seek a very comfortable life and to live with
certain moral principles* When the third executive discovered the opportunity 
to stea.1 the money, he deliberated yet again to see whether stealing the 
money was consistent with the goals and rules he had chosen through earlier 
deliberation. Thus, the determinist would argue that there are sufficient 
conditions for the third executive’s decision to steal the money, but that 
they are shrouded in several tiers of deliberation and,therefore, they are 
so complex that we could never hope to identify them* There is clearly 
nothing; absurd about this view. It certainly is possible that deliberation 
is just a, very complex deterministic process* However, I will now argue- 
that a careful look at deliberation will tend to show that it is not*#
The reason I find it difficult to believe that deliberation is a 
deterministic process is because I find it difficult to believe that 
deliberation is a process at all ; instead, I believe that it is best 
described as an aotivity* To see my point here, consider the case of the 
second executive. The determinist’s position is that the second executive’s
deliberation consists first in his desire for the money,interacting with 
fear of getting caught and once his desire for the money has supplanted 
his fear, his deliberation then consists of his desire for the money 
interacting with his moral principles,which are in turn supplanted by 
his all-powerful desire to steal the money. If we view deliberation in 
this way, then it mcüces very good sense to say that there 8,re sufficient 
conditions for the second executive’s decision because one could argue that, 
given the strength of his desire for the money combined with the stz^ength
# Ky argument owes a great deal to Taylor, Action and Rirpose, op.cit.Part 2.
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of his feor of getting omight and the strength of hi© moral principles, it 
was cans ally necessary that he would eventually decide to steal the money®
Eut I see no reason why we should accept this view of deliberation 'because 
it completely ignores the fact that deliberation is an ©tivity which human
beings engage in, rather than a process which simply takes place* The 
second executive actively considers whether stealing the money is worth
the risk of going to prison and he then considers whether ho ought to do
something which is very wrong. In both cases,the second executive made a
conscious choice and he clearly believed that he could have made the
opposite choice because if he did not believe this,there simply would be
no point in deliberating about which choice to malce. Now, in view of the
fact that deliberation is an activity in which people engage and also in
view of the fact that people who deliberate believe that they can choose
more than one alternative, that is, that one alternative is not causally.
necessary, why should vie accept the determinist's account of deliberation
as a deterministic process ? Indeed, why should anyone have ever believed
that deliberation we© a deterministic process ? There seems to have been
two reasons for this. The first is that many people have accepted general
arguments which try to show that there must be sufficient conditions for
0,11 human behaviour regardless of whether it follows deliberations or simply
springs from spur of the moment impulses® Ibcamples of such general arguments are the
argument based on the comput ex'/brain analogy and the argument that if there 
are no sufficient conditions for hurnen action,then that action is inexplicable®
The second reason is that it is possible to point to human thought processes 
which resemble délibérât ion ,lxut which arc also clearly deterministic® One 
such process is vacillation,which Taylor describes in the following passage;#
# Taylor, Action and luruose, op.oit®, p®17C®
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UO',1 whil e both of ihene coniinuinr: s tat os of mind can in some 
sense be described as processes of thought,only the first is 
deliberative* The second is,simply, between competing
inclinations* Both are,moreover, processes of my thinkiii/> But 
in the first my thought is an activity, for I am intentionally 
calling it forth. In the second I do not call forth any thoughts 
or considerations; they simply occur to me,willy-nilly, with 
whatever foroo they may or may not have for deciding the matter 
for me* In the first try thinlring is purposive,for thoughts are 
T)ursued with a view to mdcinr a decision,but in the second my 
thoughts have no purpose* They are on].y thoughts,impulses, 
or inclinations th;?.t occur in succession* The second situation 
C3,n thez'ofore be described \3ith0ut introducing the idea of my 
doing anything at all,except just deciding,whereas the first 
cannot, and there are accordingly all sort of locutions,mostly 
metaphorical,which are used to convey tho element of activity 
involved in deliberation - such as "weighing" pros and cons,
"turning"the thing over in my mind, and so on®
(p.170)
Another thought process which is similar to deliberation but is clearly 
deterministic is rationalization , in which someone has an overwhelming 
desire to do something (or refrain from doing something) but also has 
some minor qualms about going ahead with it* For example,if the first 
executive had had some semblance of moral sense, he might have rationalized 
his decision to steal the money by quiolcly dismissing moral considerations 
from his mind. It makes sense to say that both vacillation and rationalization
are deterministic processes because they tiuly fit the determinist’s model
of motivitating factors interacting with each other,but this in no way shows
that deliberation is a deterministic process® In fact, when we look closely,
we see that genuine,deliberation is very different from vacillation and 
rationalisation,and clearly,one way of accounting for this difference is 
to say that deliberation is a non-deterministic activity which human beings 
engage in rather than a deterministic process over which human beings have 
little or no controlo
Of course, this does not settle the issue of whet lier deliberate a©tions 
are free since it is still quite possible that deliberation is an extremely 
complex deterministic process. However, in view of the fact that deliberation 
certainly seems to be an activity which can have more than one outcome
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(otherwise there would he no point in deliberating) and also in view 
of the fact that deliberation is easily distinguishable from mental processes 
which are deterministic, I thinlc it is more reasonable to believe that 
deliberate actions are free than to believe that they are determined.
This is especially true when we realise that there is nothing absurd about 
saying that some human actions are free, while other Imma-n actions are 
determined. In short, until someone unravels the mysteries of deliberation 
and shows that there are sufficient conditions for deliberate actions or 
until someone presents a sound argument which demonstrates that all human 
actions must be determined, I will continue to find it more reasonable to 
believe that deliberate actions are indeed free actions.
Many libertarians,no doubt, will be quite displeased with my arguments
because if my view is correct, vie are forced to say that many people who
\
cannot be called insane or abnormal are not morally responsible for their 
actions. They might argue that I have created more problems than I have 
solved because the courts will now be faced with the problem of distinguishing 
between those criminals who deliberated before they committed their crime 
and those criminals who did not# But, as I said in the introduction to 
this chapter, I do not believe that moral responsibility is the only reason
for holding people responsible and therefore,this is not necessarily a problem 
for me, and I will say more about this in the next several chapters.
Also, I believe that my views on moral responsibility have tvio distinct 
advantages over standard libertarian views. The first is that the libertarian 
view that all human beings are agents forces them to treat all human beings 
as being essentially equal with regard to moral responsibility even though 
people obviously differ in this respect. For example, they must say that 
someone lilce the first executive who quite literally "did not know any better" 
is every bit as responsible for his actions as the third executive who is 
sober and knowledgeable, and who deliberates about everything he does. In 
short, the libertarian's dream of a world in which everyone is morally 
responsible simply is not a realistic dream, and my view recognizes this 
fact.
‘i.'lic second :vdvant:;.ge ic- that, my view involves no mysterious conception
o:'’ the self® Jïiic is very itrportsjit in the debate between libertarians
and déterministe beoaiico as long ao libertarian© insist tho,t human beings
are in some mysterious way agents, determinists can cpiite rightly ask what 




THF PRBTCIPLE OF RüNvFQïïglBILITY 
based on
In the last chapter, I aiypiod for what might be called a limited 
version of libertarianism in which some people have the ability to 
deliberate and are, therefore, morally responsible for their actions, 
while others lack this ability and,therefore, axe not morally responsiblo 
for their actions * There are two possible objections to this as a 
justification of the principle of responsibility, First, it could be 
argued that since 1 have been forced to admit that only some people are 
morally responsible for their actions? my attempt to base the general 
principle of responsibility upon moral responsibility must be considered 
a failure* The second objection is that moral responsibility is not a 
sufficient condition for holdfng people responsible for their actions? or 
this objection may take the less radical form that moral responsibility 
is a sufficient condition for reward? praise or blame, but not for 
punisliment.
lo The First Objection
The first objection, at first glance, appears very serious, especially 
when we consider that the number of people like the first executive who are 
not morally responsible for their actions may prove to be quite large*
Thus ray argument for the principle of responsibility based upon moral 
responsibility may appear so weak as to be uninteresting*
However, this objection ignores the fact that if my arguments for 
libertarianism are sound, then it follows that al3. human beings (with the 
exception of the insane or the mentally defective) have the potential to
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gain the ability of free de].ibaro;tion. and thus to become morally rccponGiblo
for their actions. It is very important to avoid a "black and white" picture
in which idnere is one section of ‘bhe population which will always have the
ability to deliberate, v/liile the rest will always lack this ability* Such
a view is unrealistic because people can both gain and loco tho ability to
deliberate and they can also have it with regard to some circumstoncos and
lack it with regard to others® For example, many porents have breathed a
sigh of relief when their arrogant, rude, head-strong teenager has
finally grown up and started to act sensibly* Also, a really doctrinaire
right or left wing radical is a good example of someone who is incapable
of deliberation in some areas*# Ke is totally bound by his doctrines and
he simply will not heao:' of anything else® But such people can change into
people who are able to deliberate and who are open to the ideas of others *
Similarly, people can lose the ability to deliberate® k-e all probably
3mow someone who has "become a bigot", or become so consumed by hate,
jealousy, awe, or love that he has lost a great deal of his ability to
deliberate® Finally, some people car deliberate in some areas but not in
others* VJe all have met people who are perfectly reasonable until someone
mentions a "forbidden subject", such as religion, certain government
policies, or women’s liberation*
Thus, even people who are not morally responsible for their actions
can become so If they ai:tain the ability to deliberate* This suggests the
possibility of encouraging people to deliberate about bheir actions end
thus to become morally responsible for them, and in order to do this it 
seems clear that we must retain the principle of responsibility* lly reason
# I am talking about the true zealot, not someone who has come to bold 
radical views after long periods of study or deliberation®
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for saying this is that to excuse someone from responsibility for an action 
because he failed to deliberate before he performed it cannot possibly 
encourage him to deliberate in the future* For example, if the parents of 
the arrogant teenager I just mentioned write off his behaviour as "going 
through a difficult stage" rather than blame him for it, they certainly 
are not encoui'aging him to become a sensible adult*#
Thus, if we assume that it is good for people to be morally responsible 
for their actions, we con base a fairly strong case for the principle of 
responsibility upon my limited libertarianism. This is so because by 
holdijig people responsible for their actions, we will ensure that those 
who are morally responsible for their actions will get what they deserve 
and we will encourage those who arc not morally responsible for their 
actions to become so® There is, of course, one obvious objection to this, 
which is that to hold someone responsible for his actions if he is not 
morally responsible for them is unjust. Again, I must postpone discussing 
this point in order to avoid duplication. In later chapters I will argue, 
at some length, that while it is true that to hold someone responsible for 
an action for which he is not morally responsible is unjust, the
#To show conclusively that holding people responsible for their actions 
will encourage them to deliberate and thus to become morally responsible 
vfould take several more pages and would nearly duplicate an argument which 
I will present later in this thesis* There I will argue that even if the 
thesis of detormnism is true, we ought to hold people responsible for 
their actions because this will encourage them to develop their rational 
wills (the rational will is basically the human ability to deliberate and 
make decisions without undue dependence upon others). In fa,ct, the only 
difference between my argument here and ray argument later in the thesis 
is metaphysical. If my arguments for libertarianism are correct, then 
holding people responsible for their actions would encourage them to 
actually become morally responsible for their actions. On the other hand, 
if the thesis of determinism is true, then by holding people responsible 
for their actions we would encourage them to develop their rational wills 
(and I will argue that a well-developed rational rill is morally valuable), 
but we could not encourage them to attain the metaphysically satisfying 
status of moral responsibility®
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alternaLives to holding someone morally responsible for his actions are 
even more unjust or are morally undesirable on other grounds * Also, I 
must again stress that I am onD.y talking about people who are not morally 
responsible for their actions because v/hife meeting the first two conditions 
of moral responsibility, they fail to laeet the third condition, I arn not 
advocating punishing the i nocent or strict liability*
2o The Second Objection
We must now turn to the second objection mentioned ad the beginning of 
this chapter - that moral res pons i bi'l .Ity is not a, sufficient condition for 
holding people responsible for their actions. It imy seem that this 
objection is so extreme that it is milikely that anyone would over pul; it 
forward* But this is not the case, because a strict acUierent of either 
act or rule utilitarianism would be forced to hold this line. Also, even 
if no one would ever put foxw/ard this objection, in this form, a more limited 
version of this objection is fairly comnon. This versio.n allows that moral 
responsibility is a sufficient reason for rewarding, praising, or blajning 
someone, but not for punishing someone because punishment is evil and can 
only be justified if it producer some further good* I will attack only 
the second version of this objection, but my arguments can be generalized to 
cover the first as well®
In a,ttacking this objection, I will become involved in the long-standing 
dispute between retributivists, who believe that punishment ought to be 
meted out according to dictates of justice, and utilitarians, v/ho argue that 
punishment is only justified if it produces some further good, such as a 
reduction in crime® I believe that a good deal of this debate is misguided 
because the iJarticipants tend to try to establish a case for one point of 
view to the exclusion of all others. I think that this is a great mistake 
because, as I stated in the introduction, I believe that moral problems
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are -iisually very complex and that a satisfactory noJ.ubJon 3mist balance 
many conflicting moral considerations « The justification of punishmont is 
an extremely good example of a complex moral problem. Punishment is 
usually discussed in the context of how the officials of the government 
ought to deal with ' criminals fin this context, the moral complexity is 
obvious because in order to be legitimato, a government must administer 
justice, consider the utility of its actions (oog, promote public welfare), 
and act in a morally acceptable manner (oog. a legitimate government is 
morally bound not to be brutal or cruel)* From this it follows that a 
legitimate government's policy on punishment must strike a satisfactory 
balance between these three moral considerations. Thus, in order to 
show that moral guilt is a sufficient condition for punisfiment, I must 
show that justice requires that we punish the morally guilty and then that 
punishing the morally guilty does not seriously conflict with the other 
tv/o moral considerations *
That justice requires that we punish the morally guilty has often been 
talcen to be self-evident, but it has been challenged on the basis that 
justice is an intangible or even an unintelligible concept* There is some 
basis for these views since some aspects of justice are intellectually 
very "slippery", but the case of punishment is not one of these slippery 
aspects* Stated in its simplest terms, the principle of distributive 
justice is that people ought to get what they deserve, not more than 
they deserve and not less than they deserve* Thus, people ought not to 
receive undeserved rewards nor escape deserved burdens* It is quite true 
that ascertaining just what people deserve can be very difficult in some 
cases. Notorious examples of this are the problems of just income 
distribution and just distribution of educational opportunities. However, 
ascertaining what people deserve with regard to specific actions poses no
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insurinoimbab'J.fc) problems® The followJ.ng examples will hopofiilly make tlrls 
clear: A clear case v/ii;h regard to rcnvard would be one whoroin a manager 
gives a promotion to his lazy brother-in-law instead, of to another mizch 
more hard-working candidate. Here the other candidate would be denied 
a reward he deserved and the brother-in-law would enjoy an undeserved 
rew'ordo Also, a person who consistently fails to praise particularly 
courteous actions on tlie po.rt of his or her spouse would be acting unjustly 
because people who perform courteous, virtuous, or in other ways outstanding 
actions deserve praise. The same holds true for blcme and punislimento 
.If someone neglects his duties, he clearly deserves to be blamed, and 
if someone is morally responsible for a serious wrong, it seems to make 
perfect sense to say that he deserves to bear a burden - that is, he 
deserves to be punished*
To deny this would be a very radical move indeed because it would 
omount to denying that what a person does can influence v/hat he deserves*
To tske this line would restrict the concept of desert to the point of 
absuu)dity* To say that a man’s actions can never affect what he deserves 
would leave room only for humai'iistic theories of desert such as the theory 
that all people deserve to have their basic needs satisfied, or old- 
fashioned "birth right" theories in which some people are said to deserve 
certain benefits by virtue of being born princes and others to deserve to 
bear burdens by virtue of their being born into some lovier station. This 
is not in any way to denigrate humanistic theories, but even if we adopted 
such a hmmmistic theory, we would certainly still want to say that a 
person’s actions can affect what he deserves. For example, even in the 
totally egalitarian world envisioned by those who put forviard such 
humanistic theories, Smj.th could still cheat Jones, and surely Smith would 
deserve to be blamed or punished for doing so* Thus, there certairilv would
Beem bo be a nrima facie case for the view tlia;b moral guilt is a sufficient 
condition f03:' pujiishment* However, I still must discuss whether punishment 
for moral guilt conflicts with the other rnoroJ considerations I mentioned 
above,
3o Is Punishment Necessarily Brutal or Savage?
It is often argued that punishment is necessarily brutal or savage 
and therefore is unjustified» This argument can take three forms, the 
first of which applies to punishment for any reason, while the second and 
third apply only to punishment for moral guilty
The first argument is that punishment is by definition the infliction 
of pain upon people who do wrong and the infliction of pain is clearly 
evil or brutalo However, this argument is unacceptable because there is 
no reason to accept the view that punishment is by definition the infliction 
of pain to wrcng-doers, p-unishment clearly must be in some sense burdensome 
and, of course, it can be painful, but there are any number of cases of 
punishment, which could not be described as painful if we take *pain’ 
in its normal, everyday sense of substantial physical or mental sufferings, 
Per example, if a child misbehaves and is confined to his room for two 
hours, it makes perfectly good sense to say that the child v/as punished, 
but he certainly could not be said to have suffered any pain. Also, a stay 
in a well-managed prison which provided privacy, opportimities for education, 
and recreational facilities could not be described as painful in the 
ordinary sense of Spain' but it certainly would seem to be an example of 
punishmento
It can be argued that punisliment is by definition the infliction of 
pain upon wrong-doers if we adopt the classic utilitarian definition of 
'pain*, where ’pain* means any type of unhappiness, displeasure or 
disutility*» If we adopt this definition, it makes perfectly good sense
* See Jeremy Benthan, Principles of Morals and heaislation. Chapter 5, 
sections 17“31o
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to say that when we send a child to his room or a man to a v/e'j..l'-»mana:;od 
prison, we are inflicting pain, but this certainly does not prove that 
imnisîiment must be evil or brutalo In short, the infliction of pain in the 
sense of substantial suffering may bo brutal or evil, but the punishment 
need not be painful in this sense« Also, while it is true that punishment 
is necessarily painful in the utilitarian sense of ’paint , this sense is 
so wide that it is insufficient to show that punishment must be evil or 
brutalo
The second argument is that punisiunerit for moral guilt necessarily 
involves some brutality because justice requires that the punishment must 
fit the crime, and brutal crimes would require brutal punj.shmentso However, 
the phrase, 'the punishment must fit the crime', can mean two different 
thingse -It can mean that the punishment must be as nearly identical to the 
crime as possible or it can mean that the punishment must be proportional 
to the seriousness of the crime » The former is the lex talionis (an eye 
for an eye etc») and it clearly would involve brutality, but there seems 
to be no reason why we should adopt it instead of the second interpretation 
which would not require brutality* In fact, it can be argued that the 
lex talionis is absurd because, in many oases, the punishment cannot be 
even remotely similar to the crime* Glear examples of this occur when 
a poor person steals from a rich person or when a man betrays his country»
The third argument is that punishment for moral guilt amounts to 
little more than institutionalised vengeance, and vengeance is a savage 
reiiinant of our uncivilized past which must be firmly resisted* Here, 
the opponent of punishment for moral guilt is using tho word 'vengeance' 
which has an extremely pejorative connotation, and this really is not 
fair* The evils of vengeance have been catalogued by Shakespeare and
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many other writers, and it is associated witli feuds, vendettas, and very 
harsh codes of law such an Haraurabi's» Thus, to call punisliment for 
moral gi.iilt 'institutionalized vengeance' is to lower the whole debate to 
the level of sophisticated rhetoric and. in no way shows that punishment 
for moral guilt is evil or brutal»
Thus, punishment for moral guil.t certainly need not be evil or 
brutal, bui; many people would still want to argue that it is wrong»
Their argument is that even though punishment need not be evil or brutal, 
it still is painful in the utilitarian sense of 'pain'» That is, it creates 
disutility and we are justified in creating disutility on]y if by doing so 
v/e promote sufficient good to counterbalance the disutility» From this 
it follows that moral guilt camiot be a sufficient reason for punishing 
someone because it is quite possible that when we punish some people who 
one morally guilty of crimes, we will, produce insufficient greater good 
to counterbalance the disutility produced by the punishment»
The "greater good" mentioned in the above argument is usually a 
reduction in the rate of crime, and thus this argument is often put forward 
by those who advocate what is often called a totally preventative view 
of punishment, which is that punisliment can only be justified if it tends 
to control crime. This view is expressed in unequivocal terms by Herbert 
L« Packer in The Limits of the Criminal Sanction when he says g "The case 
for an essentially preventative view of the function of criminal law is 
unanswerables anything else is the merest savagery»"*
The problem with this argument is that it completely ignores the 
value of justice and the disvalue of injustice. It is , of course, true 
that when v/e punish someone we inflict pain in the utilitarian sense of
^Herbert L» Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Oxford, I969 
Po 660
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'pain' and thin Jogs raise the amount of disutility in the v/orld. However, 
if someone is morally guilty of a crime, justice requires that he bo 
punished and to fail to punish him would be unjust and th:ls itself would 
be evilo* Also, it seems to make perfectly good sense to say that the 
evil of failing to punish someone who is morally guilty of a crime would 
greatly outweigh the evil of piinistiing him, providing the punishment 
took place in a woll-managod prison and the criminal was not subjected 
to cruel practices such as flogging. In short, this argument is only 
telling against punishment for moral guilt if we adopt a totally utilitarian 
view of good 8,nd evil and ignore other forms of good and evil such as 
justice and injustice»
So far punishment for moral guilt has fared very well- against its 
opponents, but there is one serious challenge left. This is that the 
practice of punishment seriously conflicts with the utilitarian goal of 
controlling crime and therefore must be replaced by something more 
effective. Thus, it may turn out that the pursuit of justice conflicts 
so radically with the pursuit of public welfare (inthis case, through the 
control of crime) that v/e must limit our pursuit of justice in order to 
insure the physical' well-being of' society.
There are two aspects of crime control. The first is preventing
people from becoming criminals in the first placej this aspect is usually
referred to as deterrence. The second is preventing criminals from
committing further crimes which is usually referredtto as the problem of
recidivism. It may seem odd that anyone would ever question punishment’s
effectiveness in controlling crime since punishment certainly seems to be
an effective deterrent, and it would seem that once a criminal had been
* I owe this point to "Punishment and Desert" by C.Vh'K. Mundle, The 
Phi10sophical Quarterly, Volume LV, ho. l6, (July 1954)o
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punished he would be loo intimidated to commit further crimes. However, 
today it is fairly easy to find people who would argue that punishing 
criminals docs not deter other people from becoming criminals and that 
punishment is very ineffective in preventing recidivism. From here, they 
go on to argue that punishment ouglit to be replaced by something else, 
such as compul-sory psychological treatment for criminals» I will now 
consider their arguments.
4o Does Punishment Deter?
It is argued by Bentham and others that by punishing criminals we 
deter other people from becoming criminals because they see that the 
advantages that crime can bring are not worth the unpleasant consequences 
of puni aliment.
This may seem like common sense, but this a.rguraent has come under very 
strong criticism recently by psychologists who argue that psychological 
studies of criminals have shovm that a high percentage of them were not 
deterred by the threat of punishment, but rather that they acted upon 
impulses which they could not control» The conclusion drawn from these 
studies is that the threat of punishment does not deter people from 
committing crimes.
This argument fails quite dismally because it is based on an obviously 
unrepresentative sample of the population - i.e., convicted criminals.
It is no doubt; true that convicted criminals were not deterred by the 
threat of punishment; clearly, had they been deterred they would not be 
criminalso Also, it may be true that a large number of convicted criminals 
never gave punishment a thought but rallier acted from impulses they could not 
control; however, from this it does not follov/ that deterrence is 
ineffective. Proponents of deterrence have never claimed that it will
*hly discussion of deterrence is based on IIoL, Packer's discussion of this 
topic in The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, pp» 39-45,
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■prevent all crime or l.hab &1II people v/ii:i. react to tho threat of punishment 
in a rational maimer. Thus, to claim thol deterrence is ineffective simply 
because some people are not deterred is just plain illogical.
In order to show that the throat of punishment doss not deter, it would 
be necessary to show that if there were no institution of puniBiimont, there 
would be approximately the same amount of crime as there is at present with 
the institution of punisliment. To show this would require a study of 
law-abiding people, not of criminals, and. if such a study were carried out, 
there is every reason to believe that it would show that the i.nstitution 
of punishment plays a significant part in keeping law-abiding people 
law-abiding»
To see this we must consider punishment and the entire mechanism of 
the criminal law in their role of moulding public opinion and behaviour.
From childhood, people are confronted with the influence of the criminal 
lav/» They Ionov/ that suspected criminals must go through the unpleasant 
process of arrest, the tense waiting period before trial and, if convicted, 
the unpleasantness of going to prison or payi.ng a fine. On top of this, 
there is the moral condemnation of one's neighbours and the loss of one's 
good name, and these taJce place even if one is given a suspended sentence 
by the court. Not only are people confronted with the unpleasantness 
av/aiting those who commit a crime, but they are also confronted with the 
moral justification behind this unpleasantness, -Thus, the institution of 
the criminal lav/ and punisliment influences people in two wayss (l) It 
encourages people to obey the law by showing them the unpleasant consequences 
of not doing so; (2) It encourages people to obey the law by inculcating 
the belief that it is right and just for criminals to be punished.
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that these influences exist would be, I think, to deny the 
obvious ; but that is juot v/l).at the critics of deterrence must do. No 
mere study of those who were not deterred will ever be adequate to show that 
punishment and the criminal law do not deter.
5o Does Punishment Prevent 'Recidivism?
Once a criminal has been convicted ho usually is sent to prison, and 
while he is in prison, his opportunities for committing other crimes are 
clearly drastically reduced. However, it would be horribly unjust, as 
well as practically impossible, to keep all criminals in prison for the 
rest of their lives, so that locking criminals up is only a temporary 
solution to the problem of recidivism. Thus, in order to prevent 
recidivism, it is necessary to change the criminal's attitudes so that he 
will consider crime wrong or at least unprofitable» If, during his prison 
stay, 8. prisoner becomes convinced that what he has done is wrong, then 
he probably would be referred to as oreformed or rehabilitated; while if 
he does not believe that his crime was wrong but has come to see that crime 
is unprofitable, then he probably would be referred to as being merely 
intimidated but not reformed.
At first glauce, one would think that almost all criminals who have 
been convicted and have spent some time in prison would never even dream 
of committing further crimes when they are released. The reasoning behind 
this is that spending time in prison is such an Unpleasant experience that 
they would carefully avoid any activity that could possibly send them back, 
Unfortunately, this is not the case» In fact, a large number of convicted 
criminals commit further crimes, and the evidence available suggests that 
those v/ho have served long sentences are more likely to commit further 
crimes than those v/ho have served light sentences or than those who have 
been given suspended sentences and placed on probation.
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The reason for bho seorning anomaly of those who have been punished 
more severely having a greater rate of recidivism is generally considered 
to be the "hardening" effect of long prison sentences* That is, long 
prison sentences tend to make criminals bitter and vengeful and also give 
iiiein ample opportunity to learn new criminal techniques from their fellow 
irunateSo On top of this, a long prison sentence often produces unpleasant 
personality traits which make the notorious problem of finding ex-convicts 
jobs even worse. Thus, it is not surprising that those who have served 
long prisons terms have a greater tendency to commit further crimes; in 
many cases, it is the only road open to them.
This hardening effect of punishment, combined with the belief tha,t 
punishment does not deter people from becoming criminals, has led-many 
people to argue that punishment is not only useless in controlling crime, 
but also that it makes the problem worse» For this reason, they argie tha;b 
punishment must be discarded in favour of some other way of deal.ing with 
criminals*. I have already discounted the argument that punishment does 
not deter and I will now argue that although punishment can harden criminals,, 
it need not do so.
To deny that pujiisliment can harden criminals would be silly. Punish­
ment often takes place in overcrowded prisons, many of which ore very old 
and were built without adequate recreational, educational, and sanitation 
facilities, Ar stay in this type of prison can be a very hardening 
experience because prisoners are often subjected to very long periods of 
inactivity in which there is little else to do but plan new crimes and 
exchange information about criminal techniques. This mind-numbing inactivity
* The most commonly mentioned alternative to pujiishment is some system of 
compulsory treatment designed to change the criminal’s behaviour and 
attitudes. I will discuss the merits and demerits of such a system in 
later chapters.
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combined with the poor conditions is very bad for a prisoner's morale, 
and it is little wonder that many criminals bocome "hardened".
But clearly an advocate of punishment for inorcil guilt need not 
advocate such poor conditions for prisoners because, as I argued, earlier, 
justice does not require that we be brutal to prisoners or make their 
lives miserable, iui advocate of punishment for moral guilt is perfectly 
free to advocate proper prisons which provide privacy and opportunities 
for recreation and education. Thus, while punishment can, and indeed does 
harde.n crimi.n.als, it need not do so; and, therefore, tho argument that 
pimis.liment necessarily conflicts with crime control breaks down.*
*It is true that governments are notoriously loath to pay for proper penal 
facilities, but as I will point out later, this problem is equally serious 
for the proposed alternatives to punishment.
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XV
P R A O T IC A L  T R E A 'm M T
I must now turn to the more complex task of arguing that we ought to 
retain the principle of responsibility even if the thesis of determinism 
is ticue. This argument will involve carefully weighing the advantages and 
disadvantages of retaining the principle of responsibility compared to the 
advantages and disadvantages of adopting the main alternative to the 
principle of responsibility.
The main alternative to the principle of responsibility is what I will 
call 'practical treatment'» It is basicoUy the view that, rather than 
blaming and punishing criminals, we should treat them any way that is 
necessary to prevent them from committing crimes in the futur'e « The reason 
that I call it 'practical treatment' rather than just 'treatment' is to 
emphasize that those who..advocate it, advocate any type of treatment which 
v/'ill change a criminal's behaviour* They are not advocating only medical 
or psychological treatment as the use of just the word, 'treatment', might 
suggest*
A practical treatment legal system, differs from a legal system based 
on the principle of responsibility in the following ways t (l) The duration 
of practical treatment is generally indefinite because it is argued that we 
can never be sure how long it will take to change a criminal's behaviour.
On the other-hand, the duration of punishment is generally based on the 
seriousness of the crime in question and almost always has an upper limit, 
(2) In order to obtain one’s release from detention in a practical treat­
ment legal system, one must show that he will no longer commit other crimes, 
that is, one must show that he is no longer dangerous. In a system based
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on the principle of responsibility, a person is released when his sentence 
has been served or before that time* if he is let out on parole. (5) Treat­
ment in a practical treatment legal system is compulsory, while any treat­
ment offered in a legal system based on the principle of responsibility is 
voluntary® In short, in a practical treatment legal system the state 
assumes the right to alter a criminal’s behaviour by an appropriate means 
and also assumes the right to detain a criminal for as long as it takes to 
alter his behaviour ™ it assumes the right to remould the criminal * In a 
legal system based on the principle of responsibility, the state has no 
such right* It may detain a criminal for a fixed period of time, mid when 
that period of time has passed, the criminal must be released* It is, of 
course, hoped that the burdens of punishment along with the moral condemnation 
which punishment necessarily involves will convince the criminal that he 
ought not to commit further crimes* Also, a proper penal system would 
provide opportunities for education, recreation, treatment, and counselling 
in order to help the prisoner to become better adjusted to society* But 
beyond this, the state has no right to alter a criminal's behaviour.
Before I can discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a legal system 
based on practical treatment as opposed to one based upon the principle of 
responsibility, I must flesh out the bar© outline above by discussing the 
arguments of some people who advocate a practical treatment legal system.
In this chapter, I will discuss three different arguments for practical 
treatment and'in the following two chapters, I will have a good deal to 
say about several general issues raised by these arguments.
Hie three advocates of practical treatment which I will discuss are 
J*E* Macdonald, Lady Wootton, and Joel Feinberg. My reasons for choosing
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these three are varied, but the main reason is that all three offer clear 
arguments for their positions. Also, they offer a good representation of 
the different fields and professions which are concerned with practical 
treatment* Macdonald is a clinical psychologist; Lady Wootton has been a
magistrate and she is a very well known social commentator on well as a
very active member of the House of Lords; and Feinberg is a very well- 
Itnown philosopher. Finally, their arguments vary in emphasis, Macdonald's 
arguments ane firmly based on the assumption that the thesis of determinism 
is true, while the arguments of Lady Wootton and Feinberg stress the 
practical and moral advantages of a system of practical treatment.
It may seem odd that I have chosen two people who do not make explicit 
use of the thesis of determinism in their arguments. My reason for doing 
this is that the truth of the thesis of determinism is basically a back­
ground condition which is necessary before we can even consider doing away 
with the principle of responsibility. In other words, if the thesis of 
determi-nism is false, then people are actually morally responsible for their 
actions, and to argue that v/e ou^it to throv; out the principle of 
responsibility even though people are actually morally responsible is very
difficult, if not patently absurd* Thus, even though Feinberg and Lady
Wootton do not make use of the thesis of determinism in their arguments, 
their arguments would be extremely weak if it turned out that the thesis 
of deterndnism was not true*
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1 » Macdonald's ArfUiinonts
■ Macdonald presented a vigorous attack on our present system of
jjunicl-uaent in tlio Journal of Mental Science in 1955*® In his article two 
separate argmnents can be discerned. Tho first is on pages 710 and 711 
where Macdonald is trying to show that it is mistaken to divide criminals 
into two groups - those who are pyschologically normal and therefore 
responsible for their crimes and those who are psychologically abnormal 
and therefore not responsible for their crimes* His reason for believing 
that this is mistaken is sirnp].y that he believes all criminals are 
psychologically abnormal and therefore not responsible for thoir crimes*
In his words ;
East (1949) R'lso writes s "The State acts, and must act, upon the 
assumption that men and women are mentally normal until the contrary 
is proved»" But normality is not to be assumed, analoguous to 
innocence: if the accused is proved guilty^i,e» physically responsible 
for the offence, then it follows that his behaviour has been deviant 
or abnormal, and to tal.k of "psycliologically normal criminals" is a 
contradiction in terms, equivalent to saying "persons who behave 
normally who behave abnormally"«
The second airgument is on pages 7H"'7I5 and is basically a somewhat
wordy version of the standard line that universal determinism is true and.
therefore no one is- morally responsible for any of his acts»
The conclusion Macdonald, draws from these two arguments is that the
concept of responsibility is a "metaphysical anachronism" and that once
responsibility is thrown out we are left with the practical problem if
disposing of the convicted» lie says:
Holegating questions of responsibility and with them those of punish- 
ment, to the orauseraent of the religious and others of that kidney, 
we are left with the important and practical question of the disposal 
of the convictedo
'XJ,E , Macdonald., "The Concept of Responsibility", Jq;urna]. of Monta,!
Vol. 101, 1955.  ^"
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■'lov/cvcr, from tho fact thab a iis.n is not ;.:orariy responsible for a
crime ho eosmlLtod, it dooo not follow tluat wo are justified in disposing
of him in a practical manner» V/hat follows is only that he does noi; deserve
rotrilmtivG punishment: the question of how we should deal with such a
person is a sopaxaie and quite complex matter which involves practical as
well as moral considerations»
But ; V/e o'till must deal v/ith Ivlacdona'J.d’s first argument in which he
tri'is to show tliat all criminals ars psychologically abnormal* Couldn't
.1 bo said thet having shown that all criminals are psychologi.cally abnormal
Macdonald is justified in claiming that we ought to dispose of all criminals
in practical manner? After all, it might be added, we already treat insane
criminals in a practical manner so surely it only makes sense to treat all
Gc:d;.inals that way now that we know that they are all pys chol ogically
ai'Liojriial* Macdonald seems to hold this line because when he finally sums
up he alludes to his first argument in the follov/ing passage :
Me are confronted with a person who has committed some action that is 
abnormal, by its infrequency of occurrence, and that has brought its 
doer into conflict with his follows : we have to decide how to obviate 
or minimizG repetition of such conflict, for the good of all concerned*
But this ar'gt-iment also doesn't establish Macdonald's case for practical
Lrsiit.jc-nt because it equivocates on the concept of psychological abnormality.
In step form his argiments can be written as follows s
btup 1* Every criminal who is psychologically abnormal is at present subject
i-o practical treatment *
h'-c]j 2» All criminal behaviour is abnormal so it follows that all criminals 
-n'i'.' psychologically abnormal.
Bfop 3, Therefore, all criminals ought to be subject to practical treatment* 
Premise one is at present included in the legal systems of many 
Gcuntries, end although it is fairly controversial let us accept it for the
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-ok:.- of" :<y;:imon l„ The important point to noticG ic that in projaioG one 
''poychologJ oally abnormal' is defined by scnio tost* This test has 
l.nadii.ionaliy been tho K'Naii:jiten rule which states that a mo,n is responsible 
for hi;.: e.ct ! ons unless he is "labouring under such a defect of reason, from
uisGaoe of the mind., as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing, OX', if ho did know it, that he did not k.now he wan doing what was 
...cor j O', In recent, years several other tests have been proposed but 1 won't 
:_;o into I. he CO .here because for the purposes of my argument a nujjiber of tests 
vill do.. To show that Macdonald'8 argument is fallacious all that is 
nocLsorry :1s that the tost used be one which precisely picks out those who 
ore ,;o- ologioally abnormal in the sense that they have a mental incapacity 
wj;ich ru'uvcnts them from governing their own affairs* It may be the case 
that ' y the M'l'Taughten rule moots this requirement (Lady Hootton thinks so?
SCO n t  section) but I am perfectly willing to admit the possibility that
other a:-}, oven better tests could be devised»
l;o\;, for Mac don aid ' s argument to be sound it is necessary that the concept 
of po.y/Logical abnormality in premise one be the same as the concept of 
poycV.G'loyical ab.norma.lity in premise two, but quite clearly this is not the 
case* I 'l the second p:cemise we are told that since criminal behaviour is 
abncr c'] all criminals are psychologically abnormal, and Macdonald has told 
us th" t c:r i.jfi.i.nal behaviour is abno:rraal because of its infrequency of 
occur:.' . rcG ^ Thus, the test for psychological abnormality in the second 
nremi:. r ■ whether -bhc- person engages in behaviour which occurs infrequently* 
Tilts ,t . , equivocation on the concept of psychological abnormality because
cl to::-.' :'.>f incapacity such as the h'Naught en rule picks out a completely 
d i f : group of people than the infrequency of occurrence test in
ft..est task will be to malce the test precise by specifying a threshold 
.f'roqu-. ■ "ioh dtv-hun: normal from abnormal behaviour. This may seem to be
''.uady Soc.ia?' Science and Social Pathology, London (l959)?P&gGs 228-229.
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a very sL.iplc task booause at first gionco il would ouom Urit normal 
DGhaviom: is behavi.oi.ir in which the vast majority (say 90y0 of the people 
engage* À. good example of this would he heterosexual behaviour; one might 
want to argue that since the vast majority of people are heterosexual it 
follows that homosexual behaviour is abnormal» But it will soon become 
obvious that the vast majority rule is entirely too restrictive® For 
example, less than half of the population are devoutly religious but do we 
really want to call such behaviour abnormal? Also even if we adopted a 
very low threshold such as 'X^ffo v/o would still be forced into some rather 
st.ran.gG corners® For instance, less than Vj/o of the population pursue a 
post secondary education and a very small percentage obtain an advanced 
degree, but ore we to call attending university abnormal behaviour?
However, the most absurd aspect of Macdonald’s infrequency of occurrence 
test is that, contrary to what he claims, some crimes would not constitute 
abnormal behavioux* according to his test. Exceeding miles per hour in 
an urban area, experimenting with canabis, dr shoplifting tire all crimes 
which occur entirely too frequently to be called abnormal* Also if we 
accept Macdonald's infrequency of occurrence test we will have to accept that 
as soon as a crime becomes sufficiently widespread it also passes from the 
realm of the abnormal to the normal»
Thus, 'there is a great deal wrong with Macdonald's infrequency of 
occurrence test but for the sake of argument let’s accept it. The question 
we now must ask is whether those people who, according to his test, behave 
abnormally are in fact psyohological.ly abnormal in the sa.rne sense as those who 
are psychologically abnormal by some test of incapacity such as the M' Naughten 
rule? The answer to this question has to be 'no* because Macdonald’s test 
only tells us that the person does in fact behave abnormally. Now, from 
this we can no doubt infer psychological abnormality in a trivial sense. For
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example a. postgraduate student is no doubt psychologically abnormal in 
that he is much more interested in an academic subject than tho rest of 
the population but this in no way tells us about a person's ability to 
manage his ovin affairs*
Thus, even if v/e accept Macdonald’s test as a coherent one it picks 
out people who are psychological^abnormal in a total 1,y different sense 
from a test of mental incapacity» Vie can therefore conclude that 
Macdonald's argument is fallacious because he equivocates on the concept 
of'psychological abnormality»
2 * Lady VIootboris Argument
In chapter eight of her book Social Science and Social Pathology 
Lady Wootton argues that it would be far better to do away with the 
concept of responsibility altogether and thus relieve the courts of the 
impossible task of wrestling with logically inadequate criteria of 
re a p ons i b 11 i ty.
Her' argument in outline form goes as follows s
Step 1. The M'Naughten rule is a good, rule in that it is precise and
fairly easy to apply. Non^caprioious decisions about a person's responsibility 
are possible with the M'Naughten rule.
Step 2, Despite the M'Naughten rule's virtue of precision, almost all 
psychiatrists and psychologists believe that it is too exclusive because 
it only deals with the defendant's intellectual capacity to appreciate what 
he is doing, and thus neglects other aspects of his psychological make-up 
such as his emotional state»
Step 3® Professional opinion may be in agreement tha.t the M'Naughten rule
is too exclusive but it certainly is not in agreement about what ought to 
put in its place. Lady Wootton reviews new criteria based on motiveless 
behaviour, unconscious motivations, the presence of standard symptoms of
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psychological abnormalily, etc, and rejects them all as logically unsoundo 
Step 4, This is an intolerable state of affairs because it prevents the 
courts from functioning properly»
Step 5» One solution to this state of affairs would be to do away with
the concept of icosponsibility altogether»
She sums up her argument as follows ; *
Admittedly the idea of ignoring all questions of responsibility in tlie
breatmont of anti-social persons involves so radical a deporture 
from basic presumptions of ancient and honoured legal systems that any 
prospect of its practical acceptance may seem utopian, Nevertheless 
the logic8,1 drive towards that conclusion is very powerful. For, 
once we allow any movement away from a, rigid intellectual test of 
responsibility on M ’Naughten lines, our feet are set upon a slippery 
slope which offers no real resting-place short of the total abandon­
ment of the whole concept of responsibility. All the intermediate 
positions, described in the foregoing pages, have shovm themselves to be 
logically quite insecure. Already in many countries, amongst which 
England must now be included, the first steps down this slope have 
been taloen: and the possibility cannot be dismissed that the relaxation 
of definitions of responsibility which is already in progress is the 
beginning of a process which, in the remoter future, is destined to 
result in the total destruction of the concept itself . (page 249)
She goes on to say that this would involve %
A shift of emphasis in the treatment of offenders away from consider­
ations of guilt and towards choice of whatever course of action 
appeared most likely to be effective as a cure in any particular case.
The legal process for determining who has in fact committed certain
actions would continue as at present i but once the facts had been 
established, the only question to be asked about delinquent persons 
would bes what is the most hopeful way of preventing such behaviour in 
future* (page 251)
It must be pointed out that Lady \7ootton doesn’t see this practical 
treatment of criminals wholly in medical or psychiatric terms. In fact, 
she envisions a sort of "play off" between medical (and psychiatric) 
methods of dealing with criminals and more traditional methods. The 
arbiter in this play-off v/ould be the statistician.
The spelling- of M ’Naughten isn’t standard, I use M ’Naughten because 
it seems to be the most common, but Lady Y/ootton uses McNaughten in
Social Science and Social Pathology *
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She also gives two cautionary notes. The first is th;it in our hurry 
to prevent offenders from committing future crimes we should not neglect 
deterrence to others who are not criminals but might become criminals if 
the sanctions against criminals become too "soft"«
The second warning is bhat ouic treatment methods must be morally 
acceptable0 She particularly mentions capital punishment and brain surgery 
in relation to this consideration.
This argument is unacceptable for two reasons, First, Lady V/ootton only 
refers to the cases in which the question of someone’s . r.snponsibility depends 
upon whether or not he is mentally ill. From the fact that there are 
problems with deciding cases of mental illness, she concludes that we ought 
to give up the principle of responsibility. But what about the vast majority 
of cases in which there is no question of the accused being menteJly ill? 
Ylhat reason do we have for rejecting the principle of responsibility in 
these cases? Lady Wootton simply does not provide an answer to this 
question'^» The second problem with Lady Wootton’s argument is that it could 
equally well be used to defend the IF Naughten rules as to support the 
conclusion that we ought to do away with the principle of responsibility, 
Given that all the proposed replacements of the M ’Naughten rules are 
logically unsound, then it would seem to make just as much sense to retain 
the M ’Naughten rules as to do away with the principle of responsibility*
In fact,'Lady Y/ootton’s argument is an almost transparent failure 
because it does not in any way show that we ought to give up the principle 
of responsibility. Yet judging from the tone of Lady Y/ootton’s argument, 
she clearly thought that she had made a very strong case for tiie abandonment 
of responsibility. This anomaly is explained once we realize that Lady 
Y/ootton makes several assumptions which she never explicitly defends.
* I will have a good deal more to say about this in my section on strict 
liability below*
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Tlioso are : (l) that our present penal system which is based on the
principle of responsibility is ineffective in controlling criri^ t; (2)
that the control of crime could be greatly improved by adopting practical
treatment; and (3) that the principle of responsibility is only valuable
in that it is part of our present legal system, and if this is inoffectivo
in controlling crime,then the principle of responsibility has no value at
all. All throe of these asbumpLions are clearly implicit in the last
paragraph of Lady V/ootton’s discussion of responsibility and mental illness *
Be this as it may, with the elimination of the concept of responsibility 
the moral problems that arise in the treatment of offenders are brought 
into line with those inherent in the use 01 almost any scientific 
instrument * So long as the presumption of responsibility survives, 
a unique complication is introduced into the treatment of the anti- ■ 
socials for methods of high effectiveness may be ruled out, not 
because they are in themselves immoral, but because of the risk of 
conflict with the requi.remonts of this presumption. Only when this 
presumption is removed can science pursue unhindored its morally 
neutral task of designing, in this as in other cases, the method of 
achieving a prescribed aim that is most likely to be effective; but 
whether that instrument be hydrogen bomb, hangman’s noose or analyst’s 
couch, the demonstration of effectiveness is not, and cannot be, by 
itself a command to use* (p. 254)
Here the principle of responsibility is depicted as an outdated and 
unnecessary constraint upon the scientific task of designing effective 
methods of practical treatment. Such treatment must, according to Lady 
Wootton, be morally acceptable, but she clearly believes the concept of 
responsibility has nothing whatsoever tr. do with the morality of practical 
treatmentc
Lady Wootton*s implicit views on responsibility and practical 
treatment help explain why she believes that a patently invalid argument 
provides a strong case for the abandonment of the concept of responsibility. 
She obviously regards the problem of deciding whether people are responsible 
as yet another black mark against the very dubious concept of responsibility.
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But to talce Lady V/ootton’s as simp t ion out in the open in no way strengthens 
her arguments because the cavalier way in which she treats the concept of 
responsibility shows that she is insensitive to a lai?ge number of moral 
considerations which are involved in the replacement of our present legal 
system, which is based on the principle of responsibility, with a practical 
treatment legal system.
Macdonald is equally insensitive to these considerations. Both he 
and Lady Yfootton do not seem to realize that they are advocating drastic 
changes in everyone’s legal rights as well as drastic changes in how we 
think about and act towards our fellow human beings., The three most 
important of these changes are s
,1. The abandonment of standard excuses which are contained in the 
requirement that mens rea must be proved*
2» The abandonment of fixed terms of punishment in favour? of indefinite 
terms of treatment which end when the criminal no longer has a tendency 
toward committing further crimes.
3. A change in our attitude toward criminals ■» from considering them to 
be moral agents to considering bhem to be people who have somehow mal­
functioned and who must be set right. This change could possibly entirely 
erode the concepts of a ’moral agent’ and ’responsibility’, and these ai"e 
very.important concepts in everyday life as well as in the law of torts 
and. contract *
In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss the first two of 
these points and I will then present Feinberg's arguments which offeh some 
solutions to the problems these points raise. The third point is much more 
complex, and I will discuss it at some length in the following two chapters,
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3 0 Mens Rea
Proving mens rea or "guilty mind" consists in showing that a person 
definitely intended to commit the crime in question* For example if the 
crime was committed by mistalce or accidentally then mens rea would not 
exist an.d in general the accused would be acquitted. But notice that in 
the practical treatment legal system advocated by Lady Wootton end Macdonald 
there would be no room for mens rea because they both advocate a legal 
system which is only interested in whether or not the defendant actually 
committed the crime and not in whether he intended to commit the crime* 
Thus, without argument or discussion both Lady Wootton and Macdonald have 
throY/n out one of the most iraportan,t principles of our present legal system: 
the principle that the defendant is guil ly only if mens rea can be proved.
Now, it could be argued that I am just being silly and that mens rea 
would still be taken into account in the new sys-tem, but it would be talcen 
into account by the practical treatment experts and not the courts* Thus, 
the practical treatment experts would treat someone who committed a crime 
by accident or mistalce differently from someone who intentionally committed 
a crime.
But a tremendous change would still have talcen place. In our present 
legal system lack of mens rea is an excuse in the full sense of the word. 
That is, if mens rea can’t be proven then the defendant is released « 
he is judged not guilty of the crime in question. However, in the new 
system we are asked to embrace he would be sent to a practical treatment 
centre where his negligence, inadvertence, "head in the slcy attitude", etc, 
would be treated. For example,’suppose I held the job I talked about in 
my second chapter which involved paying the heating company €315,000 for the 
nev; heating equipment, and suppose I took the computer’s erroneous figure 
of £400,000 as the correct sum to be paid and thus overpaid the heating
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company by £85,000» I would cleai’ly have misappropriated company funds 
but I would have done so by mistake» If my employers decided to charge 
me with fraud I would be acquitted because I didn’t intend to misappropriate 
the money» However, under the new practical treatment legal system I 
would be sent to a practical treatment centre where psychologists would 
presumably try to find out what made me make my mistake and then try to 
prevent me from making more mistakes in the future* Thus, there is no 
question that if we were to adopt this new practical treatment legal 
system, v/e would considerably extend the reach of criminal sanctions, and 
such a move surely requires a justification»
The justification which I believe they had in mind (if they gave 
this matter any thought at all) is simply that once we have done away with 
responsibility it doesn’t matter whether a person is not responsible for 
a crime because he committed it by mistalce or whether he is not responsible 
because although he intended to commit the crime he couldn’t have acted 
otherwise. In either case the defendant has committed a crime and we 
must prevent him from doing so in the future.
But here is a perfect example of putting the goal of crime prevention 
above all other considerations. It may be the case that by treating all 
criminals who committed their crimes inadvertently we would reduce crime, 
although this is by no means certain. However, do we have a right to 
significantly alter someone’s life simply becanse he has made a serious 
mistake or accidentally committed a crime? Would we want to live in a 
society which treated inadvertent criminals? Such a place would, in my 
opinion, be quite intolerable because one’s freedom would constantly be in 
jeopardy. In such a country one could do one’s level best to obey all the 
laws and yet still find oneself in a practical treatment center being- 
treated for carelessness, absentmindedness, or some such problem.
69.
4« Indefinite Sentences
'Indefinite sentence’ can mean several things. It can mean a sentence 
with a fixed minimum and maximum such as one to three years; it can mean 
a sentence with no minimum but a maximum, such as not more than ten years; 
or it can mean a sentence with no minimum and no maximum. The first type 
of indefinite sentence is cojTimon today, especially in America, V/hat this 
type of sentence does is to make explicit what has almost alv/ays been the 
case, that a prisoner can be released on parole before he has served the 
maximum sentence prescribed by lav/ for his crime. The second and third 
types of indefinite sentences are the ones which are applicable to a 
practical' treatment legal system.
The reasoning behind indefinite sentences is fairly simple. It begins 
with the following tv/o premises: (l) We must protect society by preventing 
criminals from committing further crimes. (2) We also should detain a 
criminal no longer than is necessary to achieve (l). From here, it is 
argued that since no one can be siix-e just how long it will take to modify a 
criminal's behaviour, rather than giving a criminal a definite sentence, 
we ought to send him to a practical treatment centre where he will be 
detained until the practical treatment experts are convinced that he shows 
no tendency to commit further crimes. The advantage of this system is that 
criminals who are quickly reformed will be quickly released, and criminals 
who persist in their tendencies toward crime will be detained until they 
no longer show'any tendencies tov/ard crime; in this way, the public will be 
protected, and, in theory, no:.one will be detained longer than necessary. 
There are tw^ o problems with this suggestion. First, it would allow 
many criminals to go free after extremely short periods of detention, and 
this could seriously erode the concepts of responsibility and moral agency»
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I will discuss this problem in the next two chapters. The second problem 
is that with this system many people would bo detained much longer than they 
would have been detained under our present penal system, perhaps even for the 
rest of their lives* This problem is clearly less serious if we adopt the 
second type of indefinite sentence which provides a ma-ximum period of 
detention for practical treatment® If this maximum period wore set at the 
maximum sentence presently set by the criminal lav/ for the crime in question 
then practical treatment would be no different, at least in this respect, 
than our present penal system. However, if the maximum were set at a 
relatively high figure - say, ten years - for all crimes, then we still would 
have a problem because it would be possible to lose one’s f]?eed.om for ten 
years for committing a minor crime. Also, it is not at all uncommon for an 
advocate of practical treatment to advocate indefinite sentences with no 
maximum length. For instance, Lady V/ootton and Macdonald do not even 
discuss the problems involved with indefinite sentences, but simply advocate 
that our present system of committing mentally ill criminals for practical 
treatment ought to be extended to all criminals. Therefore, since criminals 
who are treated in our present system receive indefinite sentences with no 
maximum length, it seems clear that Lady hootton and Macdonald just took it 
■for granted that a practical treatment legal system should involve indefinite 
sentences v/ith out a maximum length.
However, to be fair, Lady Wootton takes greater notice of the problems 
involved in indefinite sentences in her later book, Grime and the Criminal 
Law*. Here she says s
* Lady Wootton, Crime and the Criminal Law, Stevens and Sons, London, 1963*
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If the primary object of a sentence is to discourage further offences 
at the cost of mj.nimal interference with liberty, then the moment at 
which this discouragement is effective enough to justify the offender's 
release can hardly be forecast in advances it must depend upon his 
progress. Logically, therefore, the conception of criminal procedure 
as preventative rather than %junitive involves acceptance of'indeterminate 
sentences. (ppo 112-113)
All the same indeterminacy does, I think, demand safeguards; and I 
would whole-heartedly support both Mr. Walker and Mr. Rupert Cross in 
proposing to leave with the courts, at any rate for the time being, 
the power to fix a maximum period of detention.
(Emphasis mine)(pp.113“114) 
This clearly shows some appreciation of the problem, but I am not at all 
pleased at the underlined section of the above quote. Also, other writers 
quite clearly state their advocacy of indefinite sentences without maximum 
lengths#. Thus, even though indefinite sentences with no maximum length or 
a very long maximum length are not a necessary feature of practical treat­
ment, enough people favour them to make it worth-while to look at them 
rather closely.
Let's assurae for the sake of argument that we do have a right to 
detain a criminal until he shows no tendency to commit further crimes*
It does not follow from this that it is right to allow the practical treat­
ment experts to decide who will be released and who will not. To do so 
would clearly violate the criminal's right to due process of law since the 
length of his detention would be decided by the practical treatment experts 
and not by the courts. This is a very important point because it is surely 
wrong to allow- one man to be detained at the word of another no matter how 
expert that other person is. To do so would be opening the door to any 
number of abuses such as the indefinite detention of dissenters which is now 
widespread in the Soviet Union##.
# See the statement by B.L, Diamond on pages 217-218 in The Mentalfy Abnormal 
Offender, A.U.S. de Reuck and Ruth Rorter, eds,, J. & A. Churchill Ltd., 
London, I968. For a general background of this problem, see pages 188-218 
in this same book,
##See I.E. Stone!"Betrayal by Psychiatry ",in The ITow York Review of Books 
Vol. XVIII, Uo. 2 (Feb. 10 1972).
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To correct this defect in a practical treatment legal'system it would be 
necessary to replace indefinite sentences with short sentences (say one to 
two years) which are renewable upon demonstration in court that the 
criminal is still dangerous. But this method is frought with difficulties 
because there is reason to believe that such judicial hearings have a 
tendency to simply "rubber stamp" the decisions of the experts who are 
treating the criminal in question. The reason for this is that ’dangerous­
ness' or 'tendency to commit crimes’ are not precisely defined terms such 
as 'capital murder' or 'grand theft' and therefore the court has little 
choice but to rely heavily upon expert testimony*
Take for instance what might happen at present in a case where someone 
has been committed to mental hospital and is now trying to secure his 
release through the courts. In such a hearing the psychiatrist in charge 
of the patient is generally questioned about the patient's case history 
and then is .generally asked "In your opinion is the patient likely to injure 
himself or others if he is given his liberty?" If the psychiatrist's answer 
to this question is 'yes' then it is most unlikely that the patient will be 
given his freedom because - short of proving that the psychiatrist is corrupt 
or incompetent - it is virtually impossible for laymen to challenge a 
psychiatrist's opinion,
Bo doubt many people would say that this is just the way things should 
be. They mighj: add that psychiatrists are trained to tell whether or not 
a person is dangerous and they also have a vast amount of experience in 
such matters. Therefore, surely it is better to continue our present system 
of judicial review which depends heavily on expert opinion,
however, I think we should be very skeptical of this argument because 
such a system of judicial review encourages the experts who are treating 
the patient to be very conservative* The exrert is In effect being asked
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to guarantee that the patient will not injure himself or others if he is 
released, because if the expert says that it is safe to release the patient 
and the jiatient then injures somebody the expert will be in a great deal of
trouble. It is, of coui'se, true that the export will not have to pay a
legal penalty for his mistake, but the damage to his professional standing 
could be disastrous especially if the released patient committed a well 
publicised crime. A.S. Goldstein discusses this problem# and he even goes 
so far as to say that "The little information v/e do have suggests that the 
contemporary movement towards liberal release procedures (from mental 
hospitals) is given short shrift when the patient has been committed after 
(or in lieu of) a charge of serious crime",
A concrete example of this problem can be found in the case of Bong 
Yol Yang## which was heard before the United States District Court in 
Washington D.C. on Uovember, l8, I964* It is impossible to quote this case 
at length, but briefly Mr, Yang appeared at the White House on October 5y 
1964 asking to see the President or a representative of the President, He
was questioned by a senior Secret Service officer and he told the officer that
he was a painter who was out of work and that people were always following 
him around and revealing his subconscious thoughts,. He also said that these 
people were going to kill him and that he could not go on living with this 
problem. The Secret Service Officer thought that Mr. Yang was mentally ill
I
I and had him committed to a mental hospital. At tile hearing on Uovember 14,
; Mr. Yang was trying to obtain his release from that hospital,
i
/ # See A.S. Goldstein, "The Mentally Disordered Offender and the Criminal
Law", in The Mentally Abnormal Offender, London, I968,
##Katz _et al, Psychoanalysis Psychiatry and Law, Hew York, 19^7*
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At the hearing testimony was taken from hr. han 1?. Keeney who is a 
Psychiatrist and who had examined Mr. Yang on four separate occasions * 
hr, Keeney testided that Mr, Yang believed that for the last 42 months people 
have been following him and revealing his subconscious thoughts in a way 
which keeps him from getting a job, hr, Keeney also said that Mr, Yang 
had written a large number of letters to government officials trying to get 
them to do something about his problem and that on October 5 tîr. Yang v/as 
trying to ask the President himself to do something about it*
hr, Keeney testified that he believed that Mr, Yang was suffering 
from schizophrenia of a paranoid type. He was then asked to define these 
words in everyday terms and he explained that a person suffering from 
schizophrenia has lost his ability to differentiate between what is real and 
what is not real, and that such a person often has hallucinations, illusions, 
and false beliefs. A paranoid type of sdiizophrenia is diagnosed when these 
delusions are of persecution.
Under cross-examination hr, Keeney said that Mr, Yang had been treated 
at h,0. General Hospital with a tranquilizing drug "but at times there when 
people would question his delusions he would become agitated and disturbed 
to such an extent that it was necessaryto increase this drug considerably*"
The doctor then said, "It is my feeling that his control of his,aggressive 
and hostile impulses in situations where the questioning of these delusions 
comes up is very thin, and that it might brealc through at any time and he 
might attack someoneî Although I must admit I do not have any direct knowledge 
of his ever having attacked anyone • so far." hr, Keeney v/as then asked 
whether this was a possible danger or a real certainty? He replied "It is 
a potential danger, yes.V The defence attorney then asked "Potential or 
possible?" hr, Keeney answered, "I think it is a probable danger*"'
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A few more questions follow concerning the possibility of Mr. Yong 
obtaining tranquflizing drugs if he vuas released from the hospital and 
about Ih?. Yang’s talent as an artist* At the end of these questions the 
defence attorney* moved for a directed verdict in favour of Mr. Yang based 
on the fact that the government had failed to show that Mr. Yang was likely 
to injure himself or others. He gave as reasons for his motion the fact 
that ÎVÎ1U Yang v/as not armed when he visited the Ydiite House and that 
hr. Keeney's testimony was quite vague. He concluded that considering the 
fact that Mr, Yang had never struck anyone the Government had failed to maJre 
a prime facie case for Mr. Yang’s continued detention. To this the judge 
said, "I will deny your motion,"
The hearing then proceeded with testimony from Mr, Yang and then went 
to the jury. The jury decided that Mr, Yang was both mentally ill and 
likely to injure himself and others. Therefore, Mr, Yang was not released 
from detention.
The case clearly illustrates the power of the psychiatrist in a hearing 
of this kind. Despite the fact that Mr. Yang had never injured anyone in 
his life the psychiatrist's opinion that he v/as dangerous was sufficient 
to convince the jury that he ought not to be released*
But even more disturbing than the psychiatrist’s power is the 
incredible vagueness of the phrase "likely to injure himself or others".
This problem -is clearly illustrated by the exchange between Dr. Keeney and 
the defence counsel quoted above. Here Dr. Keeney begins with "potential 
danger" and after being pressed by the defence counsel changes to "probable 
danger". How, presumably if someone is a probable danger he is more likely 
to cause harm than if he is merely a potential danger, but even this
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tightenihg up of language does not get ua very far* "Probable danger" is 
still a very vague term because there are no precise criteria for its use*
For example, are we to say that everyone who has eccentric beliefs and who 
gets agitated when these beliefs are questioned is a potential danger?
Surely not, because this would include a vast niuaber of people many of whom 
are not dangerous at all. For example, virtually all political dissenters 
hold beliefs which, many people would call eccentric and they more often than 
not get very agitated when their views are questioned, but surely we can’t 
say that they ore all probable dangers. I am not saying that such people 
never cause harm but a mere propensity to become agitated coupled with 
eccentric beliefs surely is not sufficient to show that someone is a probable 
danger because there are any number of such people who never become violent 
in any way.
The reason I am stressing this point is that there is a legal principle 
in both the British and American legal systems that laws must be precise 
with as little definitional leeway as possible#* This principle is very 
important because if it did not exist it would be possible to pass laws
which virtually invite government officials to abuse their power. For
example, there is a'law in the Soviet Union a law against anti-Soviet 
activities## which is so vague that the government can suppress virtually any 
activity it dislikes simply by labelling it as anti-Soviet. Also lest we sink 
into a "it can’t happen here" attitude it must be remembered that the United
States flirted with the type of legislation in the hay-day of the House of
representatives Un-American Activities Committee, Thus, in order to preserve 
this principle we must fitgure out some way to define 'dangerouness’ so that
# See Packer, Op. Git. Ghapt. 5*
##See I.F. Stone, Op. Git.
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the periodic hearing will release all those criminals who are no longer 
dangerous and return to the practical treatment centers only those 
criminals who actually are still dangerous. If this isn’t done, not 
only will we have the problem of the practical treatment experts "playing 
it safe" and releasing only those criminals about whose conduct they can be 
absolutely sure, but we will also have greatly increased the potential 
for official abuse of our legal system. In the absence of a precise 
definition of ' dangerousness' the goveriment could for example hold 
political dissidents indefinitely on minor charges (such as disturbing 
the peace) simply by ensuring that the practical treatment experts 
labelled them as dangerous. In short, a free society must exclude from 
its legal system all charges which are so vague that is impossible to defend 
oneself against them, and dangerousness which is not precisely defined 
but merely proclaimed by experts is just such a charge.
But how are we to define dangerousness? Are we to say that anyone 
who is prone to agitation is dangerous? Are we to say that anyone who 
feels that people are against them is dangerous? Are we to say that 
coclqr * unco-operative prisoners are dangerous? Or should w-r consider 
these and other factors as indications of dangerousness and then devise 
some statistical formula which will tell us how likely it is for a person 
to go back to a life of crime upon his release? There is a good reason to 
believe that all such attempts at a definition of * dangerousness’ are 
doomed to failur-e because a person could exhibit all of the above 
indications and still not be dangerous and he could exhibit none of the 
above indications and be extremely dangerous.
Thus, the quest for a precise definition of ’dangerousness' is to 
say the least frought with difficulties * However, this is only to be 
expected because by allowing continued detention for dangerousness we
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would be throwing out yet another important legal principles the principle 
that criminal sanctions may be invoked only for conduct.# This principle 
has alv/ays been of prime importance to a free society because it prevents 
the all too widespread practice of locking up people because they have 
disfavoured beliefs whether they be political, religious, or in some cases 
scientifico This principle is equally important with regard to dangerousnoss. 
I have just argued that a proper definition of 'dangerousness’ is impossible 
to devise* However, there is always the possibility that a government will 
devise a precise but arbitrary definition of 'dangerousness'. Such a 
definition could be the doorway to very severe repression if for example the 
government labelled all people who favoured certain reforms as dangerous* 
Something very similar to this has in fact happened in the Soviet Union whore 
intellectuals have been detained in mental hospitals because of "excessive 
reformist delusions".## If however, we stick to our principle that people 
can only be subjected to criminal sanctions for conduct then such repressive 
practices could not be carried out under the guise of legality.
Thus, the practical treatment legal system advocated by Macdonald and 
Lady Wootton runs counter to no less than three fLindamental legal principles. 
Principles which to ailarge extent distinguish the' legal system of a free 
society from the repressive legal systems found in many parts of thé world 
today. I am not suggesting that Lady Wootton or Macdonald had anything but 
the best intentions when they advocated a practical treatment legal system.
My point is simply that they do not seem to have relized what changes would be 
required for the implementation of such a system. This is turn prevented them 
from considering whether the benefit in the area of crime control provided 
by a practical treatment system is sufficient to offset the very real dangers 
inherent in such a system.
# See Packer, Op, Cit., Chapter 5»
# See I. F, Stone, Op, Cit. ' _____
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5 * F e ln b e rg *  g A rgiirnen tg
In his articlej "Crime, Glutchability, and Individuated Treatment",#
Joel Peinberg' argues that we ought to adopt a system of practical treatment, 
but that we must adopt an elaborate system of safeguards in order to avoid 
the problems I mentioned in the last two sections* His argument is the 
best defense of practical treatment I have seen, so I will discuss it at 
some length.
In outline, his argument consists of four partsj (l) he requires that 
v/e treat "similar cases in similar ways and dissimilar oases in dissimilar 
ways; (2) he then classifies criminals into six different categories; (3) 
he describes the appropriate type of treatment for each; and (4) he describes 
the procedures which will guarantee individuated practical treatment for the 
different types of criminal and still protect the individual criminal’s rights. 
The first step is the principle of formal justice, and Feinberg puts it 
forward without argument; I have no objection to this.
The second step is much longer: it consists of a long discussion of the 
first category, which is mentally ill criminals, and somewhat shorter discuss­
ions of the.other five categories.
Feinberg begins his treatment of.mental illness and crime by saying, 
"Central to the concept of disease in general is the idea of the impairment of 
a vital function, that is, a function of some organ or faculty upon which the 
important or proper functioning of the whole system depends." Examples of 
such impairment would be a heart which is too weak to allow for any exertion or 
a limb which is paralyzed,
Feinberg then turns to the question of whether this model of disease 
applies to mental illness. In his words, "If mental illness shares the generic 
character of sickness, it must then consist in the disabling impairment of
# Joel Feinberg, "Crime, Glutchability and Individuated Treatment"-,-in Doing 
and Deserving. Princeton University Press, Princeton, Hew Jersey, I97O,
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some vital mental function, such as reasoning, remembering, feeling or 
imagining, " He points out that there is little controversy that someone 
with an impaired cognitive function is mentally ill. He argues that few 
people would argue that someone whose memory had failed, who simply could 
not draw any inferences, or who could not distinguish between fact and fantasy 
was sicko
He then goes on to tackle the much more controversial issue of whether .
someone is mentally ill if his emotional or volitional faculties are impaired.
He argues that a satisfactory explication of this type of mental illness is
possible if we carefully distinguish between various senses of symptom,
Peinberg asks us to consider the following example:
Let us imagine that there is a small gland whose secretions into the 
bloodstream help regulate emotional states, Vihen various cells in 
this gland become cancerous, the character of its secretions is subtly 
altered, so that a person falls out of emotional equilibrium easily and tends 
to overreact emotionally to commonplace stimuli. At a certain stage the 
person is subject to powerful moods of melancholy alternating with 
consuming inner rages. Soon his consciousness is pervaded by these 
feelings, and his experience chronically colored by them. Anything done 
or said to him and anything he can turn his attention to in reverie make 
him angry. He finds himself, to his own dismay, rehearsing assaults--and 
murders in his imagination. He is subject to paroxysms of resentment 
and hate. • (p, 257)
Peinberg argues that such a person would clearly be sick because "one 
of his component parts is not performing its regulative function", Peinberg 
then changes the example to one in which the symptoms a,re the same but cannot 
be accounted for by any physical malfunction. He also stresses that the 
person suffers no cognitive impairment - "The victim may still be capable of 
consecutive reasoning and valid inferences; he may suffer no perceptual 
aberrations; and although he may enjoy paranoid fantasies, he does not really 
believe them,"
Peinberg then presents us with the following description of a crime 
committed by this raanï
81.
Suppose instead that he broods for days over exi affront, considers 
measux'es of vengeance, and entertains fantasies in which he inflicts 
the sharpest agonies on his enemy. Gradually fantasy merges into plan 
and plan into action. Still he does not want to take action; he knows 
it is wrong and knows it would endanger himself. For many days he 
constrains himself; but then his angry mood flares up again, and his 
hateful desire regains its frightening strength. On the day of his 
,crime he could have stopped himself yet again. There was not irresist­
ible compulsion to commit the crime then and there; and if there had 
been a "policeman at his elbow" , he surely would not have done it then 
and there* But the crime was "in the cards," and it almost certainly 
would have happened sooner or later. (p. 258)
Bov/-, the crucial question which Feinberg must answer is whether this
man's desires are a product of an illness or a natural expression of his
character. Feinberg answers this question by drawing an analogy between a
person with a fever and the person in our examples
Fever is a symptom of underlying subfunctional impairment (such as 
infection) in a stronger sense of "symptom" than that in which a desire 
for water is a symptom of fever* In the stronger sense, a symptom is an 
infallible indication (a sufficient condition) of the presence of 
something else: in the weaie sense, a symptom is a mere sign or clue, 
or ground for suspicion. The mentally ill jmm's morbid desire to kill is 
a symptom of his illness in roughly the way the physically ill man's 
craving for water is a symptom of his fever. One can lust to kill without 
being ill, just as one can be thirsty v/ithout having a fever. On the 
other hand, the chronically gloomy moods and inner rages are, like the 
fever, in themselves sickness, that is, states of being in which a 
person cannot function properly; and, further, they are symptoms (in 
the strong sense) of some underlying part-functional impairment.
(p. 259)
He then distinguishes a third sense of symptoms : ■
If our suspicions of underlying illness, based on the occurrence of 
the hateful (or thirsty) desire are confirmed, then what w-e took to 
be a sign of possible illness is now seen to be an actual symptom in 
still a third sense. The desire is a necessary consequence of the 
pathological condition; given fever, it is necessary that there by 
dryness, and, given morbid inner rages of the appropriate type, it is 
necessary that there be mur'derous desires. (pp,259"260)
He concludes that if the murderous desires are symptoms in this strong
third sense, then they are a product of an illness and not a natural
expression of his character.
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Having shown to his satisfaction that his first category of sick 
criminals is logically sound, Peinberg goes on to categorize other criminals 
v/ho are not mentally ill. These are i
2o The self-interested risk-taker who commits a crime in order to achieve 
gain. He has weighed the risks of being caught against the benefit to be 
obtained from committing the crime and he decides to commit the crime*
Peinberg's example is a respectable bank teller who embezzles money.
3. The fallen sinner who is a good man who succumbs to temptation.
4. People who commit crimes to advance a cause other than their own and 
often at great personal cost. Such crimes can be intended to "advance or 
retard a cause, to help a loved one, or to hurt an enemy".
Criminals who are completely alienated from the ideals of the society 
at large. Peinberg's examples of this type are young provincial hooligans, 
people at war with society, and committed professional criminals*
6, Psychopaths of whom Peinberg says : "(they) commit one petty crime after 
another, are convicted, imprisoned, reassigned to hospitals, released, only 
to begin the familiar pattern of pointless self“damaging crime again,"
The appropriate treatment for the first category of criminal is presumably 
some sort of psychiatric or psychological treatment, although Peinberg is not 
In any way specific about this.
He argues that criminals of the second and third type ou^ht to be 
punished. Of the second type of criminal he says, "His is the type we have 
in mind when we speak of 'gain' as a motive and talk of punishment as a 
'pricing system' and the criminal as 'paying his debt' and "wiping his 
moral slate clean*" Punishment is also appropriate for the fallen sinner 
because it may lead to repentance. He sums up by saying that punishment
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provides rationally self-interested men self-interested motives to obey the
law and, once they have disobeyed the law, the necessary means of repentance.
He then argues that these points apply to the third category of criminal to
a lesser degree because, since such criminals are not completely self-
interested, they are less likely to be deterred by the threat of punishment
and because they are advancing a cause other than their own, they are less
likely to repent, Peinberg concludes by saying,'"The dedicated zealot, the
revolutionary, the Robin Hood bandit, the man overcome by love or pity (or
hate for that matter) are not as likely to repent for their crimes as the
ambitious bourgeois embezzler*"
Peinberg declares that punishment has no application at all to the
fourth category of criminal because, since they have' not sinned against their
own ideals, they are very unlikely to repent. Also he argues that punishment
is unlikely to deter them from committing crimes because, while they may
weigh risks with regard to the decision to commit a particular crime, they
usually do not weigh the risks of the criminal or noncriminal lives
generally* Peinberg sums up here by saying :
Thus methods end tools other than the price tag and the penitentiary 
seem called for as a response to those in this category; persuasion, 
re-education, integration into thelarger community, provision of a 
stake in it and a new source of pride. Intimidation "reforms" only 
the cco.wardly and dispirited from this group. (pp. 261-262)
Of psychopaths Peinberg simply states the usual problems that this type
of criminal presents because they completely lack prudence, conscience, the
ability to think about the future, and the ability to care about other people’s
feelings. Because this condition is incurable in adults (or at least widely-
thought to be incurable), Peinberg advocates that they "be consigned
permanently to ’places of safety' that are neither hospitals nor prisons but
are pleasant and only minimally restrictive,"
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Having made this classification, Feinberg sets about making suggestions
about how we ought to-reform our penal system. He begins by saying precisely
what he means by punishments
What distinguishes punishment from alternative modes of response is that 
it is a form of deliberately hard treatment ths/t expresses blame and 
condemnation^ It is a forceful and emphatic way of impressing upon 
the wrong-doer the public judgement tho/b he has done wrong and that 
society resents him for it. Punishment is a hard fa,te for the criminal 
. and also a symbolic way of telling him that he has deserved his hard
fate, that ho has it coming, that it serves him right. When we punish,
as S;amuel Butler's visitor to Erewhon put it, "v/e add contumely to our 
self-protection," and we rub it in. It is true, of course, that punish­
ment may have extra-punitive effects; punishing we may sometimes 
reform, deter, cure, intimidate, instruct, or detain* But In punishing 
we (necessarily) condemn and inflict pain that is meant to be ignominious 
and shameful. (pp. 263-264)
And again he stresses that he does not believe that it is appropriate for
any but the second, third, and possibly fourth categories of criminal. He
therefore suggests that we become much more flexible in dealing with criminals,
Sound policy would therefore seem to require a wide variety of types of
institutions for treating criminals and great administrative flexibility 
in procedures for selecting among them. But here is the catch* 
Flexibility presupposes discretion and liberty to experiment. These 
in turn presuppose freedom from rigid statutory impediments. But such 
freedom is a form of power over human beings,and relatively unanswerable 
power at that. YHiatever the defects of the traditional system that 
preserved the linkage between crime and punisiiment, it at least offered 
the protections of due process to the criminal from first arrest to final 
release. If we break that lihlc, do we not also sever the connection 
between crime and responsible legal procedures? (p.264)
Peinberg proposes to deal with this problem by introducing the concept
of a "clutch line". In his words ;
..othe criminal trial becomes a mere preliminary hearing to establish 
whether the state has the right to get a defendant in its clutches. If 
convicted, the accused is properly under the state's control. He can 
no longer decide his own fate, and it is up to the authorities to decide 
what kind of treatment, if any, to impose upon him, (p. 265)
Feinberg then tries to outline procedures which would guarantee an
individual's freedom both before and after the clutch line has been passed*
He argues that before the clutch line is crossed someone must have committed
an act proscribed by law or cvitted to perform an act required by law. He
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rejects out of hand the suggestions that anyone ought to get into the law's
clutches simply because he has a character flaw or neurotic symptom that
makes him a dangerous person. He rightly points out that being a dangerous
person has only been a crime in the most oppressive of societies. He also
rejects Lady Wootton's position that once it has been shown that someone has
committed a crime, then he ought to be in the state's clutches regardless of
whether he has committed the crime intentionally or by mistake, by accident,
or under duress. He concludes that before the state has a right to get a
defendant into its clutches, it must prove that he actually committed the
crime in question and that he did it intentionally (or, in some cases,
negligently or recklessly)* In short, the state must prove both that the
defendant performed the act in question and mens rea.
But now what happens after the criminal has passed the clutch line and is
in the state's power? Peinberg argues that
Procedures must be devised to make possible the assignment of clutchables 
to appropriately individualized modes of treatment and also the effect­
ive protection at every stage of their right not to be mistreated. 
Glutchability must involve at least temporary forfeiture of not only 
the right to liberty of movement but also the right to privacy. If the 
system is to have any chance of working, the clutchable will be subjected 
to tests, interviews and measurements. Many of the . Inquiries that 
were banned at the first trial now become centrally important; inquiries 
into his motives in committing the crime, his.ulterior objectives, and 
his emotional states, his cognitive capacities, his affective 
dispositions; his praise- or blameworthy traits of character, his 
attitudes and beliefs. (pp. 268-269)
I should think that such inquiries, if unimpeded, could yield evidence 
of high reliability, even in our present backward state of social 
scientific knowledge, that the convicted clutchable is either a clear case 
of one or another of the main categories of criminal - gambling consumer, 
fallen sinner, class enemy, mentally disturbed or whatever - or else 
a marginal case,or otherwise one not easily classifiable. This evidence 
then would be presented at another hearing to a committee of post- 
clutch-line judges, perhaps composed of jurists, sociologists, psychologists 
and lay jurymen in equal numbers, with the prisoner's lawyer present 
to challenge parts of it if he wishes, hut not necessarily in accord­
ance with the strict assignments of presumptions and burdens and other 
procedures characteristic of the adversary system. The prisoner himself 
would be interrogated by the committee? and, finally, a decision would 
be reached either to release him outright as no longer dangerous or 
to condeiTiii him to penal servitude for a time-period with a fixed upper 
limit , or fine him, or parole him under supervision, or assign him to a 
mental hospital, or rehabilitory work camp, or some comfortable but 
permanent "place of safety", (pp. 269-270)
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Finally, Peinberg tackles the problem of a prisoner’s falling under the 
arbitrary power of some doctor or administrator "who regards him as too 
dangerous ever to be released*" Peinberg proposes three separate safeguards 
against such a problem and argues that we ought to adopt all three. First, 
there must be someone to look after the prisoner’s interests. If friends 
are not available to do this, Peinberg argues that the state must appoint 
officials to do so* Second, he argues that there must be an elaborate system
of appeals, not only for the original court decision, but also for the
decisions of the assignment committees and of the penal and therapeutic 
authorities. Third, there must be periodic reviews at regular intervals*
Feinberg deserves credit for making a genuine effort to solve the problems 
I mentioned in the last two sections. His retention of the doctrine of mens 
rea and his provision of an elaborate appeals procedure make his suggestions 
vastly superior to the systems proposed by Macdonald or Lady Wootton,
However, I will now argue that Peinberg’s proposals are unacceptable for two 
reasons: (l) He still advocates detaining people indefinitely because they 
are dangerous. I will argue that this is unacceptable because dangerousness 
is such an ill-defined concept that even with elaborate procedures for appeals 
and review, the accused is basically in the intolerable position of not 
knowing what charges are pending against him. (2) Peinberg advocates
abandoning the principle of responsibility (at least with regard to blame and
punishment) and the adoption of practical treatment on the basis that it Is 
just that v;e treat the different categories of criminals in different ways 
and that by doing so we will reduce crime, I will argue that he is wrong 
on both counts,
In the last section, I argued that ’dangerousness’ must be precisely 
defined if the accused is to have any chance of defending himself against 
expert opinion. Peinberg in no v/ay solves this problems in fact, his
proposals seem to highlight it. He proposes that the criminals be categorized 
as "gambling consumer, fallen sinner, class enemy, mentally disturbed, or 
whatever." Of these, only the first two would go to penal institutions for 
a period of time with a fixed upper limit; the others would go to "a mental 
hospital, or rehabilitatory work camp, or some comfortable but permanent 
•place of safety'," It is this latter group which will most need the protect­
ion of Peinberg's system of appeals and reviews. But just what would these 
appeal and review hearings have to decide? Among other things, they would have 
to decide whether a criminal has an impaired emotional or volitional part- 
function or whether he is a class enemy, I will now argue that neither of 
of these concepts is precise enough to properly be part of the criminal law* 
Peinberg argues that if we agree that there can be impairments of 
cognitive part-functions, then there is no reason to believe that there cannot 
be impairments of emotional or volitional part-functions and, therefore, that 
criminals can be sick even if they do not come under the M'Baughten rules 
which only refer to cognitive impairments. On a purely theoretical level this 
'may indeed be true, but this does not show tho;b mental illness due to some 
impairment of a volitional or emotional part-function is as precisely definable 
as mental illness due to the impairment of cognitive .part-functions, and 
unless something can be precisely defined, I respectfully submit that we ought 
to be very loath to malce it part of the criminal law.
This problein is well illustrated by Feinberg's ‘example of a man who has 
constant inner rages. This is due to an impairment of a part-function, but of 
what part-function? Peinberg does not tell us, and this is a very serious 
defect in his argument, because unless we have a precise description of the 
part-function and how it operates in a normal person we know very little. 
Peinberg tells us that the murderous desires of the man in his example are a 
symptom of his morbid inner rages, and the morbid inner rages are a symptom
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of the impairment of a part-function. The question is, how do we tell morbid 
inner rages which are the result of an impaired part-function from just plain 
ordinary inner rages which are not the result of an impaired part-function?
For Feinberg's account of mental illness to be sound, we must be able to do 
this and, before we can do this, we must have a precise description of the 
normal part-function.
Feinberg would no doubt reply that surely you cannot say that someone who 
constantly rages at practically everything is normal * The man simply cannot cope 
with everyday life. He rages at things such as his neighbour typing in the 
adjoining flat or someone failing to say hello to him on the street*
But is this true? VBiat distinguishes the mein in Feinberg's example from 
an extremely nasty person who rages at everyday occurrences? I do not know
the answer to this and I do not loiow how we can ever get an answer to this
without first precisely defining the part-function which is supposed to be 
impaired in Feinberg's example*
However, even if we grant that the man in Feinberg's example has an 
impaired part-function, we must remember that Feinberg has, understandably 
enough, chosen an extreme example in order to illustrate his point. But, 
for his explication of mental illness based upon the impairment of a part- 
function to be of any use in the criminal law, he must tell us how to tell
a sick rage from a normal one in cases which are much less clear-cut* One
possible way of going about this would be to refer, to "reasonable ra,;es".
That is, someone would not be considered to be mentally ill if there were 
reasons for his rages* For exaraple, it would not be considered sick to lose 
one’s temper if someone deliberately annoyed you day after day by dumping 
leaves and trash in your garden, blocking your driveway, or playing music 
very loud late at night*
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But even here we are on shaky ground because what counts as a proper 
reason for going into a rage is difficult to pin down and may even be ideol­
ogically coloured. Take, for instance, someone who believes very strongly 
some left or right wing ideology. If he is a right-winger, he might rage 
at all things in the news which in any way smack of socialism, such as 
nationalization of 'industry, welfare projects, trade union activities, etc.
If he is a left-winger, he might rage at tax relief for big business, high 
salariés for people in management positions, arguments that workers* wage 
demands are unreasonable, etc. Given the present state of the world, either 
man will no doubt have something new to rage about practically every day, 
although when Labour is in power the right-winger will do a bit more raging 
than the left-winger and vice versa. Anyone who has known such radicals can 
testify that they can get absolutely livid simply by reading newspapers or 
watching television. Are such rages normal or are they due to the impairment 
of an emotional part-function? Vieil, in either case, the person would have a 
reason for his rages, but he would also be flying into a rage in situations 
in which most people would not bat an eye. It very much boils down to what 
you call a proper reason for flying into a rage, and this can be an issue 
with strong ideological overtones. For example, in the Soviet, Union, the 
right-winger might be considered to have an impaired emotional part-function, 
while the left-winger might be considered perfectly normal, and the situation 
might be reversed in Spain or even in some partd of the United States*
My point here is not that there is no such thing as an impaired emotional 
or volitional part-function. Clearly people vary tremendously in their 
emotional stability and their ability to control themselves. My point is only 
that considerations of emotional and volitional part-functions have no place 
in the criminal lav/ because they are such vague concepts that, in many cases,
# This is a very important question since radicals commit their share of 
crimes and these crimes are often violent*
90.
;lt is impossible to come to precise, impartial decisions about them. In
short, if someone is charged with murder, he knows what the charge against
him means and he can defend himself against it, but if he is charged with
having an impaired emotional part-function, he simply would not Imow what the
charge meant and would be at a real disadvantage in conducting his defense.
Here it might be objected that since I do not object to the M'Haughten rules
I cannot object to including considerations of emotional and volitional part-
functions in the criminal law. However, I do not object categorically to
considerations of emotional or volitional part-functions* I only object to
them if they are poorly defined as they are at present. In my section on
Macdonald’s ar-guments, I stated that I was perfectly willing to admit that the
M*Naughten rules could be improved upon or possibly added to. Here it is
worth noting that one of the reasons that the M*Naughten rules are precise is
that they deal only with extreme impairments of cognitive part-functions.
Someone has to be so far gone that he does not know what he is doing or that
he does not know that it is wrong.# Also, since the M'Naughten rules deal
only with extreme cases, we avoid the ridiculous situation in which a very
large number of criminals are classified as mentally ill. Thus, if we are to
successfully expand the M*Naughten rules to cover impairments of emotional and
volitional part-functions, we should only allow extreme impairments of these
part-functions to count as part of the legal definition of mental illness.
For example, if a precisely worded rule could be devised under which only
extreme cases such as Feinberg’s constantly raging man would count as mentally
ill because of an impaired emotional part-function, I would have no objection
# It must be remembered that this second condition refers to clear cases of 
wrong such as murder, not to ignorance of new tax laws or the like.
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to including this rule in the criminal lav/. Such a rule would be precise 
enough to allow someone to defend himself against a charge of having an 
impaired part-function and it would avoid the ridiculous and dangerous situation 
in which anyone who gets extremely emotional or excited (such as people with 
radical political views) would be considered to be mentally ill because of an 
impaired emotional or volitional part-function.
Possibly even more disturbing is Peinberg*s notion of a, "class enemiy"*
He never says exactly what he means by this, but I assume he is referring to 
many of the criminals who fit into his fourth and fifth categories such as 
dedicated zealots, revolutionaries, Robin Hood bandits, young provincial 
hooligans,, or committed professionals. But again, how does one go about proving 
that he is not a revolutionary or a committed professional criminal? These 
may seem to be better defined charges than the charge of having an impaired 
emotional part-function and indeed, in one sense, they are because we 
certainly do laiow what it means to be a revolutionary or a professional criminal. 
But the question is how one goes about proving that one is no longer a 
revolutionary or professional criminal and this is by no means clear. In 
effect, Feinberg is advocating that in order to secure his release the criminal 
must show that he is no longer dangerous, and as I argued in the last section, 
a system of criminal law which requires this is unacceptable,
. Here it most likely would be objected that I am Ignoring the many
advantages, of a^system of practical treatment and •over-emphasizing the 
disadvantages and that indefinite sentences are a small price to pay for the 
more just and less crime-ridden society practical treatment would provide.
I will discuss these and other defenses of practical treatment in the remainder 
of this chapter and in the next two chapters.
It is clear from the quoted passages above that Feinberg believes that
his system of practical treatment is in line with the principle of formal 
justice, that is, that we should treat similar cases in similar ways and
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dissimilar cases in dissimilar ways « His reasoning is that the people v/ho fall 
into hisssix categories of crinil.nals differ v/idely enough', to merit being dealt 
with in different ways, Hov/ever, the principle of formal justice can be 
satisfied by a radically .immoral legal system. For example, a legal system 
which punished all thieves who stole less than £100 by death and all thieves 
who stole more than £100 by torture followed by death would satisfy the 
principle of formal justice because we would be treating similar oases in similar 
ways and dissimilar oases in dissimilar ways. In other words, while Feinberg 
is absolutely right to say that we should abide by the principle of forma], 
justice, he also.must provide a morally acceptable way of distinguishing among 
different types of cases,
Feinberg’s method of distinguishing anong cases is simply that we should 
deal with each type of criminal in such a way as to maximize the control of 
crime. This is why Peinberg classified criminals according to their motivation 
rather than, say, according to the seriousness of their crimes. He therefore 
advocates punisiiment for those whom he believes will be prevented from committing 
crimes by punishment and treatment of various kinds for the rest (excepting 
psychopaths who will be detained permanently)• But clearly there are many 
considerations other than the control of crime which must be taken into account 
when v/e formulate a policy for dealing with criminals. For example, in the 
name of crime control, Feinberg advocates sentences of a fixed length for 
criminals of the ^second and third categories and sentences of indefinite length 
for all other categories except psychopaths, "These indefinite sentences can 
vary from immediate release after being thoroughly interviewed to detention for 
a very long period of time if someone is considered dangerous.
These suggestions bring up some very serious moral problems. First, it 
seems that the criminals from the second and third categories who will receive 
definite sentences get by far the better deal. It is true that some criminals 
from the other categories will be released outright once the interviews and
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tests show that they are no longer dangerous, but others mighi; bo detained 
for the rest of their lives or for very long periods of time. Also, those 
who receive definite sentences at least know when they will regain their 
freedom; those who receive indefinite sentences do not have the comfort of such 
knowledge*
This point seems to be completely lost on Feinberg, quite possibly 
because he has fallen into the trap of believing that pujiislment is burdensome 
while treatment is not. This is shown by what he says in the quoted passage 
where he distinguishes punishment from other responses to criminals* Feinberg 
is quite right to point out that punishment must express blame and condemnation, 
but to call it "deliberately hard treatment" is quite misleading because to 
be detained in a properly run penal institution of the type I have already 
described is no more "hard" than to be detained for practical treatment. In 
both cases, the inmate must bear the very heavy burden of losing his freedom* 
However, in the case of practical treatment, the loss of freedom is indefinite*
Thus, in his hurry to control crime Feinberg certainly seems to have 
ignored many other moral considerations. In the next two chapters, I will 
argue that these other moral considerations maice a very strong case for the 
retention of the principle of responsibility rather ;thfin the adoption of a 
system of practical treatmento
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7JUSTICE AND MORAL DESIRABILITY
In this jmd the next chapter, I will discuss the actual advantages and 
disadvantages of a practical treatment legal system as opposed to a legal 
system based upon the principle of responsibility. In this chapter, I will 
argue that justice and what might be called the moral quality of our everyday 
lives will be served best by a legal system based upon the principle of 
responsibility. In the next chapter, I will discuss the two major arguments 
in favour of a practical treatment legal system, which are that practical 
treatment is more humane and more effective in controlling crime than a legal 
system based on the principle of responsibility,
1, Justice
In the last section, I argued that Feinberg was not justified in assuming 
that the interests of justice would be served by providing individuated 
treatment for his six categories of criminal. However, the issue of justice 
plays an important role in the defense of a practical treatment legal system, 
and therefore, I must consider it in greater detail.
Stated in simple terms, the basic issue is that if the thesis of deter­
minism is true, then it follows that people never deserve blame or punishment 
for any of their actions. From this it follows that a legal system based upon 
the principle of responsibility necessarily involves injustice because to 
administer undeserved blame and punishment is clearly unjust, I will discuss 
this problem in two stages. First, I will consider a famous attempt by 
Professor P.F, Strawson to show that this problem is misconceived because we 
cannot, in fact, avoid holding people responsible for their actions. After I 
have discussed the strengths and weaknesses of Strawson's argument, I will 
proceed to what I believe to be a more satisfactory solution to this problem*
.In his lecture entitled "Freedom and Resentment" before the British Academy 
in 1962,Professor P.F, Strawson addressed himself directly to the above objection
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by identifying "optimists" v/ho deny tho.t tJie above objection haw any force
and "pessimists" who believe that this objection is valid:
Some optimists about determinism point to the efficacy of the practices 
of punishment, an.d of moral condemnation and approval, in regulating 
behaviour in socially desirable ways * In the fact of their efficacy, 
they suggest, is an adequate basis for these practices; and this fact 
certainly does not show determinism to be false. To this the pessimists 
reply, all in a rush, that just punishment and moral condemnation imply 
moral guilt and guilt implies moral responsibility and moral responsibility 
implies freedom and freedom implies the falsity of determinism, (page l88)
Strawson then reviews the two standard moves which optimists have made
in order to convince pessimists that determinism is compatible with punishment
and moral blame* The first move is to argue that the freedom required for
moral blame and punishment is simply the absence of certain conditions which
if present would make it improper to punish or blame. These a,re conditions such
as compulsion, feeble mindedness, insanity, etc. The optimist maintains that in
the absence of conditions such as these we are justified in holding someone
morally responsible for their actions. The second move is to point out that
even if determinism is true people still intend to do things and then act on
these intentions, and therefore do in fact act for reasons which are in a very
real sense their own, However, Strawson's pessimist rejects both of these
moves in the following words :
But why does freedom in this sense justify blame, etc*? You turn towards 
me first the negative, and then the positive, faces of a freedom which 
nobody challenges. But the only reason you have given for the practices 
of moral condemnation and punishment in oases where this freedom is 
present is the efficacy of these practices in regulating behaviour in 
socially desirable ways. But this is not a sufficient basis, it is not 
even the right sort of basis, for these practices as we understand them*
How Strawson makes an interesting attempt to bring the pessimist and
the optimist together. He argues, that the practices of moral blame and
punishment are, so to speak, "built into" every human being and therefore
could never be eschewed completely*
Strawson begins by considering ordinary human interactions and the
attitudes these engender. He points out that when someone displays an
96,
attitudo of goodwill, affection, or ectoejn to ooinoone eloe, the second 
person usually reacts by displaying what Strawson calls a ’'reactive attitudo”
which in these circumstances would be gratitudec Similarly when faced with
someone displaying "contempt, indifference, or malevolence" people tend to
display the reactive attitude of resentmento
However, Strawson points out that people need not display a reactive
attitude toward the actions of other people. In some cases Strawson argues
that v/e ought to and generally will adopt what he calls an objective attitude
which he describes as followss
To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to see him, 
perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a 
wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as something certainly 
to be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, of ; to be managed 
or handled or cured or trained;
Also Strawson argues that objective attitudes can be either toward 
particular actions of people who in general would be subject to reactive 
attitudes or to all the actions of a person. An example of the first would 
be when someone injures me by mistake. Here I would suspend my normal reactive 
attitude of resentment* but I would still assume that the person who injured me 
would under other circumstances still be a suitable candidate for a reactive 
attitude.
However, if someone is insane, feeble minded, delirious etc. we would 
suspend our reactive attitudes toward all of his actions and adopt a uniform 
objective attitude toward him.
Having given us this framework Strawson asks the following question on 
Page 195s
What effect would, or should, the acceptance of the truth of a general 
thesis of determinism have upon these reactive attitudes? liore specifically 
would, or should, the acceptance of the truth of the thesis lead to the 
decay or repudiation of all such attitudes? Would, or should, it mean 
the end of gratitude, resentment, and forgiveness; of all reciprocated 
adult loves; of all the essentially personal antagonisms?
* Provided, of course, that the mistake was a reasonable one, scnethi'' ■ 
which genuinely could not be helped, I might still resent someone if he 
injured me by mistake but the mistake was due to carelessness.
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Strawson answers those questions by first saying on page 197 that, "A
sustained objectivity of inter-personal attitude, aid the human isolation
which that would entail, does not seem to be something of which human beings
would be capable, even if some general truth were a theoretical ground for it"»
Strawson then goes on to point out that the reason we adopt the objective
attitude toward a particular person is that he is deranged, immature or for some
other reason outside the reach of normal human relationships, or we raay:-.adopt
an objective attitude to normal people for reasons of self-protection or policy.
His point here is that in neither case do we adopt the objective attitude because
we believe that determinism is true* He sums up his answers by saying;
So my answer has two parts. The first is that we cannot, as væ are, 
seriously envisage ourselves adopting a thorou^i going objectivity of 
attitude to ôthers an a result of theoretical conviction of the truth 
of determinism; and the second is that when we do in fact adopt such an 
■ attitude in a particular case, our doing so is not the consequence ox a 
theoretical conviction which might be expressed as ’Determinism in this 
case* , but is a consequence of our abandoning, for different reasons 
in different cases, the ordinary inter-personal attitudes.
Strawson then goes on to mention the objection which must be forming
in every reader’s mind by saying î
It might be said that all this leaves the real question unanswered, and 
that we cannot hope to answer it without knowing exactly what the thesis 
of determinism is. For the real question is not a question about what 
we actually do, or why we do it. It is not even a question about what 
we would in fact do if a certain theoretical conviction gained general 
acceptance. It is a question about what it would be rational to do if 
determinism were true, a question about the rational justification of 
ordinary inter-personal attitudes in general. To this I shall reply, 
first, that such a question could seem real only to one who had utterly 
failed to grasp the purport of the preceding answer, the fact of our 
natural hujnah commitment to ordinury inter-personal attitudes. This 
commitment is part of the general framework of human life, not something 
that can come up for review as particular cases can come up for review 
within this general framework. And I shall replyq second, that if we 
could imagine what we cannot have, viz, a choice in this matter, then we 
could choose rationally only in the light of an assessment of the gains 
and losses to human life, its enrichment or impoverishment; and the 
truth or falsity of a general thesis of determinism would not bear on 
the rationality of this choice*
Here I must maJxe two points. First, the fact that we could not sustain 
a totally objective attitude toward our fellow human being's does nox mean 
that we could not be induced to adopt an objective attitude in many more
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situations than wc do in fact now adopt that attitude. Second, from the
fact that wo presently adopt the objective attitude for reasons other than
a belief that tlio thesis of determinism is true, it doesn’t follow that a
belief that ‘blio thesis of determinism is true would not induce us to adopt
objective atiitudes in areas we do not normally adopt them today*
If these two points arc well-founded, and I will soon argue that they are,
then the question Strawson dismisses as unreal is not so silly after all.
If the belief that the thesis of determinism is true can alter our pattern
of adopting the objective attitude toward people then "the natural human
commitment to ordinary inter-personal attitudes" is more subject to review
than Strawson seems to think.
In what cases would a belief that the thesis of•determinism is trpe
cause us to change from reactive attitudes to objective attitudes? I do
not believe tho/b many cases involving what Strawson calls personal reactive
attitudes (e.g* gratitude, resentment, etc.) would be vei-y much affected by
such a belief, hut Strawson also identifies vicarious analogues of personal
reactive attitudes. I will argue that a belief in the truth of the thesis of
determinism has caused people to give up vicarious reactive attitudes in
favor of objective attitudes,
Strawson described these vicarious analogues in the following words :
They are reactions to the qualities of others' wills, not toward 
ourselves, but toward others, because of this impersonal or vicarious 
character, we give them different names, Thus one who experiences the 
vicarious analogue of resentment is said to be indignant or disapproving, 
or morally indignant or disa])proving*
The various analogues of reactive attitudes and the objective attitudes 
to which they are opposed are of special interest because these are the types 
of attitudes which officials of all kinds must adopt, and whether they adopt 
a vicarious reactive attitude or an objective attitude is a very important 
issue. For example, a personnel manager who is inclined to adopt vicarious
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reactive attitudes would consider o;i employee who was constantly tardy to he 
at fault and therefore a proper object of disapproval and disciplinary action* 
However, a personnel manager who is inclined toward objective attitudes might 
consider the employee to be in need of some type of treatment to enable 
him to face his job better.
How, we must answer two questions t (l) Is it possible to replace to a 
significant extent vicarious reactive attitudes with objective attitudes?
(2) Can a belief in the truth of •bhc thesis of determinism lead us to such av: 
replacement? I will argue that the answer to both questions is, ’yes’.
The most clear-cut cases of tlie belief that the thesis of determinism is 
true influencing people to adopt objective attitudes rather than vicarious 
reactive attitudes are cases which have to do with law and the courts. For ' 
example, there are any number of psychiatrists who believe that because 
determinism is true we ought to treat all criminals in an objective manner.
J.E. Macdonald, discussed above, is a good example.
But the shift to objective attitudes is also in evidence in university 
administrations and in personnel management in a wide variety of industries 
and government departments. An interesting example is the subtle but noticeable 
shift in the attitudes' of university administrators especially in America. The 
shift is from considering those students who do not work hard as lazy, to viewing 
them as suffering from a lack of motivation. At first glance it may seem that 
they have merely substituted a fancy synonym for ’lazy’ but this is not the 
case. The two expressions and the attitud.es-wlnicb go with them are very 
different. Notice that à student is said to suffer from a lack of motivation 
while a student is said to l^e^ lazy* The former expression implies that the 
student cannot help but not work hard because he is suffering from that dread 
malady, lack of motivation, but if we say that a student is lazy we imply that 
he is to blame. This is a clear switoli from a reactive attitude to an objective
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jV/itch from disapproving of siibstaridaj^ ’d performance v;i;ioh is 
considered to be within the control of the student to viewing such . substandard 
performance as a symptom of a malady which is beyond the student’s control** 
This shift from reactive to objective attitudes is very much in evidence 
in the field of persojinel management. Some managers have only flirted with 
objective attitudes by requiring or urging their employees to take "sensitivity 
training” or attend "group encounter sessions" in the hope that these will 
help the employees get rid of their inhibitions, or emotional problems or, 
more colloquially, their "hang-ups" and thus help them to do better work.
This again is a subtle shift from reactive attitudes to objective attitudes, 
but an important one none the less because it is a shift from the view that 
a normal human being can run his own affairs toward the view that all human 
beings have problems which can only be remedied by undergoing some form of 
treatment.
However, some managers have taken the objective view completely to heart
and view their employees’ performance not in terms of what they could do if
they tried or what they ought to do, but rather in terms of what they can be
induced to do by various means. Now, I must make it clear that I am not
talking about inducements such as fair pay and good working conditions.
The belief that good work will only be forthcoming if workers are fairly paid
and provided with proper working conditions, could hardly be considered an
objective attitude. My argument concerns the way managers view substandard
work given a background of fair pay and good working conditions. In fact my
example is a Canadian service organization which employs people in a
* I have only mentioned higher education here because the students in 
institutions of higher education are adults, and the issues raised by 
objective and reactive attitudes are most clear-cut when dealing with adults. 
VHien dealing with children (especially young children), we are sometimes 
justified in adopting objective attitudes rather than reactive attitudes, 
but my points in favour of reactive attitudes hold for children in a large 
majority of oases. Professor R.S, Downie, Miss Elizabeth Teller, and Miss 
Eileen Loudfoot make this point very well in Education. and Poreorial 
Relationships, Methuen and Company, London,1974,pp. 139-142*
101.
capacity which might be called "lay social workers". These people had no 
professional qualifications and, in view of this, their pay of £2800 must be 
considered excellent. Also they worked in a building which was not only 
brand-new, but truly first-class.
Although several of these lay social workers were excellent, there 
were several others who consistently avoided their fair share of the work.
The manager's way of dealing with this displayed a total objectivity of 
attitude. Never did he blame them for their poor work or say that they 
ought to do more. Instead, a large number of meetings were held at which he 
tried to find out the causes of their lack of motivation and how their 
jobs might be made more interesting. The methods all failed, but he shied 
away from the obvious solution of dismissing the,poor workers and hiring 
new ones. Finally he dismissed the poorest worker, but he felt very guilty 
about doing so because he felt quite strongly that the poor performance was 
not the employee's fault.
Thus we can conclude that some people have definitely shifted from
vicarious reactive attitudes to objective attitudes. This shift is far 
from universal, but I believe that practically anyone could thinic of an 
instance of this shift.
But Tfe still must answer my second question as to ?/hether this switch 
• is due to the belief that determinism is trae. In the case of those people 
who advocate that we adopt a totally objective attitude toward criminals 
there is no question that the belief that determinism is true has induced 
them to change their attitudes. As I mentioned earlier, J.E. Macdonald 
uses the truth of determinism as a major premise in his argument for 
objective attitudes toward criminals. In'the cases of university 
administrators and the personnel managers, it is most probably not a belief 
in the thesis of determinism, but rather a belief in what might be called 
a "derivative thesis" which cauccs these people to eH.opt objective attitudes,
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T.iost influenbj.al of such derivative theses is probably the belief that all
huifirm beings £u:e to a large extent the products of "socialization" and therefore
slimply nojriot help it if they have been socialized not to work hard. Another
factor which is no doubt involved in the switch to objective attitudes is the
belief in one or more of the many popular psychological theories. A belief in
a theory which depicts unhappiness, poor work, feelings of insecurity, etc, as
"conditions" from which people suffer cannot help but push someone toward
objective attitudes.
Thus I believe that it is fairly evident that there has been a switch
from, vicarious reactive attitudes to objective attitudes, and it also seems
evident that a belief that the thesis of determinism is true or the belief that
a derivative of the thesis of determinism is true has had a great deal to do with
this switch. Strawson has therefore failed on both counts. He has failed to
show that vicaz'ious reactive attitudes cannot come up for review and he has
failed to shov; that the belief that the thesis of determinism is true could
not induce people to change from vicarious reactive attitudes to objective
attitudes. So we must deal with the question which Strawson believes to be
unreal , the question of whether it is rational to sv/itch from vicarious reactive
attitudes to objective attitude^ and we must consider Strawson's reply to this
question. That is, that
Vie could choose rationally between objective and reactive attitudes 
only in the light of an assessment of the gains and losses to human 
life, its enrichment and impoverishment; and the truth or falsity of 
a general thesis of determinism would not bear'on the rationality of 
this choice,
I am very much in agreement with Strawson as to the importance 6f 
considering gains and losses to human life when deciding whether it is rational 
to hold an objective or a reactive attitude, but I see no justification for 
Strav/son's claim that 'the truth or falsity of a general thesis of determinism 
would not bear on this issue. Strawson is here rejecting the objection with
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which I beghn this section and this is extremely odd since his pessimist 
voices essentially tho same objection. This objection is that if determinism 
is true it is unjust to punish or blame people for their actions because they 
could not have acted otherwise. This issue of justice cannot be easily 
dismissed. It may be the case that considerations of the gains and losses to 
human life completely outweigh any considerations of justice, but Strawson 
certainly hasn't shovm this.
Thus we are still left with the question of whether determinism is 
compatible with the principle of responsibility and we still must take 
seriously those who argue that it is not. In what follows, I will deal with 
this question in two stages. First I will argue that the issue of justice is 
far more complex than the standard objection would lead us to believe, and that 
when all the issues are examined it turns out thah it is a greater injustice 
to adopt an objective attitude toward normal people rather than to consider 
them to be morally rand legally responsible for their actions. I will then 
follow Strawson's suggestion and investigate the gains and losses to human life 
if we were to give up vicarious reactive attitudes for objective attitudes.
2, Justice and Determinism
Is it the case that all punishment is unjust if determinism is true? The 
correct answer to this question is, I believe, yes. But I will argue that it 
doesn't follow from this that we are justified in doing av/ay with punishment 
and adopting' a. totally objective attitude to all criminals.
The argument that determinism is incompatible with just punishment is 
simply the objection I mentioned at the beginning of this paper or the points 
made by Strawson's pessimist. It is that if determinism is true then it is 
never the case that anyone could have acted otherwise than he in fact did.
From this it follows that no one is morally responsible for their action^and if 
people are not morally responsible for their actions then they do not deserve
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to bear burdens as retribution fo:r misdeeds » Thus, if determinism is true , 
punishment consists of inflicting undeserved burdens and sur'oly this is unjust*
This argument is, I think, quite sound, but we must be very careful 
about the conclusions we dra;.v from it. This argument only shows that if 
determinism is true no one deserves to be punished and from this v/e can. 
conclude that punishment would be to a certain extent unjust. This arguaient 
does not show that we are justified i.n taking aji objective attitude toward 
criminals and adopting a practical treatment legal system. Nor does it even 
show that punisliment is unjustified. The fact that punishment is to some 
extent uhjust clearly has a bearing upon whether we ought to retain punishment 
tl)r reject it and adopt a practical treatment legal system, but this fact is not 
sufficient to decide this question' one way or the other.
This will no doubt seem quite odd because at first glance it does seem 
that the issue of justice does decide this question. After all, one might 
argue, if punishment is unjust surely we must do away with it and adopt some 
other means of social control such as a practical treatment legal system.
Thus, the fact that to adopt a reactive attitude is unjust is for many people 
sufficient reason for adopting an objective attitude.
Hov/ever, to be justified in adopting an objective attitude in these 
cases we must be able to show that adopting an objective attitude involes no 
injustice or is less unjust than adopting a .reactive attitude. This point is 
generally totally overlooked or assumed without argument, but I will now argun 
that to assume that reactive attitudes are unjust while -objective attitudes are . 
not is a very great mistake.
To see this,consider the case of punishment and practical treatment.
Now, if determinism is true then it is clear that no one deserves to bear a 
burden for his misdeeds and clearly this means it is '.uijust to punish people*
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Bui'i it Ghcnild also be clear that it is 'urijust to subject anyone to practical 
treatiiienl; because T)ractical treatment also involves inflicting burdens.
Thus, .11 certainly is false thcvb practical treatment involves no injustice. 
However, it still might be the case that practical treatment involves less 
injustice thaji punishment and no doubt many people would consider this to be 
obviously the case, but a.gain the case for practical treatment and objective 
attitudes in general is not quite so easily established. The standard argument 
in favor of practical treatment is that when we' punish someone we inflict a 
burden which is only loosely related to altering his behaviour and thus making 
it safe for him to be released. On the other hand when we subject someone to 
practical treatment v;e inflict only such a burden as is necessary to control 
his undesirable behaviour. Therefore, it is argued that punishment often 
involves inflicting burdens gratuitously and thus practical treatment involves 
less injustice than punishment because^ in general» practical treatment subjects 
people to fewer burdens. But there is a good reason to discount this 
argiimenb. It is tlmt we have no guarantee that practical treatment will be 
effective. This point is crucial to the argument that a practical treatment 
legal system inflicts fewer bmrdens than punishment because if effective , 
treatment doesn’t exist, then the so-called practical treatment will be every 
bit as loosely connected with altering a criminal’s behaviour as punishment is.
Both Macdonald and Lady Yfooton adroit that no effective practical treatment 
exists but they would argue that I have missed the whole point. It is not 
•bhe case today heat we know how to treat criminals in order to alter their 
behaviour: the point is rather that we must make a commitment towax-d that end. 
Only by doing tliis will we come to a point where weuan quickly and efficiently 
control a crimjial’s behaviour. I must leave my objections to such a 
commitment until the next chapter when I discuss rehabilition. Suffice it to 
say that at present we have no guar'antee that effective practical treatment
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exists and therefore we have no reason to believe, at present, that practical 
treatment Inflicts fewer burdens than punishment.
However, it is important not only to consider burdens such as length 
of detention. There are other burdens which are just as Important. One 
such burden is to be deprived of one's dignity, and I will argue that by 
adopting a practical treatment legal system, we will be depriving many 
criminals of their dignity by considering’ them to be merely things to be 
controlled rather than beings capable of rational thought and action.
But before I discuss this point, I must dispose of a very common argument 
which is used against this point. The a,rgument runs something like this:
How can you talk about practical treatment robbing people of their dignity 
when you advocate punishing people? When we consider all the indignities one 
will face in prison, such as sadistic Imllies, overcrowding, poor sanitation, 
etc., it is hardly appropriate for you to criticize practical treatment, 7 
This argument is completely bogus for two reasons. First, it depicts punish­
ment as only taking place within disgusting prisons, and of course, there 
is no law that says prisons have to be evil or disgusting, except the "law 
of nature" which states that new prisons do not appear by magic, but must 
be built and paid for. The second reason this argument is bogus is that 
it gives the impression that there is an easy choice between disgusting 
prisons and excellent facilities where practical treatment will bo carried 
out. This, of course, is a complete fiction. Such facilities do not exist 
and they will only come into being when governments decide to pay for them. 
Thus, it is completely wrong to contrast excellent practical treatment 
centers .with very poor prisons because the enormous amount of money necessary 
to build and staff such practical treatment centers could just as 
easily be used to build excellent prisons such as I described in my 
chapter on punishment. In fact, the cost of the prisons would probably 
Sjce B.Lo Diamond in The Mentally Abnormal Offender, op, cit., pp. 217-218.
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be less because while a good prison should certainly have psychiatric care 
available it v/oiild not be charged with the specific duty of altering a prisoner' 
behaviour. Therefore, a modern prison's requirements for psychologically 
aud psychiatrically trained staff would be considerably less than the 
requirements of a practical treatment center* In short, then, we are 
perfectly justified in holding uj) an idealized prison system as an alternative 
to a practical treatment system because neither will come into existence 
without huge government outlay*
How will practical treatment rob a criminal of his dignity while modern, 
uncrowded, and well-run prisons will not? In fact, how will the two types 
of institutions be essentially different? The answer is that a practical 
treatment center would have the specific duty to alter a criminal's behaviour 
while a prison would not have such a duty* It would, of course, be hoped 
that a criminal would mend his ways in prison, but this would be up to him - 
it would not be incumbent upon the prison authorities to see that he changed 
his V7ays.
This difference is extrejaely imp or "k auk. It is the difference between 
adopting a vicarious reactive attitude toward the criminal and thus considering 
him to be capable of reasoned choices and actions and adopting an objective 
attitude tovfard him and considering him as merely something to be controlled 
and managed. It is also the difference between treating him as a normal 
human being and treating him in the way we treat insane and subnormal human 
beings. ' To treat a criminal in the latter way is surely to subject him to a, 
very great indignity for the same reason it is an indignity to keep prisoners 
in overcrowded cells with poor sanitation. Human beings of all descriptions 
deserve conditions suitable for human beings and normal human beings deserve 
to be dealt with as normal human beings, not as insane human beings or subnormal 
human beings# Anything less is to subject the criminal to indignities*
* Professor R.S. Townie makes this point in "Objective and Reactive 
Attitudes", Analysis 27*2, (December I966).
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Thus at the present state of the "praotica'l troatmenk art" it would, 
appear that practical treatment would subject criminals to greater biu?dens 
than punishment, and therefore considerations of justice would favor punish­
ment over practical treatment. However, there is the very real possibility 
of a technological "breakthrough" in practical 'treatment methods which would 
allow a considerable reduction in the length of a criminel’s detention. This 
would clearly reduce the hardens a practical treatment system would impose 
upon a criminal end therefore would greatly reduce the injustice involved in 
practical treatment. In the next chapter I will argue that such methods would 
be morally unacceptable*
3* Gains and Losses to Human Life
We can now follow Strawson's suggestion and discuss the gains and losses
to human life we can expect if we reject reactive attitudes for objective
attitudes and especially if we reject pimishment for practical treatment.
Before I go into this I must briefly introduce the concept of a rational
will which Professor R.S, Downie and Miss Elizabeth Teller discuss on page
20 of Respect for Persons;*
.... to have a rational will is to be capable not simply of thinking 
rationally but also of acting rationally; to accept the concept of 
'rational will' is to commit oneself to the view that reason can be 
practical as well as theoretical* What is involved in the practical 
exercise of reason?
It involves, in the first place, the ability to choose for oneself, 
and» more extensively, to formulate purposes, plans and policies of 
one's own. A second and closely connected element is the ability to 
carry out decisions, plans or policies without undue reliance on the 
help of others.
This concept can be illustrated by referring to my three executives 
whose rational wills clearly vary In degrees of development. The first 
executive has the least developed will since his purposes and plans are 
basically those of his father. The second executive is a step up from, this
* Respect for Persons, By R.S, Downie and Elizabeth Teller, George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., London, 19^9.
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bocausG he clearly has a "mind of his own", bat he cannot iiia'kch the 
third executive who has given all aspects of his life a great deal of 
thought e
In what follows I will argue that by rejecting reactive attitudes in 
favor of objective attitudes we will be actively discouraging people from 
developing their rational wills* This, I think, is very clear in the case 
of punishment and practical treatment, then someone is punished he is mad.e 
to bear a burden because he has performed an action which society has
proscribed. Now, among the aims of a policy of punishment is clearly the
aim of changing the behaviour of criminals after they have been released from 
prison; however, this is done simply by demonstrating to the prisoner wha'k 
burdens he will have to bear if he is caught committing a crime again.
Beyond this it is up to the criminal to decide what he will do in the future. 
He can decide to avoid criminal behaviour in the future. He can decide to
commit other crimes but also to take greater precautions in order to
avoid detection. He can decide to make no alterations in his behaviour.
And finally he can decide that the behaviour for which he was sent to prison 
ought not be forbidden and he can decide to fight the law under which he 
was convicted either by lobbying or by the more drastic means of brealcing 
the law again in order to become a test case. In any case, however, the 
decision is his. He must decide to do something even if it is only to 
continue as before.
This is not to say that people will not try to convince a prisoner that 
he ought to decide to obey the law in the future. In a well-run prison, 
career counselors would try to show him how he could get along better with­
out breaking the law. Guidance and marriage counselors would help him 
with his marital and other personal problems, and psychologists could help
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him with emotional problems, Mos'b important of all he would know that by 
indicating through good behaviour that he would in the future obey tho la// 
he could reduce the length of his detention through a parole scheme, IJov/over, 
despite these inducements the decision is very lauoh up to the prisoner. If 
he wishes he can. choose not to visit the various counselors in the prison*
Also he can choose to spurn the advantages of parole and still be released 
when his sentence is up* He must decide what to do with his life; it is not 
incumbent on the prison authorities to ensure that he will obey the law in the 
future.
With practical treatment the situation is completely different. Here 
it is the prison authorities' duty to alter the prisoner's behaviour. Thus 
the prisoner only has one choice : to abide by the law. Also if certain 
methods such as brain surgery and drugs are used in order to achieve th'is 
alteration in the prisoner's behaviour, it is very questionable whether we 
are ever justified in saying that the prisoner chose to alter his behaviour. 
However, even if no such methods are used, but rather the prisoner is simply 
required to attend regular sessions with a psychiatrist and other counselors, 
the pressures upon him to conform are quite overwhelming because in order to 
secure his release he must alter his behaviou3i^ '.
Thus, punisliment provides an opportunity for the prisoner to exorcise 
his rational will while practical treatment either provides no such opport­
unity or an opp'brtunity which is greatly restricted.
The same is true when we reject reactive attitudes in favour of object­
ive attitudes in education and management. By assuming that students and 
employees who shirk their work are suffering from a lack of motivation we 
discourage them from exercising their rational wills. lie, .in effect, "kill
This point is subject to the comments I made about the different types of 
indefinite sentences in my section on indefinite sentences in the last 
chapter*
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them with kindness" by bending over backward to motivate them to do bettor work 
rather than leaving it up to them to decide what they will do, A person v/ho 
is never faced with a clear-cut decision, but is always led to believe 
that his problems will be handled by others, cannot help but become dependent 
on other people; and this of course erodes his rational will. Thus, the loss 
to human life if v/e reject reactive attitudes in favour of objective attitudes 
is quite considerable. It is the erosion of the rational will which is a 
very serious matter since a rational will is surely one of the fundamental 
constituents of personhood**
But what of the gains to human life? Wei]p in the case of punishment 
vs* practical treatment, those who favour practical treatment claim that it 
will drastically reduce the number of recidivists-and therefore greatly reduce 
crimeo This, if true, is an important gain which must be carefully considered. 
However, in the next chapter I will argue that practical treatment methods 
which would be more effective than punishment are morally unacceptable*
As for the gains derived from shifting to objective attitudes in education 
end management, these are usually considered to be a general relaxing and 
"humanizing" of the manager/employee and lecturer/student relationships. For 
example, it might be .argued that an "old-fashioned" lecturer or manager would 
imperiously talce the drastic action of withdrawing a student’s place or 
dismissing an employee, while a "modern" lecturer or manager would take an 
objective attitude and try to motivate the poor student or employee.
However, these gains only appear to be worthwhile when compared to 
imperious lecturers and managers who dismiss people at the "drop of a hat".
To compare objective attitudes with extreme reactive attitudes such as 
these is to unfairly weight the case in favour of objective attitudes.
Holding a vicarious reactive attitude need not involve being imperious. All
See Downie and Telfer, op, cit, , pp,20-23o
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that is essential to a vicarious reactive attitudo is thai tho person to whom 
it is directed be considered responsible for his behaviour. That is, tiiat he 
be considered capable of doing something about his behaviour. Such an attitude 
is perfectly compatible with giving an employee or student a second chance*
The essential point is the clear implication that the student or employee 
must help himself; that this will not be done for him * Thus, vicarious 
reactive ai.titudes are certainly compatible with "humanized" manager/employee 
and lecturer/student relationships *
However, the champion of objective a;btitudes might wish to argue that a 
truly humanized manager/employee relationship requires security of tenure 
and that true security of tenuf:e is only possible if management adopt object­
ive attitudes. The reason for this would be that as long as management clung 
to reactive attitudes they would still claim the right to dismiss poor 
workers who failed to show improvement and clearly such a practice is in­
compatible with a policy of complete security of tenure.
It must be pointed out that while objective attitudes on the part of 
management are compatible with a policy of complete security of tenure they 
do not guarantee such security. A manager could hold an objective attitudo 
towao:d a poor employee and still dismiss him simply because his poor work 
is damaging the company. Thus complete security of tenure must be written 
directly into an employee's contract: it will not follow automatically from 
objective attitudes on the part of management.
However, it could be argued that objective attitudes on the part of 
management are more conducive to security of tenure than vicarious reactive 
attitudes. There may very well be something to this argument. For example, 
had the director of the Canadian service organization which I mentioned 
earlier held vicarious reactive attitudes toward the performance of his staff 
instead of objective attitudes he would no doubt have dismissed all three
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poor workers rather than dismissing only the worst one. However, there is 
always the possibility that had the vicarious reactive attitude of disapproval 
been displayed toward these employees at the first sign of poor v/ork they would 
have improved and no one would have needed to be dismissed. One cannot help 
but think that by not telling the eiripLoyee in clear terms that his work needed 
improvement the manager encouraged him to drift along on his undistinguished 
path until the well-being of the service organization required that he be 
dismissed*
A similar point can be made about objective attitudes in higher education. 
There is no question that universities which have adopted objective attitudes 
toward their students allow poor students to retain their places much longer 
than universities which still have a policy that poor work is the student’s 
fault and it is up to the student to show improvement. However, it is 
difficult to see what is gained by allowing poor students to retain their 
places even tliough they show no sign of improving. This is especially true 
when one considers that such lenient policies of student probation cannot be 
matched by equally lenient standards for granting degrees. Clearly very 
little is gained by allowing a student to attend a university for four years 
only to find that he is not eligible for a degree. On top of this, there is 
always the very real possibility that the lenient policies of student prob­
ation offer very little incentive for a student to improve when compared to 
a strict policy ûn which a student is given two terms to show improvement and 
if no improvement is forthcoming the student's place is withdrawn.
It would therefore appear that the case for objective attitudes in 
everyday life and practical treatment when dealing with criminals isn’t 
very strong. Not only do considerations of justice favour reactive attitudes 
over objective attitudes, but in terms of gains and losses to human life.
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objective attitudes provide very questionable gains in return for the very- 
great loss of depriving people of opportunities to exercise their rational 
willsc
4o The Lav/ of Torts and Contract
However, there is yet another drav/back to objective attitudes. This 
is that to switch from vicarious reactive attitudes to objective attitudes 
in the law of torts and contract would be in effect to destroy these two 
branches of the law* Therefore if we were to adopt a practical treatment 
system of criminal law we would either have to radically change the law of 
torts and contract or be faced with a very troublesome gap between the 
criminal lav/ on one hand and the law of torts and contract on the other.
The reason that there would be a gap is that the concept of responsibility 
is central to the law of torts and contract while it is not central to the 
criminal law*
A practical treatment system of criminal law eschews any talk of 
responsibility or of a criminal deserving to bear a burden; instead it is 
based on the belief that we ought to control a criminal’s behaviour as 
efficiently as possible, I have steadfastly argued that this type of 
criminal legal system-is very undesirable but there is nothing unworkable 
about it, although as I mentioned earlier we probably don’t know as much 
about behaviour control as we like to think we know. However, the situation 
is very different with the law of torts. The reason for this is that the 
law of torts is above all a system intended to compensate victims for 
injuries done to them rather than to regulate the behaviour of the offender 
or deter potential offenders. This is not to say that the lav/ of. torts 
does not deter potential offenders. Clearly the threat of a lawsuit is a 
very potent deterrent. Also I don’t v/ant to give the impression that the
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law of torts is a. reasonably simple body of law which is concerned solely 
with seeing tho/fc the victim gets fair compensation. The law of torts is an 
incredibly complex body of law which contains some elements which definitely 
favour the party which causes the injury
But all in all the law of torts is a system of compensation and this 
fact requires that tortfeasors bo held responsible for their actions, because 
if they wore not held responsible for their actions and made to pay compen­
sation to their victims the law of torts would be quite worthless* Thus, 
the law of torts is logically linked with responsibility while the criminal 
law is not. Therefore if we reject the concept of responsibility in the 
criminal law, would of necessity'create a tremendous gap between the criminal 
law and the law of torts*
Just what harm this gap would do is hard to assess; however, it does
seem that the fact that some torts are also crimes could lead to a clash
between the two branches of the For example if X intentionally
strikes and injures Y then X has committed a felony as well as a tort and X 
can in the end suffer criminal penalties as well as be required to pay Y 
compensation. Now a clash might well oome about in the following way.
Suppose Britain has adopted a practical treatment system of criminal law and X 
is tried and found guilty of striking and injuring Y, Suppose further that 
X is sent to a practical treatment center and so quickly responds to treat­
ment that he is^  released after only six weeks of treatment. I den’t see how
this could help but come up in the subsequent hearing of Y’s action in tort 
against X*
See George P, Fletcher " Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory", Harvard 
Lav/ Review , Vol. 8$, No, 3 (January 1972)
*%See Philip 8. James, Genera^Princi pies of the Law of Torts, Second 
Edition, Buttorworths, London, 19o4, page 12*
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For exa.mplc X ’s lawyer could argue that it is absurd lor the law to 
consider him as not responsible for the crime of striking Y and 'then turn 
around and make him pay compensation for the dar.iages caused by his crime.
The lawyer might add that if X is not responsible for tho crime then clearly 
he is not responsible for 'the tort and if be is responsible for the tort 
then he ought to be held responsible for the crime and punished*
It might be argued that this anomaly in tlie law is not really an anomaly 
at all because the aims of the two branches of i.aw are diffornt and therefore 
there is nothing unusual about holding someone responsible for a tort arising 
out of a crime but not for the crime itself. The criminal lav/ is designed 
to protect the public and the lav/ of torts is designed to compensate individuals 
for losses they have suffered. Thus, in the criminal law we protect society 
best by sending criminals to practical treatment centers and in the law of 
torts v/e must hold people responsible for their actions in order to insure 
that victims are properly compensated. But this a'cgument only provides one 
practical reason why we should tolerate this anomaly - it does not in sAiy 
way diminish it. This anomaly could still cause havoc in it he court room o,s well 
as m l  se serious questions of justice. It could also precipitate legal precedents 
which could greatly weaken the lav/ of torts,
A similar anomaly would also exist between 'the crijninal law and the 
law of contract because again not to hold people responsible for 'bho completion 
of their contract would destroy the law of contract .
Both of these anomalies could of course,be removed by replacing the law 
of torts with a system of government paid compensation for victims of torts 
and modifying the lav/ of contract so every contract carried a government 
guarantee. But these two suggestions illustrate in 'bhe strongest possible way 
the loss human life would suffer if objective attitudes replaced vicarious 
reactive attitudes. In a society in which no one was held responsible for 
crimes, torts, or breaches of contract (assuming bhat sucJi a society could 
. function) the opportunities for a human being to exorcise his rational will would 
be very few indeed*
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VI.
'TWO DEFENCES OF PMGTICAL TREATMENT
We inxist now examine two major claims that are made in favour of 
practical treatment. The first is that practical treatment is in the 
best interest of the criminal because (l) it is hunane and (2) it makes 
the criminal a better and happier person, Tîie second claim is that 
practical treatment will reduce crime by reducing the number of criminals 
who are recidivate.
The first claim is in fact two distinct claims which are almost 
always run together* The two are related in that the goal of making 
criminals better and happier persons is presumably a humane and morally 
commendable goal, and therefore, to act toward that goal is to act in a 
certain sense humanely./ However, the two are distinct in that to achieve 
the goal of making criminals better and happier people might require 
inhujTiane or morally objectionable methods*
1. Humane?
That practical treatment is humane is often taken for granted, or, 
if any argument is deemed necessary, the arguments provided are often 
entirely too simple. For example, it might be said that practical treat­
ment is therapeutic while punishment is brutal or vengeful. This argument 
is often combined with the view, which I attacked in the last section, 
that punishment always takes place in disgusting overcrowded prisons, 
while practical tx’eatmeiit would take place in modejvn, pleasant practical 
treatment centres, ]3ut both of these arguments are mistaken. The sur­
roundings in which punishment or practical treatment takes place can 
be good or bad depending upon the amount of money a government is willing 
to spend on such facilities* Thus, since it seems reasonable to assume 
that to keep people in squalid conditions is inliumane and to keep them 
in good conditions is humane, it follows that as far as conditions go, 
both punishment and practical treatment can be either humane or inhumane. 
Also, the fact that practical treatment is therapeutic does not guarantee
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that it will be humane because it is possible that effective methods of 
practical treatment may turn out to be quite inhuman©» To take an 
obvious example, aversion therapy which involves a good deal of pain 
could prove to be a very effective method of practical treatment, but it 
certainly could not be described as human©*
To be fair, I must point out that some advocates of practical treat­
ment (e.g. Lady Wootton- see above) have admitted this and have argued 
that such methods must not be used* However, I will now argue that 
practical treatment can be humane but that this does not gua^rantee that 
it is morally acceptable. This may soimd like a clear contradiction in 
terms because ’humane' is often used to mean 'morally proper'. For 
example, many people would consider 'humane treatment of criminals* to bo 
synonomous with ’morally proper treatment of criminals’, but there are 
reasons to doubt this assumption, ’Humane* is a word which the Concise 
Oxford•Dictionary defines as "benevolent or compassionate", and therefore, 
practical treatment can be called humane because it aims toward the 
benevolent end of helping c r i m i n a l s B u t  in our hurry to be benevolent 
and compassionate, it is important not to overlook other moral requirements 
for dealing with our fellow human beings, point here is that although 
practical treatment’s aim of helping criminals is humane, in a practical 
treatment legal system a criminal would be required to accept such help 
whether he wanted it or not and I  will argue that this is morally 
objectionable. My reason for saying this is that a practical treatment 
system requires that a prisoner must change his behaviour as a condition 
of his release, and I  have already argued that this very fact actively 
discourages the criminal from developing his rational will. However, a 
practical treatment system goes even further than this: it also actively
tries to change the prisoner’s ways - to remould or rehabilitate him by
subjecting him to one type of treatment or another. Tliis active- attempt 
*
Provided that the practical treatment took place in proper surroundings 
and did not involve any cruel or brutal methods.
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to remould a prisoner already involves an element of coercion in that the
prisoner is coerced into submitting to such treatment by the knowledge
that only by allowing himself to be remoulded will he ever secure his
release. However, those prisoners who x’efuse to submit to such treatment
must either be manipulated into submitting or coerced into submitting,
and either procedure would be immoral.
This point is made in an article by Arnold S, Kaufman,^ Kaufman
argues as follows:
Either the person to be reformed knows that the reformer aims to 
reform him, or he does not. If he does not then he is being -i 
manipulated,,,If the criminal does know the identity and aims of 
the reformer, then he will be made to submit to the reform regimen 
either coercively or of his own free will. If he is made to submit 
against his will, efforts to reform him are not likely to succeed. 
Also, the morality of such coercion is as dubious as is the case of 
manipulative efforts,..
Kaufman defines manipulation aà follows:
A manipulates B when A gets B to behave in a certain fashion without 
B discovering A ’s real purpose in tiying to affect B's behaviour.
He then argues that:
Manipulation, so conceived, is a prima facie wrong for a number of 
reasons. First, it involves deliberate concealment, a form of 
deception or lying. Second, it involves one person treating another 
as a tool of the former's aims or desires. Third, even in cases 
where the manipulator's aim is entirely benevolent it presupposes 
a moral inequality. It presupposes that the person manipulated is 
Incapable of assessing reasonably the manipulator's ends and of 
malcing a deliberative decision. It also presupposes that the 
manipulator knows what the one he manipulates would want if the 
latter had deliberated fully.
Kaufman also' argues that all of these objections apply to coercion, except
that coercion involves no deception.
There are two possible replies to the points Kaufman makes against
practical treatment. First, one could admit that prima facie wrongs are
necessarily involved in practical treatment but argue that these wrongs
are outweighed by the benefit practical treatment provides to the criminal
and society. The second is to deny that these are in fact prima facie
^A.S. Kaufman, "The Reform Theory of Punisbnent", Ethics, Vol. LXXI, 
1960-1961, pp. 49-53. '
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wrong» The first reply would no doubt”be the most common and i will deal 
with it directly below. The second reply is a possibility, but I doubt 
if anyone would want to argue that deception and treating other people 
as tools are not at least prima facie wrong. However, someone migiit wish 
to deny that it is prima facie wrong to consider criminals to be morally 
unequal to us and that it is perfectly correct to assume that we know 
what criminals would want if they had deliberated fully. I will discuss 
this argument in a later section.
2. The Benefit To The Criminal
Does practical treatment benefit criminals? One obvious answer to 
this is that practical treatment will result in shorter periods of incar­
ceration than will punishment and that this is clearly in the criminal’s 
best interest. However, this benefit is by no means guaranteed, as I 
tried to show in ray section on indefinite sentences. Also, I will argue 
latere that practical treatment methods which guarantee short detention 
periods may be undesirable for other reasons.
Another common answer is that all criminal behaviour is senseless 
and. self“destructive, and therefore, practical treatment is clearly in 
the criminal’s best interests. For example, J.E, Macdonald, in the 
quoted passages above, argaes that to control anti-social behaviour is in 
the "interest of all concerned". This belief that criminal behaviour is 
always senseless and self-destructive is one of the mainstays of the belief 
that all criminals are in some sense mentally ill. Here it is argued that 
criminals must be mentally ill because no sane person would ever do any­
thing so clearly against his interest as committing a crime
But is this belief in the self-destructive nature of criminal activity 
justified? It is fairly common to see the criminal’s lot as an extremely 
unpleasant one which involves constant fear of detection, victimization 
by one’s friends, squalid living conditions, etc. And clearly if such a
^Antony Flew has a good discussion of these arguments in his book, Crime 
or Disease, London, Macmillan, 1975» Chapter One, Section Four.
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situation is the rule, then those who argue that practical treatment ■'is 
always or almost always in the criminal hs interest might have o, strong 
case, But is this an accurate picture of criminal life? Well, there is 
no douht that some criminals lead very seedy lives indeed, but clearly 
not aJl criminals* For example, in A Thief's Prmer^ , the life of a 
real life "safe cracker" and cheque forger turns out to be astonishingly 
rich a^d varied. In fact, the criminal interviewed in that book claims
that the very fineness of a life of crime prevents him from going "straight":
His attitude could be expressed as "TOiy live on £60 a week with a mortgage 
when you can live on £200”500 a week in a fine hotel?" Now it is, of
course, difficult to tell just how many criminals live well off crime, but
it is clear that one cannot say categorically that criminal activity is 
always against the criminal's best interest. Also, it is very important 
to realize that to people who are in lower paid jobs or who are unemployed 
even a fairly seedy life of crime is attractive. It is no doubt true 
that many criminals would be better off with a steady job at £55 s week, 
but this fact is of little comfort to the unemployed and especially to 
those whose employment prospects are very poor. Thus, the old saw that 
crime does not pay certainly is not universally true,
However, those who wish to argue that practical treatment is in the 
criminal's beat interest do not have to claim that the criminal's interest 
can be measured by the quality of his standard- of living. In fact, many 
wou].d no doubt wish to argue that the criminal's standard of living is a 
secondary consideration or is totally irrelevant to the claim that 
practical treatment is in the criminal's best interest. For example, it 
might be argued that a successfully treated criminal is morally better 
off because he Is no longer wallowing in sin. But even here problems 
arise because practical treatment is merely treatment designed to prevent 
criminals from committing further crimes, and clearly, this does not
%ruoe Jackson, A Thief's Primer, The Macmillan Company, London, I969.
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guarantee that a .successfully treated criminal will be a morally better 
person after his treatment. To take an example, let’s consider an 
extremely evil criminal such as a professional murderer employed by 
organized crime who after treatment will no longer commit crimes. Is 
he then a morally better person? The answer to this question depends on 
the reason why he will no longer commit crimes. If the ex-murderer has 
decided that he has performed horrible deeds and is truly sorry, then 
clearly the practical treatment has made him a morally better person. 
However, if the practical treatment has only convinced him that it is 
unwise to commit other murders, then it is difficult to see how he has 
become a morally better person. After all, he still believes that it 
is all right to take lives for profit; he has only changed his estimate 
of the profit to be had from murder.
Her© it is useful to invoke the old distinction between intimidation 
and reform. Traditionally, a criminal was considered to be intimidated 
if he considered it to be unwise to commit further crimes because the 
possible benefits could not outweigh the consequences (i.e. prison) if 
he were cau^t. However, a criminal was considered to be reformed if he 
would not commit crimes in the future because he genuinely considered it 
to be wrong to do so. Today we might wish to modify the concept of 
intimidation to cover all those people who will no longer commit crimes 
but who are,not actually reformed. Thus, criminals who have undergone 
aversion therapy and who will, therefore, not coimnit further crimes 
because the very idea of doing so makes them ill,rare not intimidated in 
the classical sense, but their moral status is closer to those who are 
Intimidated than to those who are reformed.
Now, clearly, practical treatment could result in the genuine reform 
of some criminals, but none of the advocates of practical treatment whom 
X have discussed claims that genuine reform ought to be a requirement of 
release, although Peinberg clearly sees his system of individuated treat-
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ment as being oriented toward reform. Thus, it is questionable whether 
we can even say that practical treatment makes criminals morally better; 
clearly it can, but there is no guarantee that it will*
Thus, the argument that practical treatment is best for the criminal 
is by no means very strong. It is based on the quite false beliefs that 
all criminals could do better in legitimate employment and that one© a 
criminal has quit committing crimes he is a morally better person. There 
are cases in which a criminal will be both materially and morally better 
off once he has undergone practical treatment, but we have no right to 
assume this as a genera,! rule*
However, so far I have only spoken of criminals who are successfully 
treated and released, Wliat about criminals who never respond to treatment ■ 
or who respond very slowly? Such criminals would either be detained for 
life or for a very long period. Here the argunient that they are morally 
better off simply does not apply because if they were, they would not 
need to be detained. Also, to say that a life of incarceration is better 
for the criminal than a life of crime is a very difficult position to 
defend. To be deprived of your freedom even in the best of surroundings 
is. a very heavy burden to bear for even a short, period of time, much less 
for life or a very long period, A criminal would have to face an 
extremely bad life outside of prison before we could ever say that a life 
of incarceration was better than a life of crime, Thus, the view that 
practical treatment is beneficial to all criminals just does not hold up.
The criminals who respond to such treatment may or may not become better 
off. However, most of those who do not respond to such treatment will 
be positively worse off.
This is a very serious blow to the case for practical treatment because 
it can no longer be claimed that practical treatment is always in the 
interest of the criminals themselves. It simply is not clear.that the 
benefits to criminals of practical treatment are sufficient to outweigh
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the prima fade vnrongs Involved in practical treatment. Therefore, we 
are left with the claim that practical treatment will significantly 
reduce crime by preventing recidivism, mid we must ask whether this 
benefit is sufficient to outweigh the undesirable aspects of practical 
treatment I have discussed in the previous sections.
5o Crime Control
That practical treatment will help control crime by reducing 
recidivism is almost a tautology because practical treatment is by 
definition treatment designed to alter criminal behaviour. However, I 
explicitly said that it was almost a tautology because we have no guarantee 
that the treatment methods which will be employed to alter criminal 
behaviour will in fact help to reduce recidivism. Therefore, we are faced 
with two problems. First, w© must decide whether the reduction in crime 
which a practical treatment legal system might provide is worth the very 
real drawbacks of such a system which I have described in previous 
sections. We must then look into the likelihood that a practical treat­
ment system will ever achieve such a reduction and whether it is worth 
putting up with the drawbacks of a practical treatment legal system when 
we have no guarantee that it will in fact reduce crime.
It is very difficult to get a clear-cut answer to the first question 
because so many conflicting values are involved. I, personally, am very 
much inclined to say that a practical treatment legal system is a very 
bad bargain because I feel that the loss of legal safeguards, mens rea, 
and, to a certain extent, human dignity which a practical treatment legal 
system would entail is entirely too high a price to pay for a,ny increase 
in crime control. Also in connection with this question, it is important 
to notice that there is a very real possibility that we could achieve- 
every bit as effective crime control without resorting to the coercion, 
manipulation, indefinite sentences, etc. which are characteristics of a 
practical treatment legal system. A greatly improved conventional penal
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system which provided prisoners with real opportunities for recreation, 
education, reading, etc. and which made counselling available on a 
voluntary basis might prove every bit as effective in reducing recidivism 
as a practical treatment legal system.
Howeverf as I mentioned earlier, the methods used in practical treat­
ment legal systems may prove to be ineffective, and we may find ourselves 
with all the disadvantages of a practical treatment legal system without 
any reduction in recidivism. This point is totally overlooked by the 
advocates of practical treatment, but it is a very real possibility 
because as it stands now we simply do not know how to successfully treat 
criminals. Both Macdonald and Lady Wootton admit this, but only Macdonald 
expresses any pessimism as to our making progress towards this goal. Lady 
Wootton.argues in Crime and the Criminal Law that a great deal more 
research is needed into this problem, and Peinberg presents us vfith a list 
of criminal types and a few vague suggestions about treatment, but beyond 
this they offer no concrete suggestions. Thus, since no proven methods 
of practical treatment presently exist, we must accept that it is at least 
possible that practical treatment will never prove successful in preventing 
recidivism or that it will only prove a modest success.
It could be argued that even if practical treatment is only modestly 
successful it will still greatly reduce recidivism because those criminals 
who do not change their ways will be detained for life or for long periods ^ 
of time. This is, of course, true, but if such a system could only 
reduce recidivism by keeping a large number of criminals behind bars for 
life then it could hardly lay claim to the name of practical treatment. 
Also, its moral justification would be even more suspect than that of a 
practical treatment legal system.
It would seem that practical treatment's most highly touted benefit - 
the prevention of recidivism - is extremely speculative. We just do not 
-knovf whether it will reduce recidivism, but it must be remembered that
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there is nothing speculative about practical treatment's disadvantages.
However, even if we grant that practical treatment will prevent 
recidivism (or that it can eventually be developed to the stage that it 
will prevent recidivism), there still remain some problems which pertain 
to practical treatment’s very hlgli cost. From what Lady Wootton and 
Feinberg say we can assume that practical treatment will be extremely 
expensive because not only vculd it require many new facilities, but it 
would also require funds for research into treatment methods and a greatly 
increased number of highly trained staff. Now, the expense of such a 
system is not a mark against it. I am adovo,cting a greatly improved 
prison system which would also be very expensive, but hare there is a 
crucial difference; were w© to embark on a program to totally overhaul 
our prison system, the fate of the prisoners would not worsen if a cut­
back in spending' were to bring the project to a halt. Such a cut-back 
would, of course, be unfortunate because we very much need to improve the 
conditions in our prisons. But the cut-back in money would not make 
things worse. Also, no doubt some new facilities would have been com­
pleted before the cut-back, and therefore, at least some prisoners would 
have a better time of it. However, if we were to embark upon a practical 
treatment legal system, a cut-back in government spending could cause very 
serious problems for prisoners.
The reason for this is that a practical treatment legal system 
involves some very fundamental changes in the law which, so to speak, 
go hand in hand with the existence of new facilities and with greatly 
increased staff. The most fundamental change would be the introduction 
of indefinite sentences, and for this we would need adequate treatment 
facilities and, one v/ould hope, periodic review courts. Also, we would 
need a very large number of treatment staff, Now, one would hope that 
no government would ever alter the law to include indefinite sentences 
without first providing the necessary facilities and staff. However, we
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cannot assume this (for example, the government did not ensure an adequate 
number of teachers before raising the school leaving age). But even if 
we assume that indefinite sentences would not be introduced before 
adequate facilities and staff existed, there would still be the possibility 
that a future cut-back in spending would greatly reduce the number of treat­
ment staff; and this could be extremely serious, because to sentence people 
to indefinite spells of practical treatment without providing such treat­
ment would be absolutely monstrous.
It could be argued that I am being extremely pessimistic about the 
fate of a practical treatment legal system. For example, it might be 
said that no government would ever cut back the funds for so valuable a 
project as a practical treatment legal system once it had become clear 
that the practical treatment legal system had don© so much to reduce 
crime. This is a very good point. Nothing succeeds like success, and if 
those who are rimning a practical treatment legal system are successful in 
preventing recidivism, then it is very doubtful that a government would 
cut off their funds. But is this assumption of success justified? As 
I said earlier, Macdonald, B^dy Wootton, and Peinberg agree that we 
presently do not know very much about behaviour control, }kit only 
Macdonald shows any pessimism about the likelihood of making advances 
along this line. Lady Wootton and Peinberg seem to assume that research 
•into behaviour control will yield satisfactory methods of practical treat­
ment and they therefore advocate what might be described as a "learn as 
you do" approach. But vfhat guarantees do we have that such an approach 
will be successful? This point is crucial because governments can be 
expected to take a fairly dim view of such approaches if they do not yield 
a significant amount of knowledge in a reasonable amount of time, say 
four to five years. If no measurable successes were forthcoming after 
such a period, then it would seem quite possible that funds would be cut 
off, and one can only hope that the governments involved will have the
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foresight to repeal the legislation authorizing indefinite sentences when
they cut off the funds.
It cou3.d be argued that I am being very unfair to a practical treat­
ment legal system by saying that we ought not embark upon such a system 
because it is so vulnerable to government cut-backs. In fact, my argument 
here raight be classed with the argument in a recent letter in the press 
which said that we ought not build the channel tunnel because it would be 
extremely vulnerable to sabotage by extreme political groups. It could 
be argued that any project looks bad if we assuiae the worst will happen, 
and therefore, we ought not to listen to such arguments. Such a strong 
stand against "defeatism" is commendable in certain circumstances, such 
as when on© is making decisions which are easily reversible or which do 
not involve extremely large investments. However, both the channel 
tunnel and a practical treatment legal system involve very large invest­
ments, and, even more Important, a practical treatment legal system 
involves some very important changes in individual rights. In cases like 
these a "let’s give it a go" attitude is quite reckless. Thus, before 
we build the channel tuonel we have a duty to make sure that it will not
end up as a flooded thirty-two mile long tube with a hole in the middle
because if that•happened the waste of public resources would be incredible. 
Similarly, before we bring in a practical treatment legal system, we have 
a duty to make sure that a practical treatment'legal system will not be 
crippled by government cut-backs to the detriment of the inmates.
Thus, the question still remains whether a practical treatment legal 
system will be successful and therefore find favour with those who control 
the government's purse strings. At present this question is unanswerable 
because so little is known about how to go about altering human behaviour. 
In effect, those who advocate practical treatment are asking us to buy 
an extremely expensive "pig in a poke". Practical treatment might prove 
successful and it might not, within a period acceptable to the government;
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we simply do not know.
4c But Don’t We Have The Right To Remould Criminals?
I am sure what I have just said will be extremely controversial 
because I have attacked a view which has become so common that it is 
practically a cliches i.e., it is almost impossible to read any liberal 
tract on prisons without running into something like "prisons' should 
reform not punish" or "treatment not punishment". First, I want to stress 
that I am fully in favour of reforming prisoners» I am simply against 
coercion and manipulation in order to achieve reform. But this is not 
likely to appease my critics because many people will feel that by 
disallowing coercion and manipulation, I have talc en away any chance of 
effectively reforming criminals. T hus, it is safe to  aseume that many 
people would want to argue that manipulation and coercion are justified, 
given certain safeguards. One such set of safeguards is provided by 
Kaufman in the article quoted above. He argues;
. " Theoretically, the general conditions which would justify manipulation 
are clear. First they must be conditions in which, the manipulator 
. does know what the criminal would want to do after deliberation if 
he were rational and good. Second, the person manipulated is incapable 
of délibérât!vely deciding on this best course, and the manipulator
Is a man of good will. Finally, if the manipulated person wore
permitted to malce his own decisions ?dthout manipulation and without 
coercion, his moral education would not be advanced in a way which 
would yield greater benefit in the long run (even if he errs) than 
the benefits which would, in balance, flow from insuring that he 
embarks upon the best course through manipulation.
Here we have a very precise version of the argument, which I briefly
mentioned above, that it is not prima facie wrong to consider criminals
to be morally unequal to us. This point seems almost trivially true
because clearly some criminals are morally unequal to us. However, in
the following discussion of Kaufman’s first condition, I will argue that
we ought not assume this as a general rule.
At first glance, the first condition seems perfectly straightforward.
It seems correct to say that we know what other people would choose if
they were rational and good. For example, all of us judge decisions mad©
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by government officials, Tius, I might judge a particular governmental 
decision to be irrational because I believe it will lead to financial 
disaster*. Also, I might want to argue that had a particular government 
minister been a t;mly good man, he would not have chosen to help one 
economic group while neglecting the needs of another group.
Similarly, it seems to male© perfectly good sense to say of a criminal 
that had he been good and rational he would not have chosen to commit a 
crime. For example, let us consider the case of a young drug pusher.
Now clearly, if someone is good he would never choose to push drugs because 
a good person would realize that people are far better off without drugs. 
But does it follow that if he were rational he would never choose to push 
drugs? Well, it could be argued that if he were rational, he would see 
that by selling drugs he was actually hurting himself by damaging the very 
fabric of our society as well as running the risk of severe consequences 
if he is caught. But this argument only holds for people who are well 
enough off to have something to lose. For instance, a seventeen year 
old boy from an upper middle class family who sells drugs in an American 
high school is irrational (l am assuming that he himself is not addicted 
and is not selling drugs to "feed his habit"). By selling drugs he gains 
money which he does not need and which he will have trouble spending. For 
example, the dream of all seventeen year old boys, a powerful car, could 
only be purchased by lying about his age and this might involve the 
complication of forged documents. On the other hand, he would be seriously 
daJTiaging a society which has treated him very well and which offers him 
great opportunities in the future, Also, he would be running the risk of 
getting into the clutches of organized crime. However, a seventeen year 
old slum dweller who pushed drugs could not be described as irrational 
because the money he made could be put to immediate use (e.g. clothes, 
food, trips away from the slum, even a university education). Also the 
slum dweller would have far less to lose. His social position is of
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virtually no value so if he gets caught, he is not much worse off; 
and even the rough and ready employment offered by organized crime might 
be better than what he could expect from the society as a whole. Tliere- 
fore, the judgenient of what is rational is by no means simple. Yet such 
a judgement could, and probably would, appear simi^ le to the correction 
officer who was in charge of manipulating the criminals,
A similar argument applies to the decision of what a criminal would 
choose to do if he were good. The case of the drug pusher is a particularly 
clear case where practically everyone would agree that such activities 
are wrong, although even here there could be some controversy. We all 
remember the sixties when dinigs (with the exception of strong opiates and 
barbituates) were being touted as our "sick" society's only salvation.
But if there is a clear case, I would say that this was it, along with the 
cases of murder, rape, and other crimes of violence. However, what about 
crimes such as some cases of trespass (e.g. non-violent sit-ins), right 
and left wing demonstrations, anti-Soviet activities (or, for that matter, 
anti-American activities in the days of the House Un-American Activities 
Committee), printing pornographic literature, violations of the Official 
Secrets Act, etc.? All of these offences are quite controversial, so do 
we have the right to assume that if a person were good, he would choose 
not to commit offences such as these? To do so would be to equate what 
is the law with what is good, and this is clearly unwise since there can 
be, and are, bad laws.
Therefore, the assumption that someone would choose to obey the law 
if he were rational and good simply is not correct, and it is also 
dangerous if it is used to justify practical treatment. The reason for 
this is that this assumption provides the law with a sanctity it does not 
deserve and an efficacy which would be unprecedented. At present, if a 
person breaks a law, he must pay a penalty or go to prison, he is not 
obliged to agree with the law and upon release from prison he can,i_mnd
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sometimes will, break the law again, lliis is, of course, a serious 
problem, but we must be very careful how we handle it because recidivism 
is in some cases a very important form of social feedback which alerts 
society that something is wrong with its legal system or its social 
organization0 The clearest example of this type of social feedback is 
the constantly recurring crimes among the very poor. These point to very 
bad living conditions which will not be helped by simply preventing poor 
criminals from recidivating. Equally important are those cases in which 
people repeatedly break a law in order to call attention to its inequity.
This objection would especially apply to practical treatment systems
which require that the criminal be reformed before he is released rather
than merely intimidated. In this case, a prisoner would have to be made
to believe that what he did was wrong before he could be released, and
this would give the authorities the power to silence dissent with utter
finality. This last point is somewhat theoretical because there is no
quick and easy method of altering a person's thoughts. Thus, at present,
if a practical treatment legal system were used to silence dissent, people
would take notice and disapprove. For example, in the Soviet Union,
dissenters are often declared insane by the Serbsky Institute of Forensic
Psychiatry and are treated with depression and pain-inducing drugs in
order to malce them change their opinions,^ This practice is clearly brutal
and has raised a storm of protest. But what if there were a quick, easy,
and painless way to remould human beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour
patterns? If such a method existed, a practical treatment system could
probably be used to silence dissent without many people taking notice and
this could prove to be very bad indeed. On the other hand, such a method
would meet many of the standard objections to practical treatment such as
the problem of prolonged detention. In the remainder of this chapter I
will argue that we ought not adopt a "quick and eany" method of„.praotical
 ^See Amnesty International Report on Torture, Duckworth in association with 
Amnesty International Publications, London, 1975» PP» 174-178,
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treatment should one become available,
5, Quick And Easy Treatment
#iat for example should be our attitude toward a dinig which made 
people extremely susceptible to suggestion and which had no haraiful side 
effects such as ;pain, loss of memory, nerve damage, etc,? Such a drug 
(l will call it mentezin) would be extremely useful for changing criminals' 
thoughts, attitudes, and behaviour, an,d it would meet several important 
objections which are leveled at practical treatment,
Mentezin treatment would be almost IQO'/o effective in preventing 
recidivism, A therapist could interview criminals in depth, gain a great 
deal of knowledge about criminals' motives, and provide suggestions to 
counteract these motives. If a criminal refused to co-operate, the first 
dose of mehtezin could be administered by force, and once it had taken 
effect, all the therapist would have to do is to suggest that the criminal 
be co-operative. Ihis fine performance in preventing recidivism would be 
tempered by the fact that mentezin treatment would no doubt not have the 
same deterrence value that punishment has. However, just as long as crime 
did not show a drastic increase, many governments would probably still 
consider mentezin'treatment to be worthwhile, and there is always the real 
possibility that the drop in the number of recidivists which mentezin 
treatment would provide would more than mal^ e- up for any increase in "first 
time" criminals.
Also, because mentezin treatment would be so effective, there would 
be no need to detain anyone for prolonged periods of time. In fact, it 
is doubtful whether any criminal would have to be detained for more than 
about four weeks. In four weeks, a. criminal could be interviewed about 
twenty times, and that certainly would be a sufficient number to ferret 
out many deep-rooted problems and motives. This is especially true when 
we consider that mentezin would guarantee complete co-operation.on the 
part of the criminal.
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Finally, far from costing more than our present penal system, 
mentezin treatment would allow governments to drastically reduce their 
expenditures on penal institutions» It is, of course, true that mentezin 
treatment would require- a very large number of trained therapists, but this 
expense would be offset many times over by huge savings in the maintenance 
of prisoners. Mentezin treatment would limit the maximum detention of 
any nevf offender to about four weeks and, in addition, would allow a 
government over about two or three years to rehabilitate almost its entire 
prison population. This would enable a government to close dovm whole 
prisons and greatly reduce the size of those prisons where mentezin treat­
ment took place. Clearly then, the savings provided by mentezin treatment 
would be so enormous that it would be extremely attractive to many govern­
ments.
However, despite these clear advantages, I believe that mentezin 
treatment would be extremely undesirable for several reasons. First, 
mentezin treatment would go beyond manipulation and coercion to out and 
out thougîit control, and surely thought control is subject to the same 
prima facie objections which Kaufman makes against manipulation and 
coercion. Also, because mentezin would be "quick and easy", it could 
be used to quietly stamp out dissent by remoulding dissenters to the 
official government line. Finally, and possibly most important of all, 
it would greatly encourage people to hold objective attitudes rather 
than reactive attitudes and the result of this could, be extremely profound,
Talce, for example, the clash between the criminal la,w and the law 
of torts which I mentioned in the previous section. Ihe advent of 
mentezin treatment would intensify this clash because the period of =. 
detention while a criminal underwent mentezin treatment would always be 
very short and, therefore, it would make the practice of treating 
criminals, but still holding them responsible for their torts* even more 
anomalous. In fact, an imaginative lavfyer might even argue that once a
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criminal has undergone mentezin treatment he ought not be held responsible 
for any torts arising from his crime because the treatment has changed 
him into a "new man", and to hold him responsible for the tort would be 
unfair to his new personality.
Also, if a government used mentezin officially, it would ha,ve a 
difficult time keeping it from the general public» Even if mentezin 
were very carefully controlled (e.g. administered only by professionals 
such as psychiatrists and family doctors), it could not help but deal 
reactive attitudes a very serious blow, Mentezin would encourage us to 
adopt objective attitudes; that is, to see people as things "to be managed 
or handled or cured or trained", simply because it would provide us with 
a quick and effective way to manage, train, or cure people. For example, 
the head of the Canadian service organization which I mentioned in the 
previous section would not have to hunt futilely for methods to motivate 
those among his employees who were not working hard, Instead, he would 
simply recommend that they see a mentezin therapist. Similarly, people 
would be encouraged to see themselves in objective terms; fox* instance, 
students could have their lack of motivation cured so easily that there 
would be no reason for them to consider it as anything other than a con­
dition which is beyond their control. Also, since mentezin would malce 
psychological therapy much faster and cheaper, the proportion of the 
population which raalce use of such services would increase dramatically. 
Again, this would encourage people to view their problems as things to 
be cured rather than things to be faced.
Just what a society in which objective attitudes prevailed would be 
like is hard to say, but one thing at least is clean the number of people 
with strong, well-developed rational wills would decline or, to put it 
another way, the number of people who requix’e strong, precise guidance 
through life would increase, Tiiis increase would require a greatly 
increased government influence in our lives. For example, if
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tortfcasore were no longer required to pay compensation for their torts, 
the government would have to take on this responsibility» Even if we 
assume that such influence would always be benign and reasonably efficient, 
there is something very undignified about people who are not responsible 
for the consequences of their actions. Such a situation would foster an 
extreme dependence upon authority which might in the long run become a 
burden which no government could canzy. And, of course, there is always 
the possibility that this greatly increased ^government influence could 
become malignant.
My points about mentezin are quite speculative, and certainly, it 
is quite possible that a drug such as mentezin will never be developed.
But this speculation is necessary, because a drug such as mentezin is 
clearly the goal of those who advocate practical treatment; that is, a 




In the last several chapters I have argued that we must retain the 
principle of responsibility. 'Ihat is, I have argued that we are justified 
in rewarding, praising, blaming, or punishing people for their actions.
In this chapter, I will discuss the question of under what circumstances 
we ou^t to excuse people from responsibility for their actions.
In this chapter I will defend the doctrine of mens rea against its 
two chief rivals, strict liability and objective liability. The doctrine 
of mens rea or guilty mind is basically that before someone can be con­
victed of a crime it must be proven that he intended to commit the crime 
or that he did so recklessly. I must stress the word ’basically' in the 
previous sentence because the criminal law is far from simple and there 
are crimes in which it is not necessary to show that the accused actually 
intended to commit a particular crime, but simply that a reasonable man 
would have foreseen that his action would cause the crime. As we shall 
see, such cases amount to a partial abandonment of the doctrine of mens 
rea in favour of objective liability.
In general, the existence of mens rea in a particular case can be 
challenged in three different ways; by pleading ignorance of fact, mis­
take or accident. Ignorance of the law is in general no excuse. The 
precise difference between these pleas is not absolutely clear. For 
example, many cases in which someone was ignorant of fact A could also be 
described as mistakenly believing fact B which entails the negation of 
fact A, or mistakenly believing the negation of fact A. For example, in 
Sherras versus DeRutzen,^ a publican was charged with serving liquor to a 
constable who was on duty. The publican was held to be not guilty because 
he believed that the constable was off duty. In such a case it does not 
seem to matter whether one chooses to call this a case of ignorance of 
the fact that the constable was on duty or a case of mistakenly believing
R. Cross and P.L, Jones, Introduction to Criminal Law, sixth edition, 
Butterworths, London, I968, p. 50. From now on simply Cross & Jones.
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that the constable was off duty. 'Accident' is also a somewhat loose
terra. Cross & Jones define accident in the following words;
The defense of accident is based on the fact that the accused did 
not foresee that his conduct would have the consequences prohibited 
by the definition of the crime charged. It may be contrasted with 
the defense of mistake of fact because that defense goes to the 
accused state of mind concealing the circumstances surrounding his 
conduct rather than its consequences.
However, they argue that the two can be mixed, as in a case where someone 
mistakenly believes a gun to be unloaded and accidentally kills someone 
with it. Her© we have an accident because the outcome was not foreseen, 
but it was duo to a mistake, I do not mean to denigrate these categories 
but to point out that what is important is whether the accused has shovm 
that he did not intend to commit the crime in question. Categories should 
be the servant and not the master and what is important is the accused's 
moral state of mind, not the category of that state of mind.
1. Mena Rea And Aristotle
The doctrine of mens rea is very similar to the doctrine Aristotle 
expounds in the first five chapters of Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics 
which I discussed in my first chapter. Aristotle claims that people ought 
not to be held responsible for actions done under compulsion or actions 
done in ignorance. By compulsion, Aristotle means cases in which the 
accused was totally, passive. Thus, if A is accused of knocking B down and 
of injuring him, A will not be convicted if he can show that he was blo’tm 
into B by a strong gust of wind. Here there is no question of A's having 
intended to injure B and therefore mens rea would not exist,
Aristotle is considerably more cautious about actions done under 
duress. He argues that duress can be a complete .excuse, a mitigating 
factor, or possibly even no excuse depending upon the nature of the duress 
and the nature of the act done under duress. For example, a man v/ho com­
mits a crime in order to avoid unbearable torture ought, according to 
Cross & Jones, op. cit,, p. 54.
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Aristotle, to.be pardoned or treated leniently as long as his crime was 
not an exceptionally bad one such as matricide. Aristotle's doctrine is 
very similar to the doctrine of mens rea which treats duress as an excuse 
or mitigating circumstance except in cases of treason, murder, and other 
very serious felonies.
Cases of duress are interesting because they lie on the very border 
of mens rea. They clearly involve a "guilty mind" in that the person who 
coiTfimits a crime under duress clearly intends to commit a crime, however, 
this intention is not solely the actor's but is induced by threats and 
violence from other sources. Thus, the solution of treating duress as 
a mitigating circumstance is a natural one in that it seems to be the per­
fect compromise between considering the actor to be a blameless tool of 
those who have him under duress and considering him to be totally 
responsible for his crime because he intended to commit it.
Aristotle's category of ignorance also agrees with the doctrine of 
mens rea in most respects. As I mentioned earlier, ignorance of fact or 
mistake are standard pleas for the negation of mens rea and Aristotle's 
examples are very similar to those heard in court today. His example of 
talcing a naked spear rather than one with a button over the point is a 
classic case where ignorance of fact or mistake show that there was no 
intent to do harm. Also interesting is Aristotle's distinction between 
actions done,in ignorance which are involuntary and those which are not 
voluntary, which I discussed in my first chapter. The former are those 
which are followed by repentance and the latter are those which are not.
I gave as an example a hunter who mistakes his son for a deer and kills
him and another hunter who mistakes his worst enemy for a deer and kills 
him. Aristotle merely says that there is a moral difference between the 
two, and therefore, it is not clear whether or not he would wish to treat 
the second hunter more harshly than the first. This points to~a“ concern 
See Cross & Jones, o£., cit., pp. 89 and 90»
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for the moral state of the agent which goes even beyond that which is 
required by the doctrine of mens rea. In a modern court, if someone can 
prove that he did not intend to kill his enemy, then he vrould not be con­
victed of murder. However, Aristotle only briefly mentions this point, so 
it is impossible to tell whether he would disapprove of our acquitting 
such a man. Since Aristotle does not discuss it in detail, it might be 
the case that he was troubled by this case or at least was not quite sure 
what to do with it. This case points to one of the major problems which 
I will have to deal with in this chapter. That is, how far can we make 
moral blameworthiness the basis of liability to punishment? The second 
man in ray example is clearly blameworthy since by hypothesis he would have 
killed his enemy if he had seen him clearly and not mistaken him for a 
deer. But is his blameworthiness equivalent to that of someone who 
knowingly kills his worst enemy?
Finally we have Aristotle's treatment of actions done by reason of 
anger or appetite. As I pointed out in my first chapter, Aristotle does 
not believe that people should be excused from liability for actions done 
in anger or from appetite because these actions are every bit as typical 
of their character as reasoned actions are of the characters of reasonable 
men. I objected that this point is too broad because it makes no mention 
of actions done because of provocation. However, this point meshes with 
the doctrine, of mens rea very well. Mens rea allows a narrow scope to 
provocation, considering it as a mitigating circumstance rather than an 
excuse.
Thus, Aristotle's views on excuses agree quite well with the doctrine 
of mens rea. It is a staunchly moral doctrine of responsibility which 
bases responsibility and liability to punishment upon the personal blame­
worthiness of the actor. The predominance of the doctrine of mena rea 
shows that his views are still widespread, but they are being challenged 




The first rival of the doctrine of mens rea which I will discuss is 
strict liability. Simply stated, strict liability is the doctrine that 
people oug^ it to be held liable for all of their actions which are pro­
scribed by law regardless of the circumstances under which they are per­
formed, That is, the doctrine of strict liability denies that we should 
raa3ce any distinction among Crimea committed intentionally, by mistalce, 
under duress, in self-defense, etc. Strict liability has always been very 
unpopular for the obvious reason that it seems clearly very harsh to 
punish someone who did not intend to commit a crime or, at least, not to 
make allowances for someone who commits a crime under duress.
However, to those advocating practical treatment, strict liability 
has seemed much more attractive. Lady Wootton seems to embrace strict 
liability in the second quoted passage on page 64 above, and, indeed,
Joel Feinberg and H.L,A. Hart assume that she does in fact embrace strict 
liability.* Strict liability when coupled with practical treatment is in 
theory less harsh’ than strict liability coupled with punishment because 
someone who accidentally killed someone else would not be subjected to 
severe punishment, but rather would be treated in some vray which would be 
less burdensome than punishment. My objection to this proposal is twofold. 
First, of course, I am totally against practical treatment, and if my 
arguments against practical treatment are sound, then strict liability is 
morally questionable since it only obtains a semblance of respectability 
when it is coupled with practical treatment.
However, .even if we were to assume that practical treatment was 
morally acceptable, it does not follow immediately that we ought to adopt 
a system of strict liability. There is nothing absurd about adopting a 
practical treatment legal system and continuing to recognize the traditional
*8ee Joel Feinberg, Doing & Deserving,op. cit., Chapter 10 and H.L.A. Hart,
Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford University Press, Oxford, I968, -
Chapter 10,
excuses of the doctrine of mens rea. Thus, a further argument is required 
to support a case for strict liability. I will now discuss two such 
arguments.
The first argument is that it is impossible to distinguish those 
criminals who lack mens rea from those who possess it, and therefore, we 
are better off adopting strict liability, %is argument is commonly 
attributed to Lady Wootton and, clearly,: In the above*.quoted;passage she 
appears to hold this view. However, her arguments are not sufficient to 
establish a case for strict liability. Lady Wootton's argument is based 
on the need for the courts to function properly. She argues that the 
M 'Naughten Rules are precise and workable Imt unacceptable to the pro­
fessionals in the behavioural sciences. But these same professionals have 
failed to replace the M 'Naughten Rules with workable alternatives, and 
therefore, chaos reigns in the courts when decisions must be made about 
the mental state of a defendant. Her solution to this problem is to give 
up the notion of responsibility altogether and to adopt strict liability 
coupled with practical treatment.
But clearly this argument does not show that everyone who commits an 
action proscribed by law ought to be liable to practical treatment regard­
less of the existence of excusing conditions. Lady Wootton is quite right 
to point out that all the replacements for the M'Naughton Rules are 
defective, but this in no way shows that we cannot com© to conclusions 
about the state of a defendant's knowledge, his intentions, whether or not 
he was subject to coercion, etc. The fact that inquiries into a criminal's 
mental health are impossible because of confused categories and logically 
unsound criteria has no bearing upon inquiries into intentions, knowledge, 
etc, which are relatively simple and unconfused concepts. Dr. Francis 
Jacobs expresses this point particularly well;
To say that juries cannot answer questions of this kind is readily 
controverted by the everyday, experience of the criminal-'courts; 
Questions of mens rea are generally the most important which the jurj'
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must answers did he intend to keep the property for himself? Did 
he know that the cheque was forged? Did he believe that the state­
ment in the prospectus was correct?
These questions are not only answerable by a jury in ordinary 
experiences their answers are susceptible to reasoned appraisal, 
and can be set aside on appeal if unreasonable on the evidence.*'
The second argument for strict liability requires the assumption that
the thesis of determinism is true. It is that if doteminism is true, then
all people v?ho commit crimes are morally indistinguishable one from
another. That is, someone who intentionally kills someone is morally no 
different from someone who kills someone else by accident because they both 
could not have acted othervdse than they did. Thus, it is argued that it 
is unjustp immoral, or,just plain silly to excuse people who commit crimes 
unintentionally, under duress, in self-defense, etc. I will reply to this 
argument in two stages. First I will assume a system of punisîimant and 
argue that this argument does not establish a case for strict liability 
coupled with punishment. I will then argue that it does not establish a 
case for strict liability coupled with practical treatment.
Now, there will undoubtedly be objections to my even considering 
whether this argument establishes a case for strict liability to punish­
ment because it is commonly believed that if the thesis of determinism 
is true, then we ought not to punish people for their crimes, I have 
already discussed this point at length and I have argued that even if 
determinism is true, it is morally desirable to hold people responsible 
for their actions and, therefore, liable to punishment. I must now discuss 
whether we ought to hold people strictly liable to punishment.
Apart from the obvious reason of crime control, my reasons for 
holding people responsible for their crimes were that it would encourage 
people to develop and exercise their rational wills and that to punish 
someone was to respect his dignity (provided, of course, that the punish­
ment was not degrading), while to subject a man to practical treatment 
was to subject him to indignities. None of these reasons require us to 
* Jacobs, op. dit., pp. I65» I64.
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hold people strictly liable to pimlslment. It is difficult to see how 
the control of crime would be aided by holding people strictly liable for 
their crimes. Someone who commits a crime unintentionally surely cannot 
as a general rule be considered dangerous, and neither can someone who 
commits a crime under duress or in self-defense. In fact, in the latter 
two cases, the "criminal" is clearly a victim of circumstances since 
had there been no duress or no threat to his life, no crime would have been 
committed.
Also, to hold people strictly liable for their crimes would do nothing 
to encourage people to exercise their rational wills. Indeed, it might 
foster a feeling of helplessness because if we adopt strict liability, 
people would no longer be punished only for their intentional actions, but 
also for mistakes and actions dictated by circumstances beyond their control.
Here the advocate of strict liability could object that I have not 
answered his argument because I am still advocating that we deal in dif­
ferent ways with people who- are morally indistinguishable and, therefore,
I  am advocating injustice. Here we must remember that if determinism is 
true, then all people are morally indistinguishable in that they do not 
deserve to be punished for their crimes. From this it follows that we 
must have good reasons for punishing people because all punishment involves 
Injustice. In the case of people who have no excuses for their crimes we 
have such good reasons, but in the case of people who have excuses for 
their crimes we have no such good reasons. ‘Bius, punishing such people 
would involve gratuitous injustice. It is, of course, true that making 
this distinction between those who have excuses and those who do not would 
involve us in a formal injustice, but this is a small price to pay in order 
to avoid the injustices (in the distributive sense) strict liability would 
involve.
At first glance it may be thou^t that strict liability is compatible 
with a practical treatment legal system. The reason for this is that
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practical treatment is often thought of as not being burdensome because 
it is therapeutic. Thus, since it is often argued that if determinism is 
true no one deserves to bear burdens for their crimes, punishment is ruled 
out while practical treatment is acceptable» This argument is unacceptable 
because, as I argued earlier, practical treatment is indeed burdensome. 
Thus, the objections which apply to strict liability coupled with punish­
ment also apply to strict liability coupled with practical treatment, In 
order to be justified in subjecting a criminal to practical treatment, we 
must have a good reason for doing so. In the case of criminals without 
excuses we have such good reasons in the fact that such people must be 
controlled. However, what reasons do we have for subjecting people who 
have excuses for their crimes to practical treatment? Will treating such 
people reduce crime? Here a strong advocate of strict liability might be 
tempted to say, "Yes, treating such people will reduce crime. What you 
have failed to see is that if determinism is true, then all crimes are 
essentially the same regardless of the existence of excusing conditions 
in particular cases. Crimes are merely events which must be prevented 
from recurring. Subjecting all criminals to practical treatment would 
help to prevent crimes from recurring."
• This argument is completely unacceptable on two grounds. The first 
is that even if determinism is true, all crimes are not essentially the 
same. For example, intentional crimes cau be controlled both through 
deterrence and by preventing recidivism. However, if we exclude cases 
of negligence, unintentional crimes cannot be controlled through deterrence 
for the simple reason'that they are unintended.*^ Also, it is doubtful 
whether crimes done under duress or in self-defense can be controlled by 
either method. Crimes of these two types arise out of circumstances which
are often unexpected and usually beyond the criminal's control. It is
%
I am speaking hypothetically here. I still disagree with practical treat­
ment ,
**I will say a good deal more on unintentional crimes and negligence in the 
next section on objective liability.
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difficult to see how a man can be deterred, from giving into threats or 
how treatment would prevent him from giving in again if he were threatened 
again.
Thus, it is not at all clear how treating criminals who have excuses
for their crimes would help to control crime. There are, .of cours ©,■■■. cas es
of the so-called "accident prone" and possibly treatment could prevent
them from having more accidents. But there are also any number of other
cases in which treatment would have no effect. What of the pub-keeper
mentioned earlier who served the constable whom;he had good reason' to
believe to be off duty? How could treatment prevent him from committing
a similar crime in the future?
Here we would no doubt be faced with the soothing reply that all 
strict liability coupled with practical treatment would do was to insure 
that those who needed treatment would get it. Once all criminals were 
bound over to practical treatment they would be examined, and some would 
be released upon the completion of the examination. For example, the 
publican who sold liquor to the constable on duty would be released once 
the examiners were satisfied that it was a genuine mistake.
However, despite the soothing tone of this point, strict liability 
coupled with practical treatment would still be objectionable for several 
reasons. First, by adopting strict liability we would be shifting the 
responsibility for decisions about excuses from the courts to practical 
treatment experts. This is a major change which removes legal safeguards 
•provided by a public trial in which the accused is allowed defense counsel, 
In a court of law the publican could present arguments through his lawyer 
as to why he believed that the constable was off duty, and these arguments 
could then be assessed by the judge when he instructs the jury and finally 
by the jury themselves. Strict liability coupled with practical treatment 
would replace this public hearing of excuses with private tests and inter­
views, the nature of which are seldom specified. Now, this problem can
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be remedied. Special public treatment hearings could be held which were 
similar to court hearings, and special rules of testing and Interviewing 
could be set out; but even if this were done, strict liability coupled 
with practical treatment would be subject to another very serious objection.
This is that strict liability coupled with practical treatment would 
subject people to the burdens of incarceration and examination who are 
today acquitted as blameless, Ihirther, the very fact that it is deemed 
necessary to detain and examine people who have excuses for their crimes 
would indicate that they would not be released as a matter of course after 
such examinations, but could be required to undergo practical treatment if 
the practical treatment experts who examined them found something which 
would indicate that they might commit crimes in the future. Thus, strict 
liability coupled with practical treatment would involve inflicting con­
siderable burdens upon categories of people who are today released as 
blameless.
Here it would probably be argued that I have completely missed the 
point. I have failed to grasp the fact that because determinism is true 
blameworthiness no longer exists and all people who commit crimes are
morally/indistinguishable, This leaves us free to dispense with the
distinction between the blameworthy and the blameless and simply to get on 
with controlling crime, and we can do this beat by examining and possibly
treating all criminals, not just those who have no excuse.
For this argument to be sound it must be the case that the only reason 
we have for dealing with criminals who have excuses differently from those 
who have no excuses is" that we assume the former are blameless and that 
the latter are blameworthy. But surely this is not the case. For example, 
we may wish to exempt criminals with excuses from being examined and inter­
viewed by the practical treatment experts because such examinations and 
interviews would only reduce crime marginally and at a cost of .great dis­
ruptions in many people’s lives. It would help if those who advocate
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strict liability coupled with practical treatment would remember that, 
even if the thesis of determinism'is true, people are still people. That 
they are still thinlcing creatures, vdio have feelings, make decisions, and, 
above all, have rights.^ Also, we must remember that even if the thesis 
of determinism is true, a system of criminal law is designed not only to 
control crime, but also to foster an atmosphere in which our society can 
flourish and in which people can enjoy a goodly amount of freedom. These 
points should make it clear that the truth of the thesis of determinism is 
not a sufficient basis for strict liability coupled with practical treat­
ment. It does not allow us to abandon all distinctions among criminals 
and allow us just to get on with the business of controlling.crime. Crime 
control must be balanced against the people’s right not to have excessive 
interference into their affairs. Professor H.L.A. Hart expresses this 
point quite well in the following passage?
By attaching excusing conditions to criminal responsibility, we 
provide each individual with benefits he would not have if we made 
the system of criminal law operate on a basis of total 'strict 
liability’. First, we maximize the individual’s power at any time 
to predict the likelihood that the sanctions of the criminal law 
will be applied to him. Secondly, we introduce the individual’s 
choice as one of the operative factors determining whether or not 
these sanctions shall be applied to him.
Professor Hart then invites us to do the following thought experiment in
which vfe imagine the criminal law operating without excusing conditions:
First, our power of predicting what will happen to us will be im­
measurably diminished: the likelihood that I shall choose to do
thé "forbidden act (e.g. strike someone) and so incur the sanctions 
of the criminal law may not be very easy to calculate even under our 
system: as a basis for this prediction we have indeed only the know­
ledge of our o\m character and some estimate of the temptations life 
is likely to offer us. But if we are also to be liable if we strike 
someone by accident, by mistake, under coercion, etc., the chances 
that we shall incur the sanctions are immeasurably increased. From 
our knowledge of the past career of our body considered as a thing, 
we cannot infer much as to the chances of its being brought into 
violent contact with another, end under a system that dispensed with 
the excusing condition of, say, accident (implying lack of intention) 
a collision alone would land us in jail. Secondly, our choice would 
condition what befalls us to a lesser extent.
^See A.J.M, Milne, Freedom end Rights, George Allen and Unwin, London, 
1968, Chapter 10, especially p. 541c
H'L'-A. Hart, op. cit.. Chapter 2, pp. 47 and 48.
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%  Objective Liability
The other rival of the doctrine of mens rea is objective liability.
Lr. Francis Jacobs provides the following succinct expression of this 
doctrine:*
If a person is neither an infant nor insane.e.hc is deemed to be a 
'reasonable man': he is allowed to make mistakes but, only reasonable
ones; to respond to threats to his person or property, but only 
reasonably; and to retaliate if provoked, but only if the reasonable 
man would have been provoked, and then only within limits that the 
reasonable man would not have .exceeded.
This doctrine is extremely interesting because at first glance it 
appears to be the type.of liability which is often used in everyday life.
For example, suppose a.manager in business gets overly enthusiastic about 
a particular project and neglects his other duties. As a result of this 
neglect the company loses an important business contract. The manager 
cannot clear himself by saying that he did not intend to lose the contract 
or that he did not foresee that the contract would be lost. Or suppose a 
very religious lecturer is offended by an essay on the philosophy of 
religion which makes several allusions to sociological theories which try 
to explain man's need for religion and unfairly gives the student a gamma 
along with some very rude comments. When the student rightly complains to 
the professor and the lecturer is disciplined, he would not get.very far 
by saying that the student’s "denigration" of religion provoked his rude 
response. Both the manager and the lecturer acted unreasonably in ■ 
situations in which they were expected to be reasonable. In view of this, 
it may appear obvious that we ought to require that everyone live up to a 
standard of the reasonable man. Do vfc not have a right to punish people 
who unintentionally commit crimes, but who have unreasonable excuses?
Examples of such unreasonable excuses might be the following; a painter 
paints my kitchen and cleans his brushes inside the kitchen with petrol 
instead of white.-.spirit or turpentine; the pilot light in my gas cooker
* Jacobs, pjq. cit., p. 121.
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ignites the petrol fiiiies and my house burns down. Ought we to hold 'the 
painter guilty of arson? Ought we to accept the painter's plea that it 
was an accident?
Another case is Regina versus Ward' in which a man of subnormal intel­
ligence who suffered from gastric ulcers killed the eighteen month old 
child of the woman with whom he was living. One evening after work, Ward 
was so irritated by the child's crying that he shook her and this caused 
her death. He claimed that his only intention was to quiet the girl, but 
he v/as convicted of murder in a decision which specifically made use of tho 
reasonable man test.
In tho above two cases there is no question that the accused did not 
intend to commit his crime. In such cases, objective liability would make 
the accused liable to punishment while the doctrine of mens rea would not. 
However, there are cases in which it is quite likely that the accused did 
intend to commit his crime, but in which intent would be quite difficult 
to prove. In such cases, objective liability would make it easier for the 
prosecution to get a conviction. Take, for instance, the case of a young 
woman who is married to an old wealthy man. The man is subject to severe 
depression and is being treated with an anti-depressant drug which will 
react with certain foods (e.g. cheese, eggs, milk, etc.) and cause a 
drastic increase in his blood pressure and, therefore, the danger of a 
stroke. The wife has charge of the drug and has been told by the family 
doctor that fairly high dosages are permissible if the husband says he is 
very depressed, but she has been warned that the husband's diet must be 
watched very closely. One day the husband takes a large dose of the drug 
and eats some cheese. The increase in blbod pressure causes him to have a 
stroke and he dies, Did tho wife kill him intentionally? She claims that 
she simply forgot about the danger of cheese when she bought it and that 
she had no intention of killing her husband. The prosecutor claims that
■X-
Regina v. Ward, Queen’s 'Bench Division, 1956, p. 551.
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she gave him the cheese with the Intention of causing his death. Obviously, 
in, a case such as this, objective liability would make the prosecutor's 
job a great deal easier.*
Before I can discuss these examples, I must go deeper into just what 
is meant by the 'reasonable man test'. The classic exposition of this is 
The Common Law by O.W. Holmes. On page 51 he says;
The reconciliation of the doctrine that liability is founded on 
blameworthiness with the existence of liability where the party is 
not to blame, will be worked out more fully in the next Lecture, It 
is found in the conception of the average mém, the man of ordinary 
intelligence and reasonable prudence » Liability is said to arise out 
of such conduct as would be blameworthy in him. But he is an ideal 
being, represented by the jury when they are appealed to, and his 
conduct is an exteriml or objective standard when applied to any 
'given individual. That individual may be morally without stain, 
because he has less than ordinary intelligence or prudence. But he 
ho is required to have those qualities at his peril. If he has them, 
he will not, as a general rule, incur liability without blameworthiness.
Thus, someone is liable for the consequences of his actions if a reasonable 
man would have known that such consequences would follow or would have fore­
seen that such consequences were likely to follow. Holmes states, "Tlie 
test of foresight is not what this very criminal foresaw, but what a man 
of reasonable prudence would have foreseen."(p. 54)
However, Holmes does not apply the reasonable man test to the actual 
state of the criminal's knowledge. Immediately following the proceeding 
quote he says, "On the other hand, there must be actual present knowledge 
of the present facts which make an act dangerous(p. 54) Holmes defends 
this distinction between knowledge of consequences (or foresight of con­
sequences) and the knowledge of circumstances in the following words:
A fear of punishment for causing harm cannot work as a motive, unless 
the possibility of harm may be foreseen. So far, then, as criminal 
liability is founded upon wrong-doing in any sense, and so far as the 
threats and punishments of the law are intended to deter men from 
bringing about various harnful results, they must be confined to cases 
where circumstances making the conduct dangerous were knovm.
(p. 55)
*
I obtained this example from the episode of the television series Justice 
which was broadcast on May I'/t 1974.
■X-K*
OoW. Holmes, The Common Law, Little, Brown, Boston, 1881.
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I find this argument unacceptable becauce, if objective liability is
acceptable at all, it surely makes sense to extend it to cases where a
reasonable man would have known the circumstances which mad© his action
dangerous or would have made an effort to find out such circumstances.
For example, consider a young man. who comes into some money and decides to
buy a very powerful speedboat. He settles on a fabulous stern drive model
and, of course, wants to take his friends out in it. They set out for a
picnic spot four miles along the coast but never arrive because he smashes
the boat into a large rock which is submerged only a foot below the surface
of the water while going about forty miles per hour. Two of his friends
are seriously injured and drown before help can arrive. Here, the young
man is ignorant of what made his action dangerous, but clearly it is ' .
arguable that a reasonable man would not have been ignoraJit in such a
situation. '.Phe rock would have been clearly marked on an admiralty chart*
and quite possibly mentioned in a cruising guide to that part of the coast.
Also, Holmes himself vacillates on this point. For example, also on page
55, he says, "An act cannot be wrong, even when done under circumstances 
in which it will be hurtful, unless'.those circunistances are or pughttto be
known."(emphasis mine) Thus, v/hen discussing the doctrine of objective
liability, I will assume that the reasonable man test can be applied to a
person's knowledge of circumstances as well as to his knowledge and fore-
sight oi consequences.
We must now discuss the arguments for and against objective liability.
One argument has already been mentioned, which is that objective liability 
is already the standard of liability in business, government, employment, 
etc., and therefore, why not extend it to the criminal law? This argument 
is unsatisfactory, but it is worth considering because it points to several
* Many of the world's waters were charted years ago with sounding lines and 
therefore are not very accurately charted. However, British coastal waters 
have been rocharted with modern equipment, so that the rock would have been 
on a .chart.
A long discussion of this distinction can be found in Jacobs, op,cit., oh.5.
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faults of objective liability. 3?irst, there is the obvious point that' 
people are appointed to various positions in order to perform a specific 
function (e.g. lecture, manage, weld, etc.) and they take on these positions 
of their own free will and are paid to perform their function. If they can­
not perform to a reasonable standard, then they are free to go to a job 
which is less demanding. However, people are not appointed to life of 
their own free will, and to set a standard of behaviour which is beyond 
some people's capacity is unfair to these people. They cannot seek a life 
in another less demanding universe.
Also, it is very misleading to say that objective liability exists in 
many types of employment. Objective liability disregards the distinction 
between intentional behaviour and behaviour which is unintentional, but for 
which there is no reasonable excuse. However, this is not quite what takes 
place in many types of employment. Here unintentional actions which are 
not reasonably excused are considered proper grounds for discipline, but 
they are still clearly distinguished from intentional actions. For example, 
the manager v/ho unintentionally lost the important contract would probably 
be demoted or perhaps discharged, but If it were discovered that he had 
intentionally lost the account either because he was angry with the company 
or because he was bribed by another company to do so, he would be sure to 
lose his job and, quite possibly, would be sued. The same goes for the 
lecturer. His excuse is unreasonable and he will receive a warning, an^, 
possibly, his promotion chances will be hurt, but if it were discovered 
that he had intentionally tried to "get" the student, he would be in a 
great deal of trouble indeed.
However, neither of these two points would impress Holmes; as we shall 
see, he is perfectly aware that objective liability is unfair to some people, 
Also, he would probably argue that it is silly for employers to make any 
distinction between intentional acts and unintentional acts which a 
reasonable man would have avoided because both acts cause the same amount
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of harm. Holmes is very concerned with the fact that all criminal behaviour, 
regardless of the existence of excusing conditions, is harmful, and there­
fore, we ought to do our utmost to prevent it. In fact, in some places, 
he even seems to be advocating strict liability. For example, on page 49 
he i.argues :
For the most part, the purpose of the criminal law is only to induce 
external conformity to rule.
In directing itself against robbery or murder, for instance, its pur­
pose is to put a stop to the actual physical taking and keeping of 
other men's goods, or the actual poisoning, shooting, stabbing, and 
otherwise putting to death of other men. If those things are not 
done, the law forbidding them is equally satisfied, whatever the 
motive.
However, on page 50, he stops short of strict liability because
...a law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the 
average member of the coirununity would be too severe for that community 
to bear.
Thus, Holmes has weighed the value of crime control against the necessity
of preventing the rule of law from becoming oppressive, and he has concluded
that the proper balance can be struck by adopting objective liability. He
has come to this conclusion even though he is fully aware that objective
liability will involve injustice to the less able members of society. On
pages 50 and ^1, he states:
They [the standards of objective liability] take no account of in­
capacities, unless the weakness is so marked as to fall into well- 
known exceptions, such as infancy or madness. They assume that every 
man is as able as every other to behave as they command. If they 
fall on any one class harder than on another, it is on the weakest.
For it is precisely to those who are most likely to err by termpera- 
ment, ignorance, or folly, that the threats of the law are the most 
dangerous.
Holmes seems to see this injustice as an unpleasant,'but necessary, 
fact of life if the criminal law is to be effective in controlling crime.
But justice is not something to be given up lightly. In order for Holmes' 
view to be well-founded, there must be very good evidence that adopting 
objective liability will increase the effectiveness of the criminal lav/ in 
controlling crime, W© must now see whether such evidence exists.
There are two possible ways in which the adoption of objective
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liability might reduce crime. First, it might encourage people to be much 
more careful and thus prevent "crimes" such as the painter's cleaning his
brushes with petrol or the young man's hitting the submerged rock in his
speedboat. Second, it might make it much easier to get convictions because 
the prosecutor would no longer have to prove intent, but rather that a 
reasonable man would have foreseen that his actions would have caused the 
crime in question.
The first way is difficult to discuss because it is impossible to toll 
for certain whether the adoption of objective liability would, cause us to 
take greater care. However, there are two reasons to doubt whether it 
would. First, I find it hard to believe that many people are conscious of 
the fact that they are careless and, therefore, I doubt that many people 
would become more careful if they were told that carelessness could land 
them in prison. This is especially true when we consider that the wages 
of carelessness are already very high. If a painter is not going to be 
deterred from cleaning his brushes with petrol by the possibility of burning 
down his employer's house.vand possibly seriously injuring himself and others, 
then it is doubtful that he will be deterred by the possibility of being 
charged with arson or homicide. Also, we must remember that some people
cannot become reasonable men because they lack the requisite intelligence.
Therefore, in so far as their unreasonable behaviour is due to low intel­
ligence, the threat of punishment will not make them act reasonably. For 
example, Ward of Regina v. Wardwhich!- I described above just was not intel­
ligent enough to realize that shaking the child could harm her.
Here someone might wish to reply that objective liability might not 
deter people from being careless, but it certainly would prevent people 
who have committed a crime because of carelessness from committing another 
such crime. But again, if the actual consequences of his crime do not 
prevent a person from being careless in the future, then it is doubtful 
whether a prison term will be much additional help. For example, if,.5
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after ramming one speedboat onto a submerged rock, the,,young man buys 
another and does the same thing, it is doubtful whether a prison tern 
would have any deterrent effect. The man is just too thick to be reached.
In short, 1 find it hard to believe that recidivism is a major problem 
among people who commit crimes because of carelessness and I doubt whether 
punishment will prevent what recidivism there is.
The second point is far better founded. There is no question that 
objective liability would help in getting convictions. It is sometimes 
very difficult to prove that someone committed a crime intentionally, 
rather than by mistake or accident. Objective liability would ease this 
burden because the prosecution would only have to prove that a reasonable 
man would have foreseen the outcome. Thus, in thé case of the man vfho 
died when the anti-depressant drug reacted with the cheese, his wife would 
undoubtedly be convicted because she had been clearly warned that the drug 
would react with cheese. And clearly a reasonable man, having been warned 
that the drug would react in this way, would have foreseen that letting 
the man have cheese would endanger his health, Now, let us assume that 
the wife in this example had really intended to kill her husband and had 
not just forgotten the doctor's warning about the cheese. In such a case, 
objective liability would ensure that she would not be able to get away 
with her crime by pleading that she gave him the cheese by mistake or that 
the doctor's warning momentarily slipped her mind. In cases like this 
one, objective liability would ensure that people who had committed crimes 
intentionally would not be able to plead spurious mistake or accident, and 
this would help reduce crime because, presumably, many intentional criminals 
are likely to commit further crimes if they are allowed to go free.There­
fore, in order to evaluate the effect of objective liability on the level 
of crime, we must have ^od reason to believe that a large number of such 
people are being acquitted. Obviously, statistics on this topic would be 
practically impossible to obtain because there is no way of telling whether
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a person who is acquitted is actually innocent. However, I find it hard 
to believe that an alarming number of people are being acquitted who are 
actually guilty. Clearly, it is natural for a criminal to plead accident 
or mistake y/lien he is accused of a crime, but mens rea is not that dif­
ficult to prove. Also, as Dr, Jacobs pointed out in the passage quoted 
in the last section, mens rea is proved in courts all over the world 
everyday.
Also, it mi^nt be- worth mentioning that objective liability may not 
guarantee convictions in all cases where the accused has falsely pleaded 
accident or mistake. It would still be open to the defence to argue that 
the crime could not have been foreseen by a reasonable man. This may prove 
to be almost as valuable to criminals as false excuses because thé reasonable 
man test is very imprecise.
The fact that the reasonable man test is imprecise is also disturbing 
because, as I pointed out in my section on indefinite sentences, it is a 
well-established legal principle that the law ought to be precise. For 
example, it is against the law to intentionally b u m  down someone ©Ise's 
house. Intent may be difficult to prove, but we know what it means for 
someone to intentionally 1 m m  down a house. However, if we were to adopt 
objective liability, it would be against the law to perform any action 
which causes someone’s house to bum down if that action was such that 
a, reasonable- man would have foreseen that it might have caused the house 
to burn down. Mow, do we really know what we mean when we say a reasonable 
man would have foreseen that an action would, or mi^t, have certain con­
sequences? In some oases, of course, we do know what this statement means. 
For instance, it makes perfectly good sense to say that a reasonable man 
would have foreseen that pointing a loaded gun at another man and pulling 
the trigger would result in a serious injury to that man. .'But what about 
the case which I mentioned above of the painter who cleans his -brushes
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with petrol? Should he, as a reaoonable man, have foreseen that cleaning 
brushes with petrol in a kitchen could result in a serious fire? It is 
interesting to compare the type of arguments t.ie prosecution and defence 
could use in this case.
The prosecution would clearly stress the extreme dangerousness of 
petrol - i.e. that it is extremely volatile and flammable and that it can 
explode. He would then add that every reasonable man must be aware of this 
danger because of the elaborate care which is taken in handling petrol. He 
would probably point to the rules that petrol pump attendants must not smoke 
and that a ca,x* must not be refueled while its engine is running. He could 
also point out that the widespread use of petrol bombs clearly shows the 
danger inherent in this substance. He might wish to stress this last point 
because the use of petrol bombs has received a great deal of publicity over 
the last several years.
The defence would probably reply by stressing' that petrol is a very 
common substance which is often handled casually, and because it is such 
a common part of our everyday lives, few people give it a second thought 
or consider it to be very dangerous. He would no doubt point out that 
petrol pump attendants who smoke are not unknown and that petrol is often 
pumped in a very casual manner. For example, every driver has had a pump 
attendant slop petrol down the side of his car and onto the pavement. Also, 
we have all seen cars without filler caps. He might then argue that aJl 
substances for cleaning paintbrushes are flammable and volatile (barring, 
of course, water for water soluble paints) and that the painter had no 
reason to believe that petrol was more flammable than these other substances.
This last point might prove very important because it is quite possible 
that most people of average intelligence do not know that petrol is more
To add some factual bite to this example, I should point out that this 
cxsmple is based on au actual incident which look place in the United 
States where petrol is not highly taxed and ii*j therefore widely used as 
a cheap paintbrush cleaner. The house was completely gutted, but no one 
was hurt.
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dangerous than other flaimiible liquids such as paraffin, white spirit, or 
turpentine. Bat here the prosecution could counter with the claim that 
a reasonable man would have foreseen that using any flammable liquid near 
a gas cooker was dangerous. Finally, the defence could come back by claiming 
that paintbrushes are commonly cleaned in kitchens with no hainiful result, 
and therefore, the fire must be seen as an unforeseeable accident.
Needless to say, such an argument could go on and on, but the few 
hypothetical arguments I have presented her© show that the reasonable man 
test is far from satisfactory. For instance, what knowledge should a 
reasonable man be expected to possess? Should he be expected to know that 
petrol is more volatile than many other flammable liquids? Clearly, such 
knovdedge is freely available - anyone who has read a basic science book 
which Includes a chapter on the fraction distillation of crude petroleum 
would know this, but can we expect that a reasonable man would have read 
such a book? The difficulty of questions such as these is, no doubt, why 
come people would like to eliminate the question of what a reasonable man 
would have known and concentrate on the question of whether his actions 
were reasonable given the state of his knowledge. However, this latter 
question does not fare much better, Even if the painter knew that petrol 
was more flammable and more volatile than white spirit or turpentine, does 
it follow that he acted unreasonably by using it to clean brushes in a 
kitchen? Would a reasonable man have foreseen that fumes from the petrol 
could be ignited by the pilot light in the cooker which was several feet 
from the petrol? Would a man of reasonable prudence have foreseen such 
a mishap or would it require a higher standard of prudence? How do we 
ascertain what is a reasonable standard of prudence?
Holmes is not very helpful here because he defines a reasonable man
in teims of ordinary intelligence and reasonable prudence. Are we
justified in saying that reasonable prudence is the prudence that an
* Jacobs, op. cit., argues that it may be difficult to distinguish these two 
questions in some cases. See Chapter 5*
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ordinary person would exercise in everyday life? If so, then the test of 
the reasonable man becomes a bit more precise because it is, presumably, 
easier to toll what the ordinary prudence of everyday life is,..as opposed 
to reasonable prudence. This is especially true when there is a general 
procedure or common practice associated with the action in question. Common 
practice plays a big role in the law of torts where the reasonable man test
■X'
is used extensively. However, a law which states that you are liable to 
punishment if you cause certain types of harm by deviating from common 
practice is still much less precise than one which states that you should 
not intentionally cause these same types of harm. '.Uliis is especially true 
when we consider that for some activities there will not be a well-estab­
lished common practice. This lack of precision is very disturbing because 
if the criminal law does not clearly define a standard of behaviour, then 
people do not have a proper opportunity to obey the law. Also, as I 
argued in my section on indefinite sentences, imprecise law invites abuse.
Another point which should be briefly mentioned is that while common
practice is clearly one way of elucidating 'reasonable prudence*, it may
prove to be a very low standard. If this is the case, then the argument
that adopting objective liability will reduce crime becomes even weaker.
For example, if we adopt common practice as the standard of reasonable
prudence, it is quite possible that the painter would be acquitted, and
it is even more likely that the: yomig man with the speedboat would be
acquitted. Cleaning brushes in’:the kitchen is a common practice because
it is a convenient place to wash the last bit of solvent out of the brushes.
Also, it is convenient to pour the paint and solvent mixture down the drain
(another common but very dangerous pracitce). Thus, if the painter could
prove that he had no reason to believe that petrol was any more dangerous
than other paint solvents, he would probably be acquitted. The speedboat
owner would probably be acquitted because speedboat ovmers commonly bat
*See Harry M. Street, The Lav/ of Torts, Butterworths, London, 1972, pp. 127 
and 128.
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around all over the place at tremendous speeds, counting on their shallow 
draughts to keep them out of trouble. Of course, there are speedboat 
owners who are fine, careful seamen, but speedboat advertisements stress 
speed, not seamanship, and it is quite probable that the common practice 
is a very low grade of seamanship.
The final, and to my mind the most important, objection to objective
liability is that it blurs the distinction between intentional criminals
x
and people who commit crimes negligently. The former are morally more 
reprehensible than the latter, so if the latter deserve to be punished at 
all, they certainly do not deserve to be punished as harshly as the former. 
This point holds regardless of whether or not the thesis of determinism 
is true. If, as I argued in my second chapter, many people are in fact 
responsible for their actions, then it follows that most of those who 
intentionally commit crimes deserve to bear a greater burden than those 
who commit crimes negligently. However, even if determinism is true, I 
have argued that it is morally desirable to hold people responsible for 
their actions, both because it encourages them to develop their rational 
wills and because a society in which reactive attitudes predominate is 
far better than one in which objective attitudes predominate.
Here it might be objected that far from discouraging reactive attitudes, 
objective liability actually encourages them by expressing official condem­
nation of negligence which surely will encourage people to hold reactive 
attitudes toward everyday examples of negligence. There is a kernel of 
truth in this objection because negligence is certainly a suitable object 
of reactive attitudes. However, this objection takes no notice of the 
fact that reactive attitudes can and ought to be extremely diverse, 
ranging from very strong condemnation through mild rebuke all the way to 
extreme praise. Objective liability would encourage people to have reactive
*From this point on, it will be convenient to have a word for the failure 
to live up to the standard set by the reasonable man. The standard for 
this is 'negligence* and that is the one I will use.
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attitudes toward negligence, but the wrong sort of reactive attitudes.
If the law deals with our unfortunate painter in the same manner that it 
deals with someone who burns down a house intentionally, then it is 
ignoring a vitally important moral distinction between the two peoplei 
the former intended no harm; he was not wicked, while the latter was wicked 
because he intended to cause harm. This is not to say that the former is 
not morally blameworthy. It is proper to blame negligent people, but they 
are not as blameworthy as wicked people, and the reactive attitudes which 
are appropriate for negligent people are not the same as those which are 
appropriate for wicked people.
Again, the standard argument that if the thesis of determinism is ■: • 
true then there is no moral distinction between the wicked and the negligent 
does not show that we ought to display the same type of reactive attitudes 
toward both of thein. Once we have accepted that a society in which reactive 
attitudes predominate is morally more desirable than one in which objective 
attitudes predominate, it makes no sense to adopt objective liability and 
thus express the same reactive attitudes to radically different types of 
people. It is vitally important that reactive attitudes be appropriate 
to the conduct at which they are expressed. This is so because to react 
too harshly to other people's behaviour is to encourage resentment or 
even hatred, while to react too kindly is to subject oneself to ridicule 
as a fool or'a "patsy". Examples of the dangers of adopting the wrong 
reactive attitudes are easy to find practically everywhere. Almost every­
one can recall from his school days an example of a teacher who was hated 
because he was unfairly harsh v/hen he disciplined his students, one who was 
looked down to as being a "soft touch" and, hopefully, at-3:east one teacher 
who had earned a reputation of being firm but fair. Also, in America, many 
young people hate the law because they or their friends have boon given 
very harsh prison sentences for the possession of marijuana in“quantities 
which were too small to be a dealer's supply. Also in America, the law
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has been subject to ridicule when slum landlords are subject to tiny fines
for quite disgusting practices such as providing no heat in the winter
and renting dangerous premises,
A good example of how objective liability expresses inappropriate
reactive attitudes is the case of Regina v. Ward, which li.mentioned earlier,
in which a man of subnormal intelligence and suffering chronic pain from
gastric ulcers, lost his temper when the eighteen month old child would not
stop crying and shook her with "full force", but with only the intention
of making her quiet, Pilcher J. directed the jury as follows:
If, when he did the act which he did do, he must as a reasonable mojn 
have contemplated that death or grievous bodily harm was likely to 
result to the child as a result of what he did, then...he is guilty 
of murder. If, on the other hand, he could not, as a, reasonable man, 
have contemplated that death would result in consequence of what he 
did, then he is guilty of manslaughter.
Here is a perfect example of how objective liability ignores the distinction 
between a wicked person and a negligent or unthinking person. Ward was not 
wicked; he bore the child no malice; he simply intended to quiet her. Yet, 
because of the reasonable man test, he was ranlced with wicked criminals who 
actually intended to kill or seriously injure their victims. The inap­
propriateness of this decision is clear - the law certainly cannot gain 
respect by ignoring such an obvious distinction and convicting a most 
unfortunate man of murder rather than manslaughter.**
Here I am open to the following objection: You admit that it is
appropriate to hold reactive attitudes toward negligent people, yet you 
advocate the doctrine of mens rea which traditionally requires actual intent 
except in cases of recklessness,*** Surely this leaves a large nunber of 
*Regina v. Ward, o^, cit., p. 551.
**It should be noted that the Criminal Justice Act of 1967 has explicitly
ruled out the reasonable man teat. See Cross & Jones, cit., p. I56,
***Professor H.L.A, Hart defines 'recklessness' as "wittingly flying in the 
face of a substantial, unjustified risk, or the conscious creation of such a 
risk." Thus, for a person to have been reckless, ho must have foreseen that 
harm would follow from his action. It is, therefore, very similar to intent,
except that harmful.consequence is not desired. See Hart, op, cit., chapter
6, Cross & Jones, op. ci^., p. 44»
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crimes which were committed due to negligence, hut not recklessness, which 
the law is powerless to deal with unless objective liability is adopted.
This objection points to a very real problem of how to deal with crimes 
committed negligently, but it fails to recognize (l) that there may be 
other solutions to this problem than the adoption of objective liability 
and (2) that there may be reasons why some types of negligence should not 
be dealt with by the criminal law.
At present, only a few crimes are punishable if performed negligently. 
The most important is manslaughter, but even here the negligence must be 
gross; that is, the accused behaviour must have deviated very far from what 
a reasonable man would have done. Thus, the criminal law clearly does pass 
over 9, large number of acts which would become punishable if we were to 
adopt objective liability. For example, our unfortunate painter certainly 
could not be described as reckless since he did not foresee the possibility 
of the petrol exploding. Also, it is doubtful whether he could be described 
as grossly negligent because, as I argued earlier, it is very much up in 
the air as to whether he was negligent at all. Thus, if he were to be 
ruled negligent, the negligence almost certainly could not be described as 
gross.
Therefore, we must now investigate whether it would be possible to 
extend the reach of the criminal law beyond recklessness and gross negligence 
to ordinary negligence, but at the same time avoid the objections to 
objective liability that I Imve mentioned in thé last several sections.
Professor Hart suggests that some of the above difficulties could be 
overcome if, before negligence could be punished, the following two questions 
had to be answered affirmatively:
(1) Did the accused fail to take those precautions which any reasonable man 
with normal capacities would in the circumstances have taken?
(2) Could the accused, given his mental and physical capacities, have taken
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those precautions?''
This suggestion is interesting because it would meet the very first 
objection I made to objective liability - that it set a standard that v/as 
too high for some members of the commmiity to attain. Professor Hart also 
argues that if this suggestion were adopted, it would ensure that no one 
would be punished who had not had a fair opportunity to obey the law. Thus, 
for example, Vfard of Regina v. Ward would have been excused from punishment 
because he had subnormal intelligence and a short temper duo to the pain 
from his gastric ulcers and, therefore, did not have a fair opportunity to 
live up to the standard set by a reasonable man.
However, this suggestion would still punish negligent people with the 
same severity as wicked people. But this could easily be overcome by 
passing a law which stated that all crimes which were committed due to 
negligence are punishable by some fraction (say, one third) of the usual 
sentence for that crime. Thus, if the statute covering a particular crime 
stated that it was punishable by three to nine years if committed inten­
tionally or reckelessiy, it would now also be punishable by one to three 
years if committed negligently.
Professor Hart's suggestion, coupled with).my suggestion about reduced 
sentences for crimes committed negligently, would certainly be an improve­
ment over objective liability, but I am still sceptical of the advisability 
of punishing,negligence for three reasons: (l) While it is, no doubt, true
that crimes committed negligently merit reactive attitudes, I am not at all 
convinced that many of them merit the very strong reabtive attitudes we 
express (and encourage others ;to express) when we punish someone. (2) I 
am still concerned that the reasonable man test is very vague. (5) There 
is reason to believe that some of the work of the reasonable man test could 
b® done much better by precisely worded .statutes such as the Road Traffic 
Act of i960.
*Hart, o£, cit., chapter 6, p. 154*
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To discuss ray first point, we vdll need a few clear-cut cases of 
crimes committed due to negligence. Tlie first case is that of a university 
student who collects knives and who lives in a hall of residence. One day 
he buys a machete with a blade two feet long and, upon taking it back to 
his residence, he proceeds to polish and hone its blade as he is very par­
ticular that all his knives should be in perfect condition. Yrtien he has 
honed the blade to a very fine edge, h© steps from his room into the narrow 
hall with the intention of going to the comraonroom, but he sees a friend 
about thirty feet away along the hall and calls to him and says, "Stay 
right there, I want to show you something," He darts back into his room 
and re-emerges waving the machete over his head, screaming "AAAAAAAAGGGGGGG", 
and running full tilt, like an ancient warrior, toward his friend. The hall 
is lined with several doorways, each opening into other students’ rooms.
At the moment he starts running, another student steps into the hall from
one of these rooms. The two collide and the machete strikes the other
*
student, and he is seriously injured.
The second oxample takes place at the main door to the residence 
mentioned in the previous example. The door is situated on the top of 
four stone steps, and the steps have cast iron picket fences where most 
steps would have railings. The door opens out. One student had just 
climbed the steps and is about to open the door when another student on 
his way outside and in a very boisterous mood kicks the door open with 
great force. 'Hie flying door knocks the student on the steps into the cast 
iron pickets and he is seriously injured.
Now, unlike the cases of the painter and speedboat operator, these
are, hopefully, clear-cut examples of the type of behaviour a reasonable
man would avoid. No defence attorney could ever argue that a reasonable
*As fantastic as this may sound, it is based on an actual incident. I was 
the friend thirty feet along the hall, and, fortunately, no one stepped 
from the: six doors between me and my knife-wielding friend. —
"’''Again, this is baaed on an actual incident, although the outside student 
was able to prevent himself from falling on the pickets by pushing away with 
his hand.
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man would have no reason to believe that such behaviour was dangeroua. Also, 
since it certainly is not common practice to go about waving machetes or 
kicking doors open, no one could plead common practice in defence.
Also,.hopefully, almost everyone will agree that the incident with 
the machete is an example of gross negligence, while the incident with the 
door is an example of negligence, but not gross negligence. The reason 
for this is that even a fairly thick-headed person who would not qualify 
as a reasonable man would realize that knives, and especially large knives, 
are very dangerous, On the other hand, a fairly thick person probably would 
not realize that kicking doors open was dangerous,, as opposed to just 
naughty. Thus, the knife-wielding student deviated farther from the standard 
of a reasonable man than did the door-kicking student.
Both students are bright and perfectly normal, so if we were to adopt 
Hart’s suggestion, we would clearly have to punish both students because 
not only is their behaviour negligent, but they both are capable of living 
up to the standards of a reasonable man as well.
I find this quite unacceptable because even if we were to adopt my sug­
gestion that crimes committed negligently ought to carry reduced sentences,
I do not believe that punishment is appropriate in the case of the door-
kicking student. Also, while punishment may be appropriate in the case of
the knife-wielding student, I will argue that Hart’s suggestion is not the 
proper way to administer such punisliment.
The student who kicked the door open was engaged in boisterous horse- 
play and that was clearly foolish under the cii'curastances, but horseplay 
is not a crime and, had the other student not been about to open the door, 
no harm would have resulted from the horseplay. Thus, we have the anomalous 
situation in which horseplay, which under normal circumstances would merit 
the mild reproach we give foolish people, all of a sudden becomes the object 
of the very stern reproach we express by putting someone in prison. This 
is clearly unjust because the student who kicked the door and caused the
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injury ia morally the same as all other people who kicked the door open 
(and others did), yet he would be sent to prison while the others would 
simply get a stern lecture from the Dean of Men (providing, of course, 
they were caught).
But, not only would punishing such people be unjust, it would also 
quite possibly cause people to lose respect for the law because putting 
someone in prison who is only guilty of horseplay is clearly an inappropriate 
way to react to his actions.
The case of the student waving the machete is quite a bit different.
Here we have someone engaging in an activity which is extremely dangerous. ' 
In fact, the activity la so dangerous that a government might wish to make 
it punishable regardless of whether any harm ensued. For this reason, I 
would agree that there is a stronger case for punishing gross negligence 
than there is for punishing negligence in general. This student's 
activities clearly deserve a much stronger reproach than do the activities 
of the student who kicked the door. Such behaviour cum hardly be described 
as mere horseplay.
However, even if punishment were restricted to cases of gross negligence, 
such pimishraent would be objectionable for two reasons. First, good law 
ought to be precise, and a, law which states that crimes committed di^ e to 
gross negligence are punishable is anything but precise. Of course, my 
example with the machete is clear-cut because it involves a, dangerous 
weapon, but beyond such oases there is no reason to believe that the line 
between negligence and gross negligence is any clearer than the line 
between negligence and non-negligence which I discussed earlier.
My second objection to punishing crimes committed due to gross 
negligence is that it would involve an injustice in that, of all the grossly 
negligent people, only those whose negligence resulted in a crime would be 
punished. This is, in effect, the reverse of the situation of-the student 
who kicked open the door. In that case, a person who was only guilty of
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negligent horseplay would receive a prison sentence, which la a reproach 
far in excess of what he deserves and far in excess of what most people 
guilty of horseplay would receive. However, in the case of the knife- 
wielding student, he would get a prison tera which he deserves because he 
was grossly negligent, but many other grossly negligent people would not 
get what they deserve simply because they were lucky in that their gross 
negligence did not lead to a crime. Now, it is true that no system of law 
can be perfectly just if for no other reason than that oorae criminals get 
caught while others do not. However, to pass a law which provided that 
all crimes committed due to gross negligence will carry one third of the 
normal prison sentence would be writing injustice into the law because the 
reason grossly negligent people deserve punisliment is because they are 
grossly negligent, not because their negligence caused a particular crime.
Thus, I must conclude that even if punistiment for negligence is 
restricted to cases of gross negligence, it would be a very bad policy to 
adopt. This is especially true when we consider that relatively clear-cut 
cases of gross negligence can be covered by statutes. This makes all cases 
of a particular type of gross negligence punishable, rather than only those 
cases which result in harm. The Road Traffic Act of I96O is a good example. 
This act makes it an offence to drive dangerously regardless of whether you 
do it intentionally or inadvertently, and such an act is justified because 
Inadvertent dangerous driving has the potential to cause enormous harm and 
therefore qualifies as gross negligence. In other words, the danger of 
poor driving is so great that even avery thick-headed person would see its 
potential harm. Another advantage of such laws is that they are precise; 
there is no arguing about whether or not an action was grossly negligent.
Thus, those people who would like to punish negligence might seriously 
consider passing some new laws instead. For example, it might be made law 
that it is a criminal offence to point a flreaiTa of any type at_another 
person. This law, if carefully worded, would exclude genuine accidents,
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while covering those horrible cases where a foolish person thinks a, gun 
is unloaded, points it at someone else and pulls the trigger "just for fun"«
4« Mens Rea And The Principle Of Responsibility
In the last two sections I have defended the doctrine of mens rea by
arguing that the two main alternatives to it are very undesirable. In
those sections, I referred several times to my arguments for the principle 
of responsibility and I will now briefly male© the connection between the 
justification of the doctrine of mens rea and the justification of the 
principle of responsibility more explicit.
The connection between the principle of responsibility and the doctrine 
of mens rea is most clear-cut if my arguments for libertarianism are correct. 
If they are, then our justification for holding people responsible is that 
they are actually morally responsible for their actions or are capable of 
becoming morally responsible for their actions. In order to be morally 
responsible for an action, someone must meet the three conditions I laid
down in the second chapter; that is, he must have performed the act in
question; he must have not have had an excuse fox* performing it; and he must 
have been able to have acted otherwise than he did. This being the case, 
if we are to base the principle of responsibility on moral responsibility, 
then it clearly makes no sense to adopt anything but the doctrine of mens
rea. This is because someone who lacks mens rea for a particular crime
does not meet the second condition of moral responsibility because, as I 
have shown in this chapter, if you lack mens rea for a particular crime, 
then you have an excuse for performing it.
If the thesis of determinism is true, then our reason for retaining 
the principle of responsibility is, among other things, that it will en­
courage people to develop their rational wills and that it will encourage 
people to adopt reactive attitudes. Neither end will be served if we 
deviate from the doctrine of mens rea. As I pointed out in the-section on 
strict liability, to hold someone strictly liable for his actions could
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quite posf3ibIy cause him to feel helpless or resentful® It is of course 
time that strict liability and objective liability are not incompatible 
with reactive attitudes, but they both would encourage totally inappropriate 
reactive attitudes, I pointed this out with regard to objective liability 
in the last section, but the point also holds for strict liability. If 
were to adopt strict liability, we would have occasion to hold people 
liable for accidents and mistakes which were not in any way due to negligence, 
and to hold someone responsible for an action which he simply could not help 
is clearly to adopt an inappropriate reactive attitude toward him, and this 
would surely encourage other people to hold similar inappropriate reactive 
attitudes.
In short, to retain the principle of responsibility and, at the same 
time, to adopt objective or strict liability is to act at cross-purposes.
All the benefits to be gained by retaining the principle of responsibility 




In this thesis, I have tried to show three thingss (X) that Aristotle 
was essentially correct when he argued that acts which follow from 
deliberation are free, and therefore, the principle of responsibility is 
firmly based on actual moral responsibility? (2) that even if the thesis 
of determinism is true, and therefore no one is ever morally responsible 
for their actions, we are still justified in retaining the principle of 
responsibility because, for a large number of reasons, a society which 
retains the principle of responsibility is far better than one which 
has rejected it in favour of practical treatment; (5) that it is far 
better to retain the doctrine of mens rea, which is similar to Aristotle's 
doctrine of excuses,, than to adopt either strict liability or objective 
liability.
I have argued for all of these points in some detail in the body of 
this thesis and it would be fairly tedious to summarize those arguments 
here. However, there are some very general criticisms which might be 
urged against my arguments and which I have not mentioned so far. In 
conclusion, I would like to discuss foin? of these general points.
The first general criticism of my arguments is that they are
irrationally opposed to science. That is, I am afraid of changes that
scientific discoveries could cause in society and, therefore, I have
opposed them right down the line.
*
Such a criticism must be taken seriously because there is a very 
real split in the academic community between what might be called 
scientific and humanistic camps. In the scientific camp are many natural 
scientists, as well as those social scientists who adhere to the discipline 
of the scientific method. Also in this camp are those historians, r 
philosophers, and students of politics who share the scientific outlook.
In the humanistic camp are those academics who study arts, humanities, 
classics, and those historians, philosophers, and students of politics
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who share their outlook. There is a tendency for members of opposing 
camps to dismiss each other's views simply because they emanate fi:om the 
opposite camp, Tims, a scientifically minded philosopher ini^ it object 
to my arguments by claiming that I am only a humanistic thinl^er who does 
not have the intellectual toughness to accept the fact that the thesis 
of determinism is true and that this entails substantial changes in how 
societies must be organized
There are several things which must be said here, First, it should 
be clear that branding someone a Inainanistic philosopher does not mean that 
his vicTfs are wrong or misconceived, any more than branding someone as a 
"heartless scientist" shows that his arguments are misconceived. Second,
I believe that this kind of type-casting is very unfortunate because it 
tends to make people feel that they have grounds for dismissing a group 
of arguments en bloc when, if they were examined separately, one might 
find that he agrees with some of them.
It is true that every now and then this type of criticism has some 
basis because sometimes people harden into dogmatic apologists for one 
position or another. For example, if someone categorically refused to 
accept any of the findings of science, we would be justified in saying 
that he is irrationally opposed to science. However, I plead not guilty 
to the charge of dogmatically refusing to accept the findings of science. 
It is not the cas© that I steadfastly refuse to believe that the thesis 
of determinism is true in the face of overwhelming evidence that it is 
true, I offered arguments in which I tried to show that it was most 
reasonable to believe that, with regard to some actions, that actor could 
actually have acted otherwise than he did, I also admitted that this 
point vfas controversial and, therefore, X also argued my case assuming 
that the thesis of determinism was true. Finally, I freely admitted that 
science could come up with some extremely effective methods of behaviour 
control such as my hypothetical drug, mentezin.
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It is txmia that I argued that such a dru,g could he extremely 
dangerous and that it ought not to be used to treat criminals, but these 
arguments are not anti-scientific in the sense that I am refusing to 
acknowledge scientific findings, 'These arguments express concern over 
what ought to be done with such scientific knowledge, and surely such 
arguments are legitimate, if not absolutely essential to a free society. 
Thus, while my arguments may be wrong, they must be shown to be wrong 
individually? they cannot be dismissed all at once by branding them as 
anti-scientific ®
The second general criticism is that my views are reactionary. That 
is, by opposing the change to practical treatment, I am standing in the 
way of progress. This criticism can take two forms. In its first form, 
it is a moral criticism which claims that it is wrong to stand in the way
of progress. In its second form, it is a practical criticism. Here my
arguments against practical treatment are viewed as necessarily futile 
because practical treatment is an idea for which the time is right and all 
ray arguments can do is stave off its ultimate arrival. I will discuss
these two points in turn.
For the moral claim to have any force, we must be careful to use the 
word 'progress' in a strong moral sense. There are at least two possible 
moral senses of 'progress'. It could mean any 'change for the better* or 
any 'change toward some good or morally desirable goal'. The two are 
obviously very similar, but the second is a bit wider because it covers 
changes which are not themselves good, but which move us closer to some
good goal. The reason 'progress' must be used in a moral sense is that
if it were used in the sense of "progressing toward a goal" where the 
goal need not be a good one, then there would clearly be cases in which 
to be a reactionary would not be wrong at all. For example, if 'progress'
is used in a non-moral sense, it makes perfectly good sense to say that
Hitler spent several years making progress toward his goal of becoming
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ruler of Germany, In that case, it clearly would not have been wrong to 
oppose Hitler's progress, yet Hitler's supporters would clearly have 
thought such people to be reactionaries. In short, we either have to 
admit that reaction is not always bad or we have to be very careful about 
how we use the terra. We must be sure that those we accuse of being 
reactionary are reacting against progress in the true moral sense of the 
word. Thus, in order to show that I am a reactionary, someone would have 
to show that th© goal of establishing a practical treatment system of 
criminal law is a morally desirable goal. Tiiis would require an 
examination of ray arguments, not just a statement that I am a reactionary.
One could modify the moral claim to say that to be a reactionary one 
need not impede progress in the strong moral sense. Instead, it could be 
argued that it is reactionary to stand in the way of sincere efforts to 
make progress. According to this view of reaction, my arguments are 
reactionary because they support the status quo against those who are 
sincerely trying to improve the way we deal with crime by changing to a 
practical treatment legal system. This new version of the moral claim may 
appear to be more damaging to me because there are people who are 
reactionary in this sense and it is clearly wrong for them to be so.
There are people who oppose any change in the status quo, no matter how 
pressing the need for change.
H o w e v e r ,  X  c e r t a i n l y  c a n n o t  b e  g r o u p e d  w i t h  s u c h  p e o p l e  b e c a u s e  i  
h a v e  a d v o c a t e d  s w e e p i n g  c h a n g e s  i n  o u r  p r i s o n  s y s t e m s ,  x am  n o t  i n  f a v o u r  
o f  t h e  s t a t u s  q u o .  1  am  i n  f a v o u r  o f  d i f f e r e n t  c h a n g e s  t h a n  t h o s e  w h o  
a d v o c a t e  p r a c t i c a l  t r e a t m e n t .  T h u s ,  t o  c h a r g e  m e w i t h  b e i n g  r e a c t i o n a r y  
i n  n o  w a y  d i s p r o v e s  ray a r g u m e n t s  o r  s h o w s  t h a t  1  am  e v i l  b e c a u s e ,  i n  o r d e r  
t o  s h o w  t h a t  i  am  r e a c t i o n a r y  i n  a  m o r a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  s e n s e ,  o n e  m u s t  
d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  ray  a r g u m e n t s  a r e  o p p o s e d  t o  p r o g r e s s  i n  a  g e n u i n e  m o r a l  
s e n s e .
X will now turn to the second part of this criticism, which is that
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niy arguments are just a futile reaction to an idea for which the time 
ie rigfitc. rhe point here is that the principle of responsibility is a 
relic of tne past and must eventually be replaced by practical treatment, 
X:simply see no reason to accept this, but I carmot go too deeply into it 
because that would involve going into the Philosophy of History, However, 
I would like to point out that whether or not an idea's "time has come"' 
very much depends upon how people thinlc and feel about it, and to present 
reasoned arguments against such an idea might very well Influence how 
people think and feel about such an idea and, therefore, might not be 
futile*
The third criticism is that I have shown myself to be insensitive to 
the very,real problems of the mentally ill criminal by advocating very 
restrictive rules (i.e. the M'Haughten rules) for distinguishing between 
mentally normal and mentally abnormal offenders and by insisting that we 
retain the principle of responsibility rather than adopt practical treat­
ment. . This point is, I thinlc, simply due to the misconception that the 
only way to deal with the mentally ill is with compulsory treatment* This 
simply is not true. As long as psychiatric or psychological help is made 
available to criminals on a voluntary basis, one can hardly be accused 
of being insensitive to the problems of mentally ill criminals* It may 
be the case that by subjecting all criminals to compulsory treatment we 
would ensure’that some mentally ill criminals would get treatment who 
would otherwise be loath to accept it. However, this small gain would 
be bought at a hi^ 4^  price because, as I argued in the main part of this 
thesis, practical treatment is very undesirable.
The fourth criticism is that I have consistently placed criminals' 
rights over the rights of society in general* In particular, it could 
be said that I have argued that we should not adopt practical treatment 
because it would violate the rights of criminals, and this clearly runs 
counter to the public interest because I am saying that we ought not
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adopt an Important weapon in the control of crime.
There are two things I nmst say about this. First, I did consider 
the contribution practical treatment might malce toward the control of 
crime and I argued that, at present, it did not seem that there was much 
probability of a significant increase in crime control if we were to adopt 
practical treatment, However, I did argue that even if there were very 
effective treatment methods available (such as my hypothetical drug, 
mentezin), we still ought not adopt practical treatment. This, on the 
face of it, clearly appears to be putting the rights of criminals over 
the public interest, so I must say some more about this.
It is important not to see this problem only in terms of criminals' 
interests versus the public's interest in being protected from crime, 
because the issue is much more complicated than that. To be sure, it is 
in the public's interest to be protected from crime, and if practical 
treatment can provide such protection, then that is a clear mark in favour 
of practical treatment, unfortunately, practical treatment violates 
several rights which criminals presently enjoy, but if this were all there 
was to the issue, many people would argue that society's interests must 
take precedence. They would have a very strong case because, within 
certain humanitarian limits, the rights of criminals must take second 
place to the interests of society as a whole* However, there is a great 
deal more to it than this because the changes in the rights of criminals 
which practical treatment would bring directly affect the interests of 
society as a whole in at least three ways* First, practical treatment 
would most probably involve detention for dangerousnoss. That is, before 
a criminal could be released, it would have to be demonstrated that he is 
no longer dangerous. 1 argued that 'dangerousness' was very difficult 
to define and, therefore, that criminals would be held on a very vague 
charge. I argued that this could lead to widespread abuses of the law, 
and this clearly is not in the public interest. Second, to adopt
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practical treatment in the criminal law would open a large gap between 
the criminaJ law on the one hand and the law of torts and the law of con­
tract on the other* I argued that this gap could lead to significant 
changes in the latter two branches of the law which could lead to greatly 
increased goveiiiment influence over our everyday lives and I do not believe 
that this would be in the public interest® Third, adopting practical 
treatment would discourage people from developing their rational wills 
and would also encourage people to hold objective rather than reactive 
attitudes, and I argued that these two changes could have a very marked 
effect on society and I certainly do not believe that this would be in 
the public interest®
Thus, while many people would no doubt disagree with the way I have 
weighed the public's interest in being protected from criminals against 
the other aspects of the public interest, I do not think they are 
justified in claiming that I have placed the interests of criminals above 
those of the public.
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